New Understanding of the Civil War

The constitution is not a suicide pact. Maybe Lincoln did act unconstitutionally to save the union. Maybe he didn’t.

Let’s say, for the sake of argument he did. The question then becomes was he justified in doing so. That leads to the question if secession, as done by the southern rebels in 1860-61 was constitutional. If it was then everything that Lincoln an the northern states did was unconstitutional. If it wasn’t constitutional then I say Lincoln gets a pass because he was suppressing an unconstitutional rebellion.

To determine if secession was constitutional we have to look first at the constitution. The constitution itself is silent on secession. The word appears nowhere in the constitution. In fact the only power delegated involving states is given to the legislature in adding states and changing state boundaries.

Some argue that the 10th Amendment is where the power of secession lies. For that to be true we have to look at who are the parties to the constitution. Is it the states or the people. If the states are a party to the constitution then since they made it they can unmake it. If the people are the party then only they can unmake it.

What does the constitution say about who made it? It is very clear on this in the preamble.
“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”

Some claim that the preamble has no force of law. Perhaps true but it is, if you will, the mission statement for what the constitution does and who is doing it.

However, let us see if their is any support for this assertion that the constitution was formed by the people and not the states. Where in the constitution does the power to interpret it reside? In the judicial branch with it’s highest branch being the US Supreme Court. Are there any antebellum US Supreme Court cases that explain who are the parties to the constitution? Yes there is.

Just five years after adoption of the constitution the court said this;

“We the people of the United States, do ordain and establish this Constitution. Here we see the people acting as sovereigns of the whole country, and, in the language of sovereignty, establishing a Constitution by which it was their will that the State governments should be bound, and to which the State Constitutions should be made to conform. Every State Constitution is a compact made by and between the citizens of a State to govern themselves in a certain manner, and the Constitution of the United States is likewise a compact made by the people of the United States to govern themselves as to general objects in a certain manner. By this great compact however, many prerogatives were transferred to the national government, such as those of making war and peace, contracting alliances, coining money, etc. etc.” – Chisholm v. Georgia, 1793

Then in 1821 it said this;
“That the United States form, for many, and for most important purposes, a single nation, has not yet been denied. In war, we are one people. In making peace, we are one people. In all commercial regulations, we are one and the same people. . . . America has chosen to be, in many respects, and to many purposes, a nation; and for all these purposes, her government is complete; to all these objects, it is competent. The people have declared, that in the exercise of all the powers given for these objects, it is supreme.... The constitution and laws of a State, so far as they are repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States, are absolutely void. These States are constituent parts of the United States. They are members of one great empire-for some purposes sovereign, for some purposes subordinate.

“The people made the constitution, and the people can unmake it. It is the creature of their will, and lives only by their will. But this supreme and irresistible power to make or to unmake, resides only in the whole body of the people; not in any sub-division of them. The attempt of any of the parts to exercise it is usurpation, and ought to be repelled by those to whom the people have delegated their power of repelling it.” [19 U.S. 264] 1821
Cohen vs Virginia 1821

“The Constitution of the United States was ordained and established not by the States in their sovereign capacities, but emphatically, as the preamble of the Constitution declares, by ‘the people of the United States.” Joseph Story Martin v Hunter 1821

It is crystal clear on who created the constitution. In fact I can find no antebellum cases where the US Supreme Court ever stated that the states made or were a party to the constitution. It is clearly “We the people” that made the constitution, and that is all the people, no sub-set of the people.

Therefore “secession” by the southern rebels was unconstitutional and President Lincoln had a constitutional duty to suppress this insurrection. Making any actions by him that might be unconstitutional a moot point. His overriding constitutional duty was the preservation of America.

woodpusher: "The majority, the prevailing opinion of the Court, held that the Constitution intended to, and did, confer the full authority of removal to the President, with no power of the Senate to interfere.
Assumptions do not make holdings or precedents, and control nothing. "

At some point, after his repeated posts misrepresenting the truth, we have to ask, is our new FRiend woodpusher stupid or just dishonest, or both?
In this example he has refused to recognize my actual view on the 1926 SCOTUS Meyers ruling, which is that I agree with the majority, written by Chief Justice Taft.
But that's not what's at issue here.
It's a diversion from woodpusher's original point.

Once again, the original issue here is woodpusher's claims that President Lincoln broke the law regarding habeas corpus while President Andrew Johnson broke no law in 1868 worthy of impeachment.
My response is: no, that's exactly backwards because Lincoln broke no law on habeas corpus while Johnson did break the 1867 Tenure of Office Act.

Oh, well, says woodpusher, Tenure was struck down and declared "null and void ab initio" by the Supreme Court -- therefore Johnson broke no law, he says.
But woodpusher's problem is, that's not what happened.
Instead the 1867 Tenure of Office law was repealed by Congress in 1887, then mentioned in dicta by SCOTUS in it's 1926 Meyers ruling, saying it was "invalid", "insofar as it attempted to prevent the President from removing executive officers who had been appointed by him by and with the advice and consent of the Senate...".

So, does the 1926 in dicta comment of "invalid" equate to woodpusher's claims of "null and void ab initio"?
In their 1926 dissents, McReynolds, Brandeis and Holmes each gave reasons why Tenure was considered valid in 1868.

woodpusher: "Chief Justice Taft, in writing the Opinion of the Court in Myers, spent dozens of pages reducing the Brandeis dissent to a smoking ruin.
Taft eviscerated the dissent, with constitutional history and legal precedent.
The following is a sample of what you chose to ignore."

Again woodpusher presents us with a lengthy and wonderful civics lesson, well worth the time & effort to read.
But what he choses to ignore is the fact that I agree with the SCOTUS 1926 majority ruling.
I disagree that ruling made the 1867 Tenure of Office Act "null and void ab initio".

Again the question here is: did President Lincoln break the law regarding habeas corpus and did President Johnson break the Tenure of Office law?
I say: no and yes.
Woodpusher says: yes and no, but to get there he must first imagine a law for Lincoln on habeas corpus which did not exist and then he must nullify the law for Johnson on Tenure which did then exist.

woodpusher: "Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803) was a case about an appointment, not a removal.
It was impossible for Marbury to issue a holding, or set a precedent, about the President's removal authority.
A dictum never controls anything."

And yet our new FRiend woodpusher wishes us to buy his argument that the 1926 SCOTUS in dictum comments regarding the repealed 1867 Tenure of Office Act render that law "null and void ab initio".

woodpusher: "Legally, the 1867 Statute, and all subsequent statutes to the same effect, never became laws.
An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.
The other branches treat a statute as law until the Judiciary proclaims otherwise.
When the Judiciary proclaims a statute to have been enacted as repugnant to the Constitution, it holds that the Legislature had no authority to issue the statute in the first place, and its act of issuance was entirely void. "

And here we see my key point, underlined.
The 1867 Tenure law was not ruled on directly before being repealed in 1887.
It was mentioned in dicta in 1926 as "invalid".
But in 1868, in woodpusher's own words, "The other branches treat a statute as law..."

President Johnson broke the Tenure of Office Act (then considered law), for which he was impeached.
President Lincoln broke no law regarding habeas corpus.

That's what all these many lengthy posts are about.

OIFVeteran quoting John Jay in Chisholm v. Georgia, 1793: "We the people of the United States, do ordain and establish this Constitution.
Here we see the people acting as sovereigns of the whole country, and, in the language of sovereignty, establishing a Constitution by which it was their will that the State governments should be bound, and to which the State Constitutions should be made to conform.
Every State Constitution is a compact made by and between the citizens of a State to govern themselves in a certain manner, and the Constitution of the United States is likewise a compact made by the people of the United States to govern themselves as to general objects in a certain manner...."

OIFVeteran quoting John Marshall in Cohen vs Virginia 1821: "The people made the constitution, and the people can unmake it.
It is the creature of their will, and lives only by their will.
But this supreme and irresistible power to make or to unmake, resides only in the whole body of the people; not in any sub-division of them.
The attempt of any of the parts to exercise it is usurpation, and ought to be repelled by those to whom the people have delegated their power of repelling it."

Thanks for two great quotes from Federalists John Jay and John Marshall.
Quotes like these help explain why some anti-Federalist Lost Causers consider Jay and Marshall to be words like, "nationalists", "monarchists", "oppressors", "tyrants", small-d "democrats", "crony capitalists", "liars" and whatever other nasty names might come to their minds.

