So bio warfare and the overthrow of the Government with the 2018 eo could have triggered the war part of the clause, and Bank statements of receiving funds from the CCP tied to an overt act to aid and abet the overthrow plus 150,000,000 witnesses might enable treason charges in a military tribunal.
Your creative writing skills are impressive.
Just tossing the Constitution and the other laws in the basement until you have completed your unlawful mission will work also. It worked for Lincoln who financed a war with an unconstitutional unapportioned income tax, and stuffed the Supreme Court with a tenth justice, and so on and so forth. Just make believe.
You appear to be missing proof of biological warfare, the overthrow of the Government, verifiable statements from a bank, and about 150,000,000 witnesses, plus a properly authorized military tribunal with jurisdiction to try the unnamed defendant. Other than that, its all good. In order for a military tribunal to have jurisdiction, the civilian courts need to be closed by some necessity.
What was really unfortunate was that President Trump apparently used the 2018 EO to overthrow his own government and didn't know it. I thought Trump was still President.
The last person executed for treason appears to have been William Mumford in 1862.
tied to an overt act
Conspiracy theory. Unfortunately, conspiracy is not a violation of the laws of war.
In view of the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), have no fear and few hopes.
Hamdan, Opinion of the Court at 566-67:
Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I through IV, Parts VI through VI–D–iii, Part VI–D–v, and Part VII, and an opinion with respect to Parts V and VI–D– iv, in which Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join.Petitioner Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni national, is in custody at an American prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In November 2001, during hostilities between the United States and the Taliban (which then governed Afghanistan), Hamdan was captured by militia forces and turned over to the U. S. military. In June 2002, he was transported to Guantanamo Bay. Over a year later, the President deemed him eligible for trial by military commission for then unspecified crimes. After another year had passed, Hamdan was charged with one count of conspiracy “to commit... offenses triable by military commission.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 65a.
Hamdan filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus and mandamus to challenge the Executive Branch’s intended means of prosecuting this charge. He concedes that a courtmartial constituted in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U. S. C. §801 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. III), would have authority to try him. His objection is that the military commission the President has convened lacks such authority, for two principal reasons: First, neither congressional Act nor the common law of war supports trial by this commission for the crime of conspiracy— an offense that, Hamdan says, is not a violation of the law of war. Second, Hamdan contends, the procedures that the President has adopted to try him violate the most basic tenets of military and international law, including the principle that a defendant must be permitted to see and hear the evidence against him.
The District Court granted Hamdan’s request for a writ of habeas corpus. 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (DC 2004). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. 415 F. 3d 33 (2005). Recognizing, as we did over a half century ago, that trial by military commission is an extraordinary measure raising important questions about the balance of powers in our constitutional structure, Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 19 (1942), we granted certiorari. 546 U. S. 1002 (2005).
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the military commission convened to try Hamdan lacks power to proceed because its structure and procedures violate both the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions. Four of us also conclude, see Part V, infra, that the offense with which Hamdan has been charged is not an “offens[e] that by . . . the law of war may be tried by military commissions.” 10 U. S. C. § 821.
At 597-600
Quirin is the model the Government invokes most frequently to defend the commission convened to try Hamdan. That is both appropriate and unsurprising. Since Guantanamo Bay is neither enemy-occupied territory nor under martial law, the law-of-war commission is the only model available. At the same time, no more robust model of executive power exists; Quirin represents the high-water mark of military power to try enemy combatants for war crimes.The classic treatise penned by Colonel William Winthrop, whom we have called “the ‘Blackstone of Military Law,’” Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 19, n. 38 (1957) (plurality opinion), describes at least four preconditions for exercise of jurisdiction by a tribunal of the type convened to try Hamdan. First, “[a] military commission, (except where otherwise authorized by statute), can legally assume jurisdiction only of offences committed within the field of the command of the convening commander.” Winthrop 836. The “field of the command” in these circumstances means the “theatre of war.” Ibid. Second, the offense charged “must have been committed within the period of the war.” 28 Id., at 837. No jurisdiction exists to try offenses “committed either before or after the war.” Ibid. Third, a military commission not established pursuant to martial law or an occupation may try only “[i]ndividuals of the enemy’s army who have been guilty of illegitimate warfare or other offences in violation of the laws of war” and members of one’s own army “who, in time of war, become chargeable with crimes or offences not cognizable, or triable, by the criminal courts or under the Articles of war.” Id., at 838. Finally, a law-of-war commission has jurisdiction to try only two kinds of offense: “Violations of the laws and usages of war cognizable by military tribunals only,” and “[b]reaches of military orders or regulations for which offenders are not legally triable by court-martial under the Articles of war.” Id., at 839.29
All parties agree that Colonel Winthrop’s treatise accurately describes the common law governing military commissions, and that the jurisdictional limitations he identifies were incorporated in Article of War 15 and, later, Article 21 of the UCMJ. It also is undisputed that Hamdan’s commission lacks jurisdiction to try him unless the charge “properly set[s] forth, not only the details of the act charged, but the circumstances conferring jurisdiction.” Id., at 842 (emphasis in original). The question is whether the preconditions designed to ensure that a military necessity exists to justify the use of this extraordinary tribunal have been satisfied here.
