Is it true that the Soviet Union actually won the war for the allies?

There is no doubt that it is was the Red Army that tore the heart out of the German Army. Vladimir accurately quotes PM Churchill on this. President Roosevelt said basically the same thing. And there is no Western historian of any importance who disagrees. Only people who get their history from Hollywood disagree. Unfortunately this seems to be the case of many Russians who have in their head that Americans question the importance of the Red Army. It simply is not true.

First the Soviet Union was not an Allied power. It was a co-belligerent. In fact for nearly the first two years of the War, the Soviets were allied with the NAZIS, both launching the War by invading Poland.. The Soviets conducted terrible atrocities in Poland and the other countries they invaded (1939–41). The Soviet NKVD behaved much like the NAZI SS. And the Soviets supported the NAZI war machine by shipping vast quantities of oil, strategic metals, and grain to NAZI Germany.

The Soviets were not only a NAZI ally, the two totalitarian giants JOINTLY invaded and partitioned Europe between themselves. They then BOTH committed terrible atrocities and bickered over the boundaries (1939–41). In addition, Stalin actually wanted to join the Axis. Only Hitler’s objections prevented this.

It is true that the Red Army had to fight the Germans virtually alone for nearly 2 years on the Eastern Front. But part of the reason for this was that the Soviets aid the Germans by the huge deliveries of material to defeat the French and drive Britain from the Continent. Having to fight alone was the Soviets own doing.

Now while it is certainly true that it was the Red Army that tore the heart out of the German Army, it is also true that the Western Allies played an important role in the defeat of NAZI Germany. Here it is important to note that it is not Americans denying the importance of the Red Army, it is Russians who deny the importance of the Western Allies.

1. American diplomacy so infuriated the Japanese and threatened their main interest (China) that they shifted their military plans from a Strike North to a Strike South strategy. Of course the battles with the Red Army (July 1939) were also a factor.) World War II Japan road to World War II

2. The RAF severely damaged the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain. The Luftwaffe was weaker in 1941 than when it played a key role in the German Western Offensive (1940). As a result the Wehrmacht had less air support than it had in the West. This is often ignored in Barbarossa assessments. Without the Battle of Britain, Hitler would have had an air force twice as large as he had in 1940. World War II air campaign -- Battle of Britain

3. British activity in the Mediterranean resulted in Hitler's Balkan adventure, delaying Barbarossa. The delay made a huge difference. If the Wehrmacht had had only a few more weeks of good weather, they may well have succeeded in destroying the Red Army. World War II Axis invasion of the Balkans

4. Another reason that Barbarossa failed is that Stalin was able to move sizable Siberian forces west and mount an offensive before Moscow (December 1941). The reason he was able to do this is American pressure on Japan forced them together end their war in China or attack the United states. They chose war with America. World War II Pacific naval campaigns -- Pearl Harbor

5. Although the Western Allies were not on the Continent in 1941, Britain being in the war, forced the Germans to maintain a substantial force in France. The Germany could not throw their full weight against the Soviets. World War II German occupation of France

6. American Lend Lease had an enormous impact on the Soviet war effort. Perhaps the most important was American trucks. Without the mobility provided by the trucks, the great Soviet victories of 1943-44 would not have been possible. And the without Lend Lease food, many Soviets would have starved. The Soviets may have prevailed without American help, but it would have taken them longer and it would have been at far greater cost. World War II campaigns -- Arsenal of Democracy Lend Lease countries Soviet Union

7. The Allied strategic bombing campaign had a massive impact on the German war economy. Without the air campaign, the Red Army would have faced better equipped German and other Axis troops. In addition, the Luftwaffe had to be pulled back to protect German cities. and huge numbers of artillery pieces had to be pointed up around German cities rather than deployed in the East. The quantity of ammunition not available in the East was massive. Second World War II Allied strategic bombing campaign

8. While the Heer was broken in the East. The Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine were both broken in the West. In terms of manpower, the German losses were highest in the East. But i terms of industrial production, a very substantial part of the NAZI war economy was devoted to the Luftwaffe and Keiegsmarine (especially efforts to build improved U-boats in 1944 1nd 45). And the effort to build secret weapons like the V-weapons was primarily aimed at the West. While German manpower was primarily committed to the East, the German war economy was not committed to the East to the same degree. World War II naval campaigns -- the Atlantic phase 2

9. German soldiers were primarily deployed in the East, but it is important to note that German industry, science, and technology was not comparably oriented. The fact that Britain remained in the War caused the Germans to significantly increase priorities to the Navy, especially U-boats. This diverted huge quantities of steel from tank and artillery production. The air war was even more important. Not only did the Strategic Bombing Campaign force the Germans to deploy much of their artillery and ammunition around German cities, but aircraft production was a sizeable component of German industry. Running the numerous, about half if German industry, perhaps more than, half was supporting the war in the West, not the War in the East. Germany World War II -- German industry

10. The British at first and then aided by America blockaded German/Axis ports. This meant the Germans were unable to import needed raw materials except from Sweden and a few other neutrals bordering on NAZI controlled territory. World War II -- economics raw materials food metals

11. While Hitler was able to deploy most of his land forces in the East. This changed after Alamein and Torch. Thus in 1943-45, he was forced to deploy substantial forces in the West, relieving pressure in the Red Army. World War II Western Desert : Afrika Koprs

13. Japan was unable to threaten the Soviets from the east even after failing to aid Barbarossa. After Midway, the Japanese were so heavily engaged by America that they no longer had the strength to attack the Soviet Union. https://www.histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/sea/pac/ncp-mid.html

14. The American Arsenal of Democracy overpowered the Axis. America had the largest economy in the world and after Pearl Harbor it was mobilized for war. And the Axis economies could simply not keep match it. World War II campaigns -- arsenal of democracy

15. Financing war is an often overlooked topic, in part because it does not interest military historians. An here again America led the way. No country in history had ever spent so much money on a war. And no country had ever ended a war with such a massive debt. World War II -- United States financing the war borrowing

Consider though, doing that, may have avoided Stalin being eventually overthrown in a military coup,

He should have been overthrown, but besides the poor quality of his army under Stalin, his purges were almost suicidal:

Beginning in 1936, Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin set about deliberately murdering 700,000 people in the Great Purge, an act of mass killing that “constituted a form of rule” unto itself, as Stalin biographer Stephen Kotkin explained.