[BroJoeK #289]: But there were two problems, the first was the lack of a filibuster rule, meaning Democrats could block pretty much anything in the Senate.
[BroJoeK #297]: The fact is that minority Democrats did attempt to filibuster the habeas corpus bill HR-591, even after RINO Illinois Senator Trumbull removed the word "indemnification" from it.

Yet another fictional account. History is what happened, not what you fantasize.

The proceedings were taken down verbatim and reported in the official record, then called the Congressional Globe.

https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=063/llcg063.db&recNum=548

I gave you links to the pages. Why can't you find the filibuster, or the removal of the word indemnity from H.R. 591 before the vote? Until the final vote, the change was only in the Senate version of a House Bill, which was an indemnity bill.

Here is the OFFICIAL RECORD on it at page 1459:

Mr. TRUMBULL. I must insist on calling up the report of the committee of conference on the indemnity bill, which was laid aside until seven o'clock. After that is before the Senate, if this other matter can be disposed of informally by unanimous consent, I will not object.

There is the indemnity bill, after 7 p.m. in the Senate. This is when the Report of the Committee is first brought up for debate.

https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=063/llcg063.db&recNum=563

Here is the OFFICIAL RECORD at page 1474:

Mr. POWELL. I have concluded my speech, and move to adjourn in order that the Senator from Delaware may have an opportunity to speak tomorrow.
The question being put, there were, on a division—ayes 4, noes 14; no quorum voting.
Mr.CHANDLER called for the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered; and being taken, resulted—yeas 4, nays 32; as follows:
[recorded vote omitted]
So the Senate refused to adjourn.

Mr. Bayard took the floor and talked from pages 1474-1477.

Here is the OFFICIAL RECORD at page page 1477:

https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=063/llcg063.db&recNum=566

Mr. FESSENDEN. Let us have the yeas and nays on the adjournment.
The yeas and nays were ordered; and being taken resulted—yeas 4, nays 33; as follows:
[recorded vote on adjournment omitted]
So the Senate refused to adjourn.
The PRESIDING OFFICER, (Mr. Pomeroy.) The question is on concurring in the report af the committee of conference. Those in favor of concurring in the report will say “aye” those opposed “no.” The ayes have it. It is a vote. The report is concurred in.
Mr. TRUMBULL. I move that the Senate now proceed to the consideration of House bill No. 599.
Mr. POWELL. I hope the Senate will proceed with this indemnity bill.
The motion of Mr. Trumbull was agreed to.
Mr. TRUMBULL. It is a bill relating to the validity of deeds of public squares and lots in the city of Washington.
Mr. POWELL. What has become of the other bill?
Mr. GRIMES. It has passed.

This is the official record of the passage of the Report of the Committee on H.R. 599.

There was NO RECORDED VOTE on H.R. 599. It is contested that a call for the nays was even called and heard. The only record of the vote is the Presiding Officer stating, The ayes have it. The yeas and nays were not counted and recorded. This is your claimed overwhelming majority vote.

The reason you cannot find the removal of the word indemnity prior to the vote is that it did not happen.

Here is the OFFICIAL RECORD the House at page 1479:

https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=063/llcg063.db&recNum=568

INDEMNITY BILL
The SPEAKER. The hour of one o'clock having arrived the vote will now be taken, by previous order of the House, on agreeing to the report of the committee of conference on the indemnity bill.
Mr. ALLEN, of Ohio, called for the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The question was taken; and it was decided in the aflirmative—yeas 99, nays 44; as follows:
[recorded vote omitted]
So the report of the committee of conference was agreed to.

There is the indemnity bill, Report of the Committee, passing at 1 a.m. in the House. The SPEAKER called the vote for the indemnity bill.

HR-591 passed in March 1863 despite Democrats' attempted filibuster and after RINO Illinois Senator Trumbull removed the word "indemnification".

Why were the senators and the Speaker calling it the Indemnity Bill in the wee hours of the morning; the Speaker calling a vote on the indemnity bill. Apparently he had not yet gotten the word from Wikipedia.

When exactly did Senator Trumbull remove the word "indemnification?" (sic - indemnify)

James G. Randall was an historian and former president of the American Historical Association. Randall was a history professor and specialized on Abraham Lincoln and the American Civil War era. One of his noted books was Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln, originally published in 1926, reprinted in 1951 with updates and revisions, by the University of Illinois Press. In 1926, Randall wrote of the Indemnity Act of 1963. In my copy of the 1951 updated book, Randalls Chapter IX is entitled, The Indemnity Act of 1963. In footnote 8 on page 189, Randall explained:

⁸ In using the name "Indemnity Act" to designate the law of March 3, 1863, contemporary usage has been followed. Senator Trumbull and others referred to the measure while under debate as the "Indemnity Bill," and the same designation appeared in the headings of the record, as well as i many other places. (Cong. globe, 37 Cong., 3 sess., pp 1459, 1479.)

Your fictionalization that Senator Trumbull removed indemnification from the bill to indemnify is yourstory, not history.

Trumbull's amendment to House Resolution 591, changing the title of the bill, and eliminating the word indemnify was proposed to the Senate on January 15, 1863, almost a year before the Report of the Committee reached the floor of the Senate.

Journal of the Senate, January 26, 1863, page 152

The Senate proceeded to consider, as in Committee of the Whole, the bill (H. R. 591) to indemnify the President and other persons for suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and acts done in pursuance thereof; and
After the consideration of executive business,
The Senate adjourned.

The proposed title, To regulate judicial proceedings in certain cases therein mentioned, replacing the House phrasing, To indemnify the President and other persons for suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and acts done in pursuance thereof, did not change the bill itself. It was still a House indemnity bill, the Senate just sought to obfuscate what Congress was doing, sort of like the USA PATRIOT Act or the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.

Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln, p. 192:

It is significant that Stevens, the author of the indemnifying feature of the House bill, was not one of those who held, with the Attorney General, that the President had the right to suspend habeas corpus privilege. Some who concurred in the Attorney General's opinion that the President had the full power to suspend, andto delegate such authority to subordinates, argued that no wrongs had been committed, and that no indemnification was necessary. Conversely, the very basis of the bill of indemnity, in the minds of many who voted for it, was an assumption that the President did not constitutionally have this power, or at least a doubt as to the legality of this presidential suspension and a desire to clear up the matter once and for all.

It appears, amongst other things, that you must add the name of Thaddeus Stevens to your list of RINOs, Democrats and Traitors.

Mr. Trumbull did all he could do before the vote on March 3, 1863. He effected a change to the Senate version only, which was not agreed to by the House until the vote on the Report of Committee on March 3.

Congressional Globe, 37th Cong, 3rd Sess, March 2, 1863, pp. 1435-1438

The congressional session of March 2, 1863 extended past midnight and into March 3, 1863. The bill passed during the March 2 session, after midnight.