The charge against Hamdan, described in detail in Part I, supra, alleges a conspiracy extending over a number of years, from 1996 to November 2001. All but two months of that more than 5-year-long period preceded the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the enactment of the AUMF—the Act of Congress on which the Government relies for exercise of its war powers and thus for its authority to convene military commissions. Neither the purported agreement with Usama bin Laden and others to commit war crimes, nor a single overt act, is alleged to have occurred in a theater of war or on any specified date after September 11, 2001. None of the overt acts that Hamdan is alleged to have committed violates the law of war.
These facts alone cast doubt on the legality of the charge and, hence, the commission; as Winthrop makes plain, the offense alleged must have been committed both in a theater of war and during, not before, the relevant conflict. But the deficiencies in the time and place allegations also underscore—indeed are symptomatic of—the most serious defect of this charge: The offense it alleges is not triable by law-ofwar military commission. See Yamashita, 327 U. S., at 13 (“Neither congressional action nor the military orders constituting the commission authorized it to place petitioner on trial unless the charge proffered against him is of a violation of the law of war”).
There is no suggestion that Congress has, in exercise of its constitutional authority to “define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations,” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 10, positively identified “conspiracy” as a war crime.
We are involved in a different type of warfare which the cases you cited would not apply.
Cyberwarfare in the United States is the United States Cyber Command’s military strategy of Proactive Cyber Defence and the use of cyberwarfare as a platform for attack. The United States Department of Defense sees the use of computers and the Internet to conduct warfare in cyberspace as a threat to national security. The Joint Forces Command issued a statement: “Cyberspace technology is emerging as an “instrument of power” in societies, and is becoming more available to a country’s opponents, who may use it to attack, degrade, and disrupt communications and the flow of information. With low barriers to entry, coupled with the anonymous nature of activities in cyberspace, the list of potential adversaries is broad. Furthermore, the globe-spanning range of cyberspace and its disregard for national borders will challenge legal systems and complicate a nation’s ability to deter threats and respond to contingencies.”
The new United States military strategy, makes explicit that a cyberattack is casus belli for a traditional act of war.
In September 2012, the State Department chief legal advisor, Harold Koh, announced that certain cyber attacks may constitute a “use of force”, and are subject to international law and rules of war.
In 2013, a U.S. Department of Defense task force stated that nuclear weapons could be used in response to a cyber attack.
Well, thank you very much for your outstanding references that quite frankly were very well laid out with much labor as to your part. As you can see I am not a lawyer, and I very much appreciate your effort and very valuable time.
But I am not trying to write a enjoyable story, I actual find the situation quite distasteful, if fascinating.
However I think having the bio weapon, (it is patented, therefore man made), released deliberately, by restricting all flights out of Wuhan domestically but open internationally, clearly shows intent. And matched with the stated strategy papers leaked from China speculating that as a viable strategy to weaken an opponent as a strategic, not tactical move is damning on Chinas Part.
The purchase of 600 million dollars of Dominion shares, the 305th intelligence battalion tracing and recording the interference with the election and the 2018 eo spelling out that an attack on our critical infrastructure is considered an act of War places the paid for cooperation with the ccp to block discovery as a act of treason DURING A TIME OF WAR if said EO was invoked.
(Sorry for he all caps, too lazy to html this entire post for a little bold)
So, as per above the only question remains is who tries for treason, in theater, during a time of war with the use of a weapon of mass destruction, a political figure like Biden after committing treason to overthrow the government by abetting the foreign power in its act of War. Will it be military or civilian courts?
Especially with Biden taking of disbanding the US Army and inviting China in for domestic “defense” On his first day in office? Are we surrendering already?
His acceptance of Bribery in multiple schemes with China is overwhelming established at this point. It could be simply postulated that he is a spy for that foreign power that is at war with us.
Seems pretty clear to me a firing squad is warranted by the DOJ. My guess is the Army will do the firing squad either before or after it is disbanded.
Because if Biden hands us all over to the Chinese, obviously everyone in the Pentagon is a dead man walking.