The armed forces were not spared. The purges swept through the officer corps, including 154 division commanders — of 186 in total — and resulted in the NKVD executions of several of the country’s most innovative and senior military thinkers, including Mikhail Tukhachevsky who was forced into signing a confession under torture before his murder. Thousands of officers were executed.

Georgy Zhukov, then a cavalry commander, escaped the purges and went on to become one of the most senior Soviet military leaders, a war hero and one of the most well-known and respected generals in modern history — implementing the theory of “deep operations” on the Eastern Front which Tukhachevsky had pioneered on the drawing board.

Zhukov was also once marked for death. (Russia Might Have Lost World War II If Stalin Killed His Best General)

During the first months of the war, scores of commanders, most notably General Dmitry Pavlov, were made scapegoats for failures. Pavlov was arrested and executed after his forces were heavily defeated in the early days of the campaign. Only two of the accused were spared: People's Commissar of Armaments Boris Vannikov (released in July) and Deputy People's Commissar of Defense General Kirill Meretskov (released in September). The latter had admitted guilt, under torture.[2]

About 300 commanders, including Lieutenant General Nikolay Klich, Lieutenant General Robert Klyavinsh, and Major General Sergey Chernykh, were executed on October 16, 1941, during the Battle of Moscow. Others were sent to Kuybyshev, provisional capital of the Soviet Union, on October 17. On October 28 twenty individuals were summarily shot near Kuybyshev on Lavrentiy Beria's personal order, including Colonel Generals Alexander Loktionov and Grigory Shtern, Lieutenant Generals Fyodor Arzhenukhin, Ivan Proskurov, Yakov Smushkevich, and Pavel Rychagov with his wife, as well as several individuals who had been previously arrested during the immediate aftermath of the Great Purge in 1939, prior to the Red Army Purge of 1941, including politicians Filipp Goloshchyokin and Mikhail Kedrov.[2] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1941_Red_Army_Purge)

Stalin initiated the purge by ordering some of the truly professional officers of the Tukhachevskii group to be arrested on false charges, emanating from the security services, that they were traitors in the pay of Nazi Germany. Voroshilov subsequently called on all servicemen to vigilantly report suspicious activity and denounce enemies of the people hidden in their ranks. Officers and men enthusiastically heeded these instructions, especially those in Communist Party organizations. As a result, a wave of denunciations spread throughout the armed forces. From June through December 1937, 2,238 officers were arrested and 15,426 discharged. By the time the Ezhovshchina was over, twothirds of the more than 9,500 arrests had been orchestrated by special sections of Ezhov’s NKVD assigned to the army; the People’s Commissariat of Defense (NKO), playing Stalin’s game, had ordered the arrest of the remaining third.

Military district staffs in particular played an important role in the scale of the Ezhovshchina, because the NKO gave them wide latitude. In October 1937 the NKO authorized military districts to expel Communists under suspicion from the party without consulting the central authorities in Moscow and to relieve expelled officers of their military duties on the spot. What constituted grounds for discharge or arrest was not always clear. A man could be denounced for any type of military inefficiency or political unreliability, from criticizing some aspect of party policy to holding favorable views of the policies of Stalin’s former rivals to having even the slightest connection with a foreign country. Six months earlier, in March 1937, the Politburo had ordered that all senior officers expelled from the party were to be discharged from active duty. Many men found themselves in trouble simply for not being Russian: In 1938 orders went out to the military districts to discharge all officers with German, Polish, Latvian, Estonian, Korean, Finnish, Lithuanian, Romanian, Turkish, Hungarian, or Bulgarian backgrounds. Accordingly, NKO leadership initiated the discharge of 4,030 army and political officers and the military districts discharged another 7,148 men.

In November, Beria successfully lobbied Stalin to simplify the procedure for carrying out death sentences issued by local military courts so that they would no longer require approval of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court and Politburo for the first time since the end of the Great Purge. The right to issue extrajudicial death sentences was granted to the Special Council of the NKVD. With the approval of Stalin, 46 persons, including 17 generals, among them Lieutenant Generals Pyotr Pumpur, Pavel Alekseyev, Konstantin Gusev, Yevgeny Ptukhin, Nikolai Trubetskoy, Pyotr Klyonov, Ivan Selivanov, Major General Ernst Schacht, and People's Commissar of Ammunition Ivan Sergeyev, were sentenced to death by the Special Council. They were executed on the Day of the Red Army, February 23, 1942.

The Red Army had never been in good shape; it continuously struggled with indiscipline, rampant alcoholism, equipment and weapon shortages, and inattentiveness to training. Social strife between workers and peasants in the ranks was also a problem: The peasantry had suffered when agriculture had been collectivized in the 1930s and a famine early in that decade only worsened matters, as did the party’s idealization of workers (https://www.historynet.com/stalin-attacks-red-army.htm)

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.