1435
MESSAGE FROM T1IE HOUSE.
A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Etheridge, its Clerk, announced that the House of Representatives had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the bill (H. R. No. 591) to indemnify the President and other persons for suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and acts done in pursuance thereof.
1435
Mr. TRUMBULL. The committee of conference on the bill of the House of Representatives (No. 591) to indemnify the President and other persons for suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and acts done in pursuance thereof, have agreed on a report, which I submit.
1436
Mr. TRUMBULL. I will state, for the information of the Senate, that the report embraces nothing but the subject-matter of the bill which passed the House of Representatives, and the amendments which passed the Senate. The House of Representatives passed a bill containing two sections, the first with a preamble. The first section ratified all acts of the President in the arrest of parties, and indemnified and discharged all officers from suits or prosecutions in consequence of any arrests made under his authority; and the second section of the bill, as passed by the House of Representatives, authorized the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. This was the House bill. The Senate disagreed to the bill which passed the House, and passed a substitute for it. The substitute provided for the protection of officers in the courts of the United States, instead of declaring proceedings against them null and void. The two Houses having entirely disagreed, not having agreed upon any thing, what was before the committee? Unquestionably the bill as it passed the House of Representatives, and the amendments as they passed the Senate. Neither House had agreed with the other upon a single line.
1437
Mr. RICHARDSON. Probably I can attain the object I have in view by making a motion that the report of the committee of conference be not received. I make that motion if it will attain the purpose I have of discussing, for it is a matter of importance enough to discuss the question before the Senate.
The PRESIDENTpro tempore. The Chair has passed upon no question of order. The Chair has said that theobjections raised do not presents question of order for the Chair to decide as such. They may raise objections, decisive reasons for non-con- currence in the report. The immediate question before the Senate is, “ Will the Senate concur in the report of the committee of conference?” and that opens the whole subject-matter to full debate before the Senate.
Mr. WALL. Understanding, Mr. President, that the Senator from Delaware who is not in his seat [Mr. Bayard] desires to speak on this bill, I move the postponement of the consideration of the report until to-morrow.
Mr. WILSON, of Massachusetts. I suggest that it be postponed until five o’clock this afternoon. There are some very important measures that we ought to act upon.
Mr. POWELL. 1 would suggest to the Senator from Massachusetts that this is one of the most important bills.
Mr. WILSON, of Massachusetts. I know it is very important.
Mr. POWELL. I hope it will be postponed until to-morrow. We shall all be busy to-day here, and cannot examine it at all. We should have an opportunity to examine it. There is plenty of other matter to take up to-day.
Mr. WILSON, of Massachusetts. I will simply say that the questions have all been discussed. The Senator from New Jersey, I understand, desires to speak, and I propose to postpone the report till five or six o’clock.
Mr. WALL. I would suggest seven o’clock, after the recess, if we take one.
Mr. WILSON, of Massachusetts. Very well; say seven o’clock.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. By common consent this report may be laid aside until seven o’clock this evening.
Mr. TRUMBULL. I have not ngreed to suspend the report until seven o’clock.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question then is on the postponement of the report until seven o’clock.
Mr. TRUMBULL. If we can have an understanding that there shall be a vote this evening, I shall have no objection; but if the intention is to suspend it with a view to go on and take up time in regard to it, I shall object to the postponement. If it is understood that a vote is to be taken on this bill to-night, I will make no objection to suspending it until seven o’clock. I do not wish to hurry it to a decision before Senators have an opportunity to express any views they desire to express; and if we can, by a sort of common understanding—I do not wish any formal agreement about it—generally consent that the vote shall be taken some time to-night, I shall make no objection to its going over until seven o’clock. It is now within a day of the last of the session, and that is the reason I make the suggestion. I hope our friends on the other side^vill indicate whether it will be acceptable to them to take a vote some time to night, in case we postpone the report until seven o’clock.
Mr. RICHARDSON. It introduces new matter, and we desire to discuss it.
Mr. TRUMBULL. That nobody objects to.
1438
Mr. TRUMBULL. Then I ask leave to withdraw the call for the yeas and nays by unanimous consent, and let the subject go over until seven o’clock.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. If no objection be made, the call for the yeas and nays will be withdrawn. The Chair hears no objection, and the call is withdrawn; and the further consideration of this subject is postponed until seven o’clock this evening.

Mr. Trumbull's amendment to the title was not accepted until the vote in both houses approving the Report of the Committee. It was a House bill and Mr. Trumbull had no authority to unilaterally change it. The Report of the Committee proposed to approve the Senate version of the title, and both houses voted for that change on March 3, during the extended March 2, 1863 session.

The House Indemnity Bill remained the Indemnity Bill right up until it was voted on and became the Habeas Corpus Act. As a bill, the House never changed it from the Indemnity Bill. As it is, it is an indemnity act by another name.

In the House on March 2, 1863 the Speaker called up the indemnity bill; in the Senate, the bill to indemnify the President was called up.

It was agreed to take up the bill at 7 p.m. that evening. Its passage was after midnight, in the early morning. When did the filibuster take place? When was the word indemnification (sic - indemnify) removed from the House Bill?

"...these called for a constitutional amendment to abolish slavery nationally and permanently.
On December 14, 1863, a bill proposing such an amendment was introduced by Representative James Mitchell Ashley of Ohio.[14][15]
Representative James F. Wilson of Iowa soon followed with a similar proposal.
On January 11, 1864, Senator John B. Henderson of Missouri submitted a joint resolution for a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery.
The Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, became involved in merging different proposals for an amendment.
Radical Republicans led by Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner and Pennsylvania Representative Thaddeus Stevens sought a more expansive version of the amendment.[16]
On February 8, 1864, Sumner submitted a constitutional amendment stating...
On February 10, the Senate Judiciary Committee presented the Senate with an amendment proposal..."
So notice the different terms used for virtually the same things:

"called for constitutional amendment"
"a bill"
"proposal"
"joint resolution"
"submitted a constitutional amendment"
"amendment proposal"
Sure, doubtless there do exist legalistic definitions for each of these, definitions which may be important in certain contexts, but I'm not sure why for layman's purposes they matter.

You might as well include a link and give proper credit to your Wikipedia source that you cut and pasted from:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thirteenth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution

In the final years of the Civil War, Union lawmakers debated various proposals for Reconstruction.[13] Some of these called for a constitutional amendment to abolish slavery nationally and permanently. On December 14, 1863, a bill proposing such an amendment was introduced by Representative James Mitchell Ashley of Ohio.[14][15] Representative James F. Wilson of Iowa soon followed with a similar proposal. On January 11, 1864, Senator John B. Henderson of Missouri submitted a joint resolution for a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery. The Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, became involved in merging different proposals for an amendment.
Radical Republicans led by Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner and Pennsylvania Representative Thaddeus Stevens sought a more expansive version of the amendment.[16] On February 8, 1864, Sumner submitted a constitutional amendment stating:

All persons are equal before the law, so that no person can hold another as a slave; and the Congress shall have power to make all laws necessary and proper to carry this declaration into effect everywhere in the United States.[17][18]

Sumner tried to have his amendment sent to his committee, rather than the Trumbull-controlled Judiciary Committee, but the Senate refused.[19] On February 10, the Senate Judiciary Committee presented the Senate with an amendment proposal based on drafts of Ashley, Wilson and Henderson.[20][21]

You copied and pasted a list of various proposals for Reconstruction. The proposals are characterized by the Wikipedia source as a bill, a constitutional amendment, a joint resolution, and an amendment proposal. While the article makes no claim that these things are the same, or virtually the same, if it makes you feel better to believe that a proposed constitutional amendment, a constitutional amendment, a joint resolution of Congress, and a bill are all virtually the same thing, I say go for it. Bless your heart.

“The Constitution of the United States was ordained and established not by the States in their sovereign capacities, but emphatically, as the preamble of the Constitution declares, by ‘the people of the United States.” Joseph Story Martin v Hunter 1821
It is crystal clear on who created the constitution. In fact I can find no antebellum cases where the US Supreme Court ever stated that the states made or were a party to the constitution. It is clearly “We the people” that made the constitution, and that is all the people, no sub-set of the people.

It is apparent that you have not read and/or have not understood the out of context quotation of Justice Story. The quote is from Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).

Your contention that the consolidated people of the United States ordained and established the Constitution is reduced to absurdity by the history of the Framing and Ratification, not to mention by putting the Story quote into the context in which Story framed it.

The Constitution was approved at a convention by representatives of eleven (11) states, Rhode Island and New York not present or voting. Moreover, the representatives at the convention had no authorization from anyone to create a constitution or propose to change the form of government.

The Constitution was ratified by eleven (11) states, Rhode Island and North Carolina not ratifying.

A new union was formed by eleven (11) states, Rhode Island and North Carolina not being members.

North Carolina joined about six months after Washington's inauguration, and Rhode Island joined more than a year later.

Each state ratified seperately and membership in the resulting union was limited to the states so ratifying the Constitution.

There was no consolidated vote of the people. The people of each state cast one vote as a state.

It is not possible for the vote of eleven states to express the consolidated will of all thirteen (13) original states.

It is not possible for a consolidated vote of all the people of the thirteen (13) states to decide for all the people of those states, and result in having eleven (11) member states in the union, and two (2) member states out of the union.

It's nonsense.

The major problem is not what Story wrote, but the juvenile interpretation of what Story wrote. A more complete quote returns it to its proper context. "The Constitution was not, therefore, necessarily carved out of existing State sovereignties, nor a surrender of powers already existing in State institutions, for the powers of the States depend upon their own Constitutions, and the people of every State had the right to modify and restrain them according to their own views of the policy or principle." The people of each state collectively are the political community called the State. They have ever exercised their sovereignty as States. The people organized at States vote to elect delegates to the Electoral College who cast votres on behalf of the people of the State that elected them. Whether the delegates are winner-take-all or proportional is a matter for the State to decide. Ratifications of constitutional amendments are by States. And the Constitution itself proclaimed that, "The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same." Any nine states. It could have comprised less than half the population, were it the nine least populous states. It did not form a union of all the thirteen states, but only of the nine or more States that ratified. The actual number was eleven.

Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 324-327 (1816).

[324]
Before proceeding to the principal questions, it may not be unfit to dispose of some preliminary considerations which have grown out of the arguments at the bar.
The Constitution of the United States was ordained and established not by the States in their sovereign capacities, but emphatically, as the preamble of the Constitution declares, by "the people of the United States." There can be no doubt that it was competent to the people to invest the general go-
[325]
vernment with all the powers which they might deem proper and necessary, to extend or restrain these powers according to their own good pleasure, and to give them a paramount and supreme authority. As little doubt can there be that the people had a right to prohibit to the States the exercise of any powers which were, in their judgment, incompatible with the objects of the general compact, to make the powers of the State governments, in given cases, subordinate to those of the nation, or to reserve to themselves those sovereign authorities which they might not choose to delegate to either. The Constitution was not, therefore, necessarily carved out of existing State sovereignties, nor a surrender of powers already existing in State institutions, for the powers of the States depend upon their own Constitutions, and the people of every State had the right to modify and restrain them according to their own views of the policy or principle. On the other hand, it is perfectly clear that the sovereign powers vested in the State governments by their respective Constitutions remained unaltered and unimpaired except so far as they were granted to the Government of the United States.
These deductions do not rest upon general reasoning, plain and obvious as they seem to be. They have been positively recognised by one of the articles in amendment of the Constitution, which declares that
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."
[326]
The government, then, of the United States can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the Constitution, and the powers actually granted, must be such as are expressly given, or given by necessary implication.
On the other hand, this instrument, like every other grant, is to have a reasonable construction, according to the import of its terms, and where a power is expressly given in general terms, it is not to be restrained to particular cases unless that construction grow out of the context expressly or by necessary implication. The words are to be taken in their natural and obvious sense, and not in a sense unreasonably restricted or enlarged.
The Constitution unavoidably deals in general language. It did not suit the purposes of the people, in framing this great charter of our liberties, to provide for minute specifications of its powers or to declare the means by which those powers should be carried into execution. It was foreseen that this would be a perilous and difficult, if not an impracticable, task. The instrument was not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years, but was to endure through a long lapse of ages, the events of which were locked up in the inscrutable purposes of Providence. It could not be foreseen what new changes and modifications of power might be indispensable to effectuate the general objects of the charter, and restrictions and specifications which at the present might seem salutary might in the end prove the overthrow of the system itself. Hence its powers are expressed in general terms, leaving to the legislature from time to
[327]
time to adopt its own means to effectuate legitimate objects and to mould and model the exercise of its powers as its own wisdom and the public interests, should require.
With these principles in view, principles in respect to which no difference of opinion ought to be indulged, let us now proceed to the interpretation of the Constitution so far as regards the great points in controversy.

The introductory sentence eliminates any possibility of the paragraphs the follow to be more than obiter dictum.

Of course, the same Joseph Story wrote in Commentaries on the Constitution, vol. III, Sec. 321, that,

§ 321. The obvious deductions, which may be, and indeed have been, drawn from considering the constitution as a compact between the states, are, that it operates as a mere treaty, or convention between them, and has an obligatory force upon each state no longer, than suits its pleasure, or its consent continues; that each state has a right to judge for itself in relation to the nature extent, and obligations. Of the instrument, without being at all bound by the interpretation of the federal government, or by that of any other state; and that each retains the power to withdraw from the confederacy and to dissolve the connexion, when such shall be its choice; and may suspend the operations of the federal government, and nullify its acts within its own territorial limits, whenever, in its own opinion, the exigency of the case may require. These conclusions may not always be avowed; but they flow naturally from the doctrines, which we have under consideration. They go to the extent of reducing the government to a mere confederacy during pleasure; and of thus presenting the extraordinary spectacle of a nation existing only at the will of each of its constituent parts.

That is the more mature and considered opinion of Joseph Story.

You may wish to rethink your support for the early Joseph Story who stated in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, that the Constitution was a compact. Oh my, just look at what flows from such finding, according to Story.

And it was the Great Expounder, Daniel Webster, who said in The Constitution Is Not a Compact, 1861, p. 8:

If a league between sovereign powers have no limitation as to the time of duration, and contain nothingmaking it perpetual, it subsists only during the good pleasure of the parties, although no violation be complained of. If, in the opinion of either party, it be violated, such party may say he will no longer fulfil its obligations on his part, but will consider te whole league or compact at an end, although it might be one of its stipulations that it should be perpetual.

Farrand's Records — In a Committee of the Whole House. Wednesday May 30, 1787.

It was then moved by Mr Randolph and seconded by Mr G Morris to substitute the following resolution in the place of the first resolution
Resolved that an union of the States, merely foederal, will not accomplish the objects proposed by the articles of confederation, namely "common defence, security of liberty, and general welfare.
It was moved by Mr Butler seconded by Mr Randolph to postpone the consideration of the said resolution in order to take up the following resolution submitted by Mr Randolph namely
Resolved that a national government ought to be established consisting of a supreme legislative, judiciary and executive.
It was moved by Mr Read seconded by Mr C. C. Pinckney to postpone the consideration of the last resolution in order to take up the following
Resolved That in order to carry into execution the design of the States in forming this convention and to accomplish the objects proposed by the confederation "a more effective government consisting of a Legislative, Judiciary, and Executive ought to be established"
On the question to postpone, in order to take up the last resolution, the question was lost.
On motion to agree to the said resolution moved by Mr Butler it passed in the affirmative [ayes -- 6; noes -- 1; divided 1.]2 -- and the resolution, as agreed to, is as follows.

[Note 2: 2 Vote 2, Detail of Ayes and Noes, see below note 6.]

Resolved that it is the opinion of this Committee that a
Page 31
national government ought to be established consisting of a supreme Legislative, Judiciary, and Executive

Yea verily, the considered and approved a national, as opposed to a federal government.

Farrand's Records — May 30th, 1st resolution from Mr. Randol.

Mr. R. wishes to have that resol. dissented to. The resol. postponed to take up the following:

1st. That a union of the States merely foederal will not accomplish the object proposed by the articles of confederation, namely, "common defence, security of liberty, and general welfare".
Mr. C. Pinkney wishes to know whether the establishment of this Resolution is intended as a ground for a consolidation of the several States into one.
Mr. Randol has nothing further in contemplation than what the propositions he has submitted yesterday has expressed.
2. Resolved that no treaty or treaties between the whole or a less number of the States in their sovereign capacities will accomplish their common defence, liberty or welfare.
3. Resolved therefore that a national governmen ought to be established consisting of a supreme legislature, judiciary and executive.

Mr. Whythe presumes from the silence of the house that they gentn. are prepared to pass on the resolution and proposes its being put.
Mr. Butler — does not think the house prepared, that he is not. Wishes Mr. Randolph to shew that the existence of the States cannot be preserved by any other mode than a national government.
Gen. Pinkney — Thinks agreeing to the resolve is declaring that the convention does not act under the authority of the recommendation of Congress.
The first resolution postponed to take up the 3d. viz -- Resolved that a national government ought to be established consisting of a supreme legislature, judiciary and executive.
1787, 21 Febry. Resolution of Congress.
Resolved that in the opinion of Congress it is expedient
Page 42
that on the 2d Monday of May next a convention of delegates who shall have been appointed by the several States to be held at Philada. for the sole and expres purpose of revising the articles of confederation, and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures, such alterations and provisions therein as shall when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the grates, render the foederal constitution, adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the union."
Mr. Randolph explains the intention of the 3d Resolution. Repeats the substance of his yesterdays observations. It is only meant to give the national government a power to defend and protect itself. To take therefore from the respective legislatures or States, no more sovereignty than is competent to this end.
Mr. Dickinson. Under obligations to the gentlemen who brought forward the systems laid before the house yesterday. Yet differs from the mode of proceeding to which the resolutions or propositions before the Committee lead. Would propose a more simple mode. All agree that the confederation is defective all agree that it ought to be amended. We are a nation altho' consisting of parts or States--we are also confederated, and he hopes we shall always remain confederated. The enquiry should be—

1. What are the legislative powers which we should vest in Congress.
2. What judiciary powers.
3 What executive powers.

We may resolve therefore, in order to let us into the business. That the confederation is defective; and then proceed to the definition of such powers as may be thought adequate to the objects for which it was instituted.

And they voted on a national form of government,

The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 [Farrand's Records, Volume 2] JOURNAL Monday August 6. 1787.

Page 176
The House met agreeably to adjournment.
The honorable John Francis Mercer Esq, One of the Deputies from the State of Maryland, attended and took his seat.
The honorable Mr Rutledge, from the Committee to whom were referred the Proceedings of the Convention for the purpose of reporting a Constitution for the establishment of a national Government conformable to these Proceedings, informed the House that the Committee were prepared to report— The report was then delivered in at the Secretary's table, and being read once throughout and copies thereof given to the members-- It was moved and seconded to adjourn till wednesday morning
which passed in the negative. [Ayes--3; noes--5.]
The house then adjourned till to-morrow morning at 11 o'Clock A. M

Back in the day, they sure had a way with words. It passed in the negative. That is pre-Trek talk for it's dead Jim.

A national form of government was considered and rejected.

You do get credit for knowing buzz phrases though.

If you notice from your quote from Story's commentaries on the constitution the end statement that you did not emphasis;

§ 321. The obvious deductions, which may be, and indeed have been, drawn from considering the constitution as a compact between the states, are, that it operates as a mere treaty, or convention between them, and has an obligatory force upon each state no longer, than suits its pleasure, or its consent continues; that each state has a right to judge for itself in relation to the nature extent, and obligations. Of the instrument, without being at all bound by the interpretation of the federal government, or by that of any other state; and that each retains the power to withdraw from the confederacy and to dissolve the connexion, when such shall be its choice; and may suspend the operations of the federal government, and nullify its acts within its own territorial limits, whenever, in its own opinion, the exigency of the case may require. These conclusions may not always be avowed; but they flow naturally from the doctrines, which we have under consideration. They go to the extent of reducing the government to a mere confederacy during pleasure; and of thus presenting the extraordinary spectacle of a nation existing only at the will of each of its constituent parts. ding sentence.

He is rejecting that the states have the right to nullify federal law. He is saying this doctrine would reduce the government to a confederacy and presents an extraordinary spectacle of a nation(America) existing only at the will of each of it's constituent parts. This is a rejection of the so called right of secession.

As far as who ratified the constitution and who was party to it. This was discussed at the constitutional convention when they debated resolution 19.

Resol: 19. [FN6] "referring the new Constitution to Assemblies to be chosen by the people for the express purpose of ratifying it" was next taken into consideration.

Mr. ELSEWORTH moved that it be referred to the Legislatures of the States for ratification. Mr. PATTERSON 2ded. the motion.

Col. MASON considered a reference of the plan to the authority of the people as one of the most important and essential of the Resolutions. The Legislatures have no power to ratify it. They are the mere creatures of the State Constitutions, and can not be greater than their creators. And he knew of no power in any of the Constitutions, he knew there was no power in some of them, that could be competent to this object. Whither then must we resort? To the people with whom all power remains that has not been given up in the Constitutions derived from them. It was of great moment he observed that this doctrine should be cherished as the basis of free Government. Another strong reason was that admitting the Legislatures to have a competent authority, it would be wrong to refer the plan to them, because succeeding Legislatures having equal authority could undo the acts of their predecessors; and the National Govt. would stand in each State on the weak and tottering foundation of an Act of Assembly. There was a remaining consideration of some weight. In some of the States the Govts. were not derived from the clear & undisputed authority of the people. This was the case in Virginia Some of the best & wisest citizens considered the Constitution as established by an assumed authority. A National Constitution derived from such a source would be exposed to the severest criticisms.

Mr. RANDOLPH. One idea has pervaded all our proceedings, to wit, that opposition as well from the States as from individuals, will be made to the System to be proposed. Will it not then be highly imprudent, to furnish any unnecessary pretext by the mode of ratifying it. Added to other objections agst. a ratification by Legislative authority only, it may be remarked that there have been instances in which the authority of the Common law has been set up in particular States agst. that of the Confederation which has had no higher sanction than Legislative ratification. Whose opposition will be most likely to be excited agst. the System? That of the local demagogues who will be degraded by it from the importance they now hold. These will spare no efforts to impede that progress in the popular mind which will be necessary to the adoption of the plan, and which every member will find to have taken place in his own, if he will compare his present opinions with those brought with him into the Convention. It is of great importance therefore that the consideration of this subject should be transferred from the Legislatures where this class of men, have their full influence to a field in which their efforts can be less mischeivous. It is moreover worthy of consideration that some of the States are averse to any change in their Constitution, and will not take the requisite steps, unless expressly called upon to refer the question to the people.

Mr. GERRY. The arguments of Col. Mason & Mr. Randolph prove too much. they prove an unconstitutionality in the present federal system even in some of the State Govts. Inferences drawn from such a source must be inadmissible. Both the State Govts. & the federal Govt. have been too long acquiesced in, to be now shaken. He considered the Confederation to be paramount to any State Constitution. The last article of it authorizing alterations must consequently be so as well as the others, and every thing done in pursuance of the article must have the same high authority with the article. -Great confusion he was confident would result from a recurrence to the people. They would never agree on any thing. He could not see any ground to suppose that the people will do what their rulers will not. The rulers will either conform to, or influence the sense of the people.

Mr. GHORUM was agst. referring the plan to the Legislatures.

1. Men chosen by the people for the particular purpose, will discuss the subject more candidly than members of the Legislature who are to lose the power which is to be given up to the Genl. Govt.

2. Some of the Legislatures are composed of several branches. It will consequently be more difficult in these cases to get the plan through the Legislatures, than thro' a Convention.

3. in the States many of the ablest men are excluded from the Legislatures, but may be elected into a Convention. Among these may be ranked many of the Clergy who are generally friends to good Government. Their services were found to be valuable in the formation & establishment of the Constitution of Massachts.

4. the Legislatures will be interrupted with a variety of little business, by artfully pressing which, designing men will find means to delay from year to year, if not to frustrate altogether, the national system.

5. If the last art: of the Confederation is to be pursued the unanimous concurrence of the States will be necessary. But will any one say, that all the States are to suffer themselves to be ruined, if Rho. Island should persist in her opposition to general measures. Some other States might also tread in her steps. The present advantage which N. York seems to be so much attached to, of taxing her neighbours by the regulation of her trade, makes it very probable, that she will be of the number. It would therefore deserve serious consideration whether provision ought not to be made for giving effect to the System without waiting for the unanimous concurrence of the States.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. If there be any Legislatures who should find themselves incompetent to the ratification, he should be content to let them advise with their constituents and pursue such a mode as wd. be competent. He thought more was to be expected from the Legislatures than from the people. The prevailing wish of the people in the Eastern States is to get rid of the public debt; and the idea of strengthening the Natl. Govt. carries with it that of strengthening the public debt. It was said by Col. Mason

1. that the Legislatures have no authority in this case.

2. that their successors having equal authority could rescind their acts.

As to the 2d. point he could not admit it to be well founded. An Act to which the States by their Legislatures, make themselves parties, becomes a compact from which no one of the parties can recede of itself. As to the 1st. point, he observed that a new sett of ideas seemed to have crept in since the articles of Confederation were established. Conventions of the people, or with power derived expressly from the people, were not then thought of. The Legislatures were considered as competent. Their ratification has been acquiesced in without complaint. To whom have Congs. applied on subsequent occasions for further powers? To the Legislatures; not to the people. The fact is that we exist at present, and we need not enquire how, as a federal Society, united by a charter one article of which is that alterations therein may be made by the Legislative authority of the States. It has been said that if the confederation is to be observed, the States must unanimously concur in the proposed innovations. He would answer that if such were the urgency & necessity of our situation as to warrant a new compact among a part of the States, founded on the consent of the people; the same pleas would be equally valid in favor of a partial compact, founded on the consent of the Legislatures.

Mr. WILLIAMSON thought the Resoln.: 19 so expressed as that it might be submitted either to the Legislatures or to Conventions recommended by the Legislatures. He observed that some Legislatures were evidently unauthorized to ratify the system. He thought too that Conventions were to be preferred as more likely to be composed of the ablest men in the States.

Mr. Govr. MORRIS considered the inference of Mr. Elseworth from the plea of necessity as applied to the establishment of a new System on ye. consent of the people of a part of the States, in favor of a like establishment. on the consent of a part of the Legislatures as a non sequitur. If the Confederation is to be pursued no alteration can be made without the unanimous consent of the Legislatures: Legislative alterations not conformable to the federal compact, would clearly not be valid. The Judges would consider them as null & void. Whereas in case of an appeal to the people of the U. S., the supreme authority, the federal compact may be altered by a majority of them; in like manner as the Constitution of a particular State may be altered by a majority of the people of the State. The amendmt. moved by Mr. Elseworth erroneously supposes that we are proceeding on the basis of the Confederation. This Convention is unknown to the Confederation.

Mr. KING thought with Mr. Elseworth that the Legislatures had a competent authority, the acquiescence of the people of America in the Confederation, being equivalent to a formal ratification by the people. He thought with Mr. E-also that the plea of necessity was as valid in the one case as in [FN10] the other. At the same time he preferred a reference to the authority of the people expressly delegated to Conventions, as the most certain means of obviating all disputes & doubts concerning the legitimacy of the new Constitution; as well as the most likely means of drawing forth the best men in the States to decide on it. He remarked that among other objections made in the State of N. York to granting powers to Congs. one had been that such powers as would operate within the State, [FN11] could not be reconciled to the Constitution; and therefore were not grantible by the Legislative authority. He considered it as of some consequence also to get rid of the scruples which some members of the State Legislatures might derive from their oaths to support & maintain the existing Constitutions.

Mr. MADISON thought it clear that the Legislatures were incompetent to the proposed changes. These changes would make essential inroads on the State Constitutions, and it would be a novel & dangerous doctrine that a Legislature could change the constitution under which it held its existence. There might indeed be some Constitutions within the Union, which had given a power to the Legislature to concur in alterations of the federal Compact. But there were certainly some which had not; and in the case of these, a ratification must of necessity be obtained from the people. He considered the difference between a system founded on the Legislatures only, and one founded on the people, to be the true difference between a league or treaty, and a Constitution. The former in point of moral obligation might be as inviolable as the latter. In point of political operation, there were two important distinctions in favor of the latter. 1. A law violating a treaty ratified by a pre-existing law, might be respected by the Judges as a law, though an unwise or perfidious one. A law violating a constitution established by the people themselves, would be considered by the Judges as null & void. 2. The doctrine laid down by the law of Nations in the case of treaties is that a breach of any one article by any of the parties, frees the other parties from their engagements. In the case of a union of people under one Constitution, the nature of the pact has always been understood to exclude such an interpretation. Comparing the two modes in point of expediency he thought all the considerations which recommended this Convention in preference to Congress for proposing the reform were in favor of State Conventions in preference to the Legislatures for examining and adopting it.

On question on Mr. Elseworth's motion to refer the plan to the Legislatures of the States.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

As you can see the constitutional convention discussed who should ratify, the states through their legislatures or the people through special conventions. The discussion makes it clear that if the state's ratified then they are a party to it and can leave just as easily as they entered. If the people ratify it this is not the case. Mr. Elsworth motion that the state legislatures, and therefore the states, should ratify the constitution was voted down.

As Madison said; "He considered the difference between a system founded on the Legislatures only, and one founded on the people, to be the true difference between a league or treaty, and a Constitution.

Whether Story's statement in the case is ratio decidendi or ober dictum, even ober dictum is considered persuasive.

The constitutionality of secession was explicitly settled in Texas v White 1869. This case was about bonds sold by the rebel Texas Government and if that government had authority to do so. Before the supreme court could decide the case they had to determine if they had jurisdiction. To determine if they had jurisdiction they had to determine what the status of Texas was. To determine what the status of Texas was they had to determine the legality of secession.

Since the legality of secession was germane to their decision that make their statements on secession ratio decidendi. In fact this decision was cited as evidence that secession is unconstitutional as recently as 2006 by the Alaska Supreme Court in the case of Kohlhaas v. State, Alaska. The Alaska Supreme Court also ruled that secession was unconstitutional.

I stand by my statement that there is no antebellum case by the Supreme Court that said, in either ratio decidendi or obiter dictum that the states were party to ratification of the constitution. If you believe there is I would be interested in seeing it.

I do give you points for selectively quoting.

At some point, after his repeated posts misrepresenting the truth, we have to ask, is our new FRiend woodpusher stupid or just dishonest, or both?
In this example he has refused to recognize my actual view on the 1926 SCOTUS Meyers ruling, which is that I agree with the majority, written by Chief Justice Taft.

Oh goody! You agree with the 1926 SCOTUS Meyers ruling. Just for clarity and possible penetration, the ruling is the Opinion of the Court, and is most definitely not any part of any dissenting opinion.

It is good to see that you agree with the Opinion of the Court.

Regarding youur claimed precedent of Marbury, the Myers Court stated, that Marbury holds great authority in other matters, but "is not to be regarded as such authority in respect of the power of the President to remove officials appointed by the advice and consent of the Senate, for that question was not before the Court."

And the Myers Court stated, "the Tenure of Office Act of 1867, in so far as it attempted to prevent the President from removing executive officers who had been appointed by him by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was invalid...."

And the Myers Court continued, "... and that subsequent legislation of the same effect was equally so. For the reasons given, we most therefore hold that the provision of the law of 1876, by which the unrestricted power of removal of the first class postmasters is denied to the President, is in violation of the Constitution, and invalid." In other words, you failed to read and/or understand, Myers or Marbury.

Instead the 1867 Tenure of Office law was repealed by Congress in 1887, then mentioned in dicta by SCOTUS in it's 1926 Meyers ruling, saying it was "invalid", "insofar as it attempted to prevent the President from removing executive officers who had been appointed by him by and with the advice and consent of the Senate...".
So, does the 1926 in dicta comment of "invalid" equate to woodpusher's claims of "null and void ab initio"?
In their 1926 dissents, McReynolds, Brandeis and Holmes each gave reasons why Tenure was considered valid in 1868.

The 1926 dissents were the losing side. They played no role in the Opinion of the Court.

The dissents gave their argument. Their argument failed. The Opinion of the Court expounds the argument that prevailed.

But what he choses to ignore is the fact that I agree with the SCOTUS 1926 majority ruling.

You cite the dissenting opinions to do what? To establish that your argument, along with their argument, is the losing argument? Do make up you mind whether you agree with the Court ruling or the losing arguments of the dissenting justices.

I disagree that ruling made the 1867 Tenure of Office Act "null and void ab initio".

It is not a dictum when it is necessary and central to the case.

http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/impeach/imp_tenure.html

In 1926, in the case of Myers vs. United States, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft, held unconstitutional a law requiring the consent of the Senate for removal of certain non-Cabinet officials.

Aside from the observable fact that it is not a dictum, my source here is a law school faculty, yours is Wikipedia. That is aside from the fact that one of us reads court opinions and the other seems allergic to them.

The Myers court held that it found the 1867 Tenure in Office Act to be unconstitutional, and based on that holding, it must find all subsequent legislation to the same effect to be unconstitutional and void.

Marbury (1803) has not changed since I last quoted it to you at #300:

As Marbury stated at 5 U.S. 178

If an act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the Courts and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory, and would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on.

For a statute, repugnant to the Constitution, to have ever been effective as a law, one must recognize the (non-existent) power of Congress to change the Constitution with a statute. There is no such power. The statute was enacted, the Constitution was the superior, supreme law, and any law in conflict with the Constitution is a nullity.

Statutes are treated by the other branches with a presumption of regularity until the Judiciary decides otherwise. A judicial holding of repugnance to the Constitution holds that the offending statute never became a law.

Your ignorant blustering is no substitute for knowledge.

Nor has Norton changed.

Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 441-442 (1886), Justice Field, Opinion of the Court

But it is contended that if the act creating the board was void, and the commissioners were not officers de jure, they were nevertheless officers de facto, and that the acts of the board as a de facto court are binding upon the county. This contention is met by the fact that there can be no officer, either de jure or de facto, if there be no office to fill. As the act attempting to create the office of commissioner never became a law, the office never came into existence. Some persons pretended that they held the office, but the law never recognized their pretensions, nor did the supreme court of the state. Whenever such pretensions were considered in that court, they were declared to be without any legal foundation, and the commissioners were held to be usurpers.
[...]
Their position is that a legislative act, though unconstitutional, may in terms create an office, and nothing further than its apparent existence is necessary to give validity to the acts of its assumed incumbent. That position, although not stated in this broad form, amounts to nothing else. It is difficult to meet it by any argument beyond this statement: an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.

SCOTUS has repeatedly ruled that every statute struck down as repugnant to the constitution was a nullity. It was not a law, it never became a law. It only had apparent existence as a law. In legal contemplation, it never actually existed as a law.

For your juvenile logic to apply, you must adopt the position that an unconstitutional act of Congress strikes down whatever of the Constitution it conflicts with, until a Court decides it is unconstitutional.

If the Constitution prohibits A, and a Statute legalizes A, only one may establish whether A is prohibited or legal. You would have an unconstitutional Statute be a valid enforceable law, which is only possible if the Statute takes precedent over the Constitution. Article VI of the Constitution provides that, "The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution...." The Constitution takes precedent over all other laws.

Should Congress today pass and the President sign a statute establishing that abortion and gay marriage, constitutionally protected per the Supreme court, are capital offenses, would abortion and gay marriage be capital offenses? Would that statute be a valid law?

Could a State pass such a law every hour on the hour just to stay ahead of the courts? I must admit it is fun reducing your rants to the incoherent babbling that they really are.

As SCOTUS explicitly stated in Norton, "The act attempting to create the office of commissioner never became a law... an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed."

Your disagreement with the explicit holdings of SCOTUS is as legally insignificant as Stormy Daniels' virginity.

woodpusher: "Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803) was a case about an appointment, not a removal.
It was impossible for Marbury to issue a holding, or set a precedent, about the President's removal authority.
A dictum never controls anything."

And yet our new FRiend woodpusher wishes us to buy his argument that the 1926 SCOTUS in dictum comments regarding the repealed 1867 Tenure of Office Act render that law "null and void ab initio".

I am the only one in the address line. Who are "our" and "us"? Do you have a mouse in your pocket? Do you fantasize that I am my own new FRiend? Do you have FRiends like that? I suspect you may.

It is not a dictum when it is necessary and central to the case.

http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/impeach/imp_tenure.html

In 1926, in the case of Myers vs. United States, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft, held unconstitutional a law requiring the consent of the Senate for removal of certain non-Cabinet officials

Aside from the observable fact that it is not a dictum, my source here is a law school, yours is Wikipedia and your own blather.

Regarding your claimed precedent of Marbury, the Myers Court stated, that Marbury holds great authority in other matter, but "is not to be regarded as such authority in respect of the power of the President to remove officials appointed by the advice and consent of the Senate, for that question was not before the Court." In other words, you failed to read and/or understand, Myers or Marbury.

And the Myers Court stated, "the Tenure of Office Act of 1867, in so far as it attempted to prevent the President from removing executive officers who had been appointed by him by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was invalid...."

And the Myers Court continued, "... and that subsequent legislation of the same effect was equally so. For the reasons given, we most therefore hold that the provision of the law of 1876, by which the unrestricted power of removal of the first class postmasters is denied to the President, is in violation of the Constitution, and invalid."

Repealing an unconstitutional and void Statute, that, in legal contemplation never became a law, does not convert the void and unconstitutional Statute into a law.

woodpusher: "Legally, the 1867 Statute, and all subsequent statutes to the same effect, never became laws.
An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.
The other branches treat a statute as law until the Judiciary proclaims otherwise.
When the Judiciary proclaims a statute to have been enacted as repugnant to the Constitution, it holds that the Legislature had no authority to issue the statute in the first place, and its act of issuance was entirely void. "

And here we see my key point, underlined.
The 1867 Tenure law was not ruled on directly before being repealed in 1887.
It was mentioned in dicta in 1926 as "invalid".
But in 1868, in woodpusher's own words, "The other branches treat a statute as law..."

Let me clarify for the willfully, legally, incompetent. The other branches treat a statute as if it were a valid law until the Judiciary proclaims otherwise. Only the Judicial Branch is vested with the power to establish that a Statute was and is unconstitutional, repugnant to the Constitution, and therefore null and void, and never capable of having become a valid law.

As for your repeated incompetent nonsense that the 1867 Act was mentioned in dicta, it was holding and the very basis of the Myers decision. I have cited a law school faculty to that effect, and you have cited Wikipedia and your own blather.

It is not a dictum when it is necessary and central to the case.

http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/impeach/imp_tenure.html

In 1926, in the case of Myers vs. United States, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft, held unconstitutional a law requiring the consent of the Senate for removal of certain non-Cabinet officials

Aside from the observable fact that it is not a dictum, my source here is a law school faculty, yours is Wikipedia and your own blather.

But in 1868, in woodpusher's own words, "The other branches treat a statute as law..."

If you treat a dog's tail as a leg, does it have five legs?

The Executive or Legislative Branches treating a statute as presumptively valid, does not transform an unconstitutional statute into a valid law.

The Myers Court stated, "the Tenure of Office Act of 1867, in so far as it attempted to prevent the President from removing executive officers who had been appointed by him by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was invalid...."

And the Myers Court continued, "... and that subsequent legislation of the same effect was equally so. For the reasons given, we must therefore hold that the provision of the law of 1876, by which the unrestricted power of removal of the first class postmasters is denied to the President, is in violation of the Constitution, and invalid."

Repealing an unconstitutional and void Statute, that, in legal contemplation never became a law, does not convert the void and unconstitutional Statute into a law.

Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886), Justice Field, Opinion of the Court

Their position is that a legislative act, though unconstitutional, may in terms create an office, and nothing further than its apparent existence is necessary to give validity to the acts of its assumed incumbent. That position, although not stated in this broad form, amounts to nothing else. It is difficult to meet it by any argument beyond this statement: an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.

As a law, the Statute of 1867 has apparent existence and nothing more. In legal contemplation, it was unconstitutional and could never have existed as a valid law.

OIFVeteran quoting John Jay in Chisholm v. Georgia, 1793: ...
Every State Constitution is a compact made by and between the citizens of a State to govern themselves in a certain manner, and the Constitution of the United States is likewise a compact made by the people of the United States to govern themselves as to general objects in a certain manner...."

Yowza! You just declared secession lawful.

In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), at page 429 beings the Opinion of Judge IREDELL. At page 466 begins the Opinion of Justice CUSHING. At page 469 begins the opinion of Chief Justice Jay, At page 471 appears the quoted dictum of CJ Jay.

Jay’s dictum is not in an Opinion of the Court. The decision of the Court in Chisholm was reversed in 1798.

The legal wisdom announced in the opinion of Justice Iredell was adopted as the law of the land in 1798. At that time, the opinions of JAY, CJ, and Cushing, J were deprecated.

For students of history, on February 7, 1795, North Carolina became the 12th State to ratify the Eleventh Amendment. As there were 15 states at the time, that provided the requisite three-fourths of the member states for adoption. However, Liberals and Federalists being what Liberals and Federalists were and are, President John Adams did not announce that the requisite number states had ratified until January 8, 1798, nearly three years later. As the official certification of ratification did not occur until 1798, the adoption officially occurred in 1798 and not 1795.

For those students of history who use Justia as their source of Supreme Court opinions, it should be noted that all such opinions at Justia contain a disclaimer:

Disclaimer: Official Supreme Court case law is only found in the print version of the United States Reports. Justia case law is provided for general informational purposes only, and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or information linked to from this site. Please check official sources.

The Justia version contains three paragraphs from page 378, and one paragraph from page 382, and does not remain precisely faithful to the official text.

For those who use Findlaw as their source of Supreme Court opinions, they do not include a disclaimer, and tried to include the whole text, but committed a signification omission on page 379:

[, or retrospective regulation. No ex post facto law can be passed by Congress. Const. Art I § 9. No ex post facto]

For those students of history who use Wikipedia as their source of Supreme Court opinions, bless your heart.

Hollingsworth et al. versus Virginia, 3 U.S. Reports 378 (1798)

United States Supreme Court
Hollingsworth et al. versus Virginia (1798)
Argued: Decided: February 1, 1798
The decision of the Court, in the case of Chisholm, Ex'or. versus Georgia, (2 Dall. Rep. 419) produced a proposition in Congress, for amending the Constitution of the United States, according to the following terms:

"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law and equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States, by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state."

The proposition being now adopted by the constitutional number of States, Lee Attorney-general, submitted this question to the Court—Whether the Amendment did, or did not, supersede all suits depending, as well as prevent the institution of new suits, against any one of the United States, by citizens of another State?
W. Tilghman and Rawle, argued in the negative, contending, that the jurisdiction of the Court was unimpaired, in relation to all suits instituted, previously to the adoption of the amendment. They promised, that it would be a great hardship, that persons legally suing, should be deprived of a right of action, or be condemned to the payment of costs, by an amendment of the Constitution ex post facto; 4 Bac. Abr. 636 7. pl. 5. And that the jurisdiction being before regularly established, the amendment notwithstanding the words “shall not be construed,” &c. must be considered, in fact, as introductory of a new system of judicial authority. There are, however, two objections to be
[3 U.S. 378, 379]
discussed: 1st. The amendment has not been proposed in the form prescribed by the Constitution, and, therefore, it is void. Upon an inspection of the original roll, it appears that the amendment was never submitted to the President for his approbation. The Constitution declares that “every order, resolution, or vote, to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, &c.” Art. I. § 7. Now, the Constitution, likewise declares, that the concurrence of both Houses shall be necessary to a proposition for amendments. Art. 5. And it is no answer to the objection, to observe, that as two thirds of both Houses are required to originate the proposition, it would be nugatory to return it with the President's negative, to be repassed by the same number; since the reasons assigned for his disapprobation might be so satisfactory as to reduce the majority below the constitutional proportion. The concurrence of the President is required in matters of infinitely less importance; and whether on subjects of ordinary legislation, or of constitutional amendments, the expression is the same, and equally applies to the act of both Houses of Congress.
2nd. The second objection arises from the terms of the amendment itself. The words “commenced or prosecuted,” are properly in the past time; but, it is clear, that they ought not to be so gramatically restricted; for, then, a citizen need only discontinue his present suit, and commence another, in order to give the court cognizance of the cause. To avoid this evident absurdity, the words must be construed to apply only to suits to be “commenced and prosecuted.” The spirit of the constitution is opposed to every thing in the nature of an ex post facto law, or retrospective regulation. No ex post facto law can be passed by Congress. Const. Art I § 9. No ex post facto law can be passed by the Legislature of any individual State. Ibid. § 10. It is true, that an amendment to the Constitution cannot be controuled by those provisions; and if the words were explicit and positive, to produce the retrospective effect contended for, they must prevail. But the words are doubtful; and, therefore, they ought to be so construed, as to conform to the general principle of the Constitution.* In

CHASE, Justice. The words “commenced and prosecuted,” standing alone, would embrace cases both past and future.
W. Tilghman. But if the court can construe them, so as to confine their operation to future cases, they will do it, in order to avoid the effect of an ex post facto law, which is evidently contrary to the spirit of the constitution.

[3 U.S. 378, 380]
4 Bac. Abr. 650. pl. 64. it is stated, that “a statute shall never have an equitable construction, in order to overthrow an estate;” but, if the opposite doctrine prevails, it is obvious that many vested rights will be affected, many estates will be overthrown. For instance; Georgia has made and unmade grants of land, and to compel a resort to her courts, is, in effect, overthrowing the estate of the grantees. So, in the same book (p. 652. pl. 91. 92.) it is said, that “a statute ought to be so construed, that no man, who is innocent, be punished or endamaged;” and “no statute shall be construed in such manner, as to be inconvenient or against reason:” whereas the proposed construction of the amendment would be highly injurious to innocent persons; and, driving them from the jurisdiction of this court saddled with costs, is against every principle of justice, reason, and convenience. Presuming, then, that there will be a disposition to support any rational exposition, which avoids such mischievous consequences, it is to be observed, that the words “commenced and prosecuted” are sinonimous. There was no necessity for using the word “commenced,” as it is implied and included in the word “prosecuted;” and admitting this glossary, the amendment will only affect the future jurisdiction of the court. It may be said, however, that the word “commenced” is used in relation to future suits, and that the word “prosecuted” is applied to suits previously instituted. But it will be sufficient to answer, in favor of the benign construction, for which the Plaintiffs contend, that the word “commencing” may, on this ground, be confined to actions originally instituted here, and the word “prosecuted” to suits brought hither by writ of error, or appeal. For, it is to be shewn, that a state may be sued originally, and yet not in the Supreme Court, though the Supreme Court will have an appellate jurisdiction; as where the laws of a state authorize such suits in her own courts, and there is drawn in question the validity of a treaty, or statute of, or authority exercised under, the United States, and the decision is against their validity. 1 Vol. p. 58. § 13. p. 63. s. 25. Upon the whole, the words of the amendment are ambiguous and obscure; but as they are susceptible of an interpretation, which will prevent the mischief of an ex post facto Constitution (worse than an ex post facto law, in as much as it is not so easily rescinded, or repealed) that interpretation ought to be preferred.
Lee, Attorney General. The case before the court, is that of a suit against a state, in which the Defendant has never entered an appearance: but the amendment is equally operative in all the cases against states, where there has been an appearance, or even where there have been a trial and judgment. An amendment
[3 U.S. 378, 381]
of the constitution, and the repeal of a law, are not, manifestly, on the same footing: Nor can an explanatory law be expounded by foreign matter. The amendment, in the present instance, is merely explanatory, in substance, as well as language. From the moment those who gave the power to sue a state, revoked and annulled it, the power ceased to be a part of the constitution; and if it does not exist there, it cannot in any degree be found, or exercised, else where. The policy and rules, which in relation to ordinary acts of legislation, declare that no ex post facto law shall be passed, do not apply to the formation, or amendment, of a constitution. The people limit and restrain the power of the legislature, acting under a delegated authority; but they impose no restraint on themselves. They could have said by an amendment to the constitution, that no judicial authority should be exercised, in any case, under the United States; and, if they had said so, could a court be held, or a judge proceed, on any judicial business, past or future, from the moment of adopting the amendment? On general ground, then, it was in the power of the people to annihilate the whole, and the question is, whether they have annihilated a part, of the judicial authority of the United States? Two objections are made: 1st, That the amendment has not been proposed in due form. But has not the same course been pursued relative to all the other amendments, that have been adopted?* And the case of amendments is evidently a substantive act, unconnected with the ordinary business of legislation, and not within the policy, or terms, of investing the President with a qualified negative on the acts and resolutions of Congress. 2nd, That the amendment itself only applies to future suits. But whatever force there may be in the rules for construing statutes, they cannot be applied to the present case. It was the policy of the people to cut off that branch of the judicial power, which had been supposed to authorize suits by individuals against states; and the words being so extended as to support that policy, will equally apply to the past and to the future. A law, however, cannot be denominated retrospective, or which merely changes the remedy, but does not affect the right: In all the states, in some form or other, a remedy is furnished for the fair claims of individuals against the respective governments. The amendment is paramount to all the laws of the union; and if any part of the judicial act is in opposition to it, that part must be expunged. There can be no amendment of the constitution, indeed, which may

Chase, Justice. There can, surely, be no necessity to answer that argument. The negative of the President applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation: He has nothing to do with the proposition, or adoption, of amendments to the Constitution.

[3 U.S. 378, 382]
not, in some respect, be called ex post facto; but the moment it is adopted, the power that it gives, or takes away, begins to operate, or ceases to exist.
The Court, on the day succeeding the argument, delivered an unanimous opinion, that the amendment being constitutionally adopted, there could not be exercised any jurisdiction, in any case, past or future, in which a state was sued by the citizens of another state, or by citizens, or subjects, of any foreign state.

OIFVeteran quoting John Marshall in Cohen vs Virginia 1821: "The people made the constitution, and the people can unmake it.
It is the creature of their will, and lives only by their will.
But this supreme and irresistible power to make or to unmake, resides only in the whole body of the people; not in any sub-division of them.
The attempt of any of the parts to exercise it is usurpation, and ought to be repelled by those to whom the people have delegated their power of repelling it."
Thanks for two great quotes from Federalists John Jay and John Marshall.
Quotes like these help explain why some anti-Federalist Lost Causers consider Jay and Marshall to be words like, "nationalists", "monarchists", "oppressors", "tyrants", small-d "democrats", "crony capitalists", "liars" and whatever other nasty names might come to their minds.

Can I play? As a student of history, you should enjoy this.

Everybody opposed to Consolidation. — Washington, under “the unanimous order of the convention,” reported the new project to congress in a letter, dated September 17, 1787, which contains the following little phrase : “in all our deliberations on this subject, we kept steadily in our view . . . the consolidation of our union.” Literally this phrase does not speak of the states; but it is the union of them that is to be consolidated, that is to say, increased in utility, efficiency, and strength, made more solid and strong, and more likely to endure. And, as will now be shown from her debates, this precisely accords with what her statesmen said, in her ratifying convention, in defence of the proposed system. One quotation will suffice to present the charge as made in the convention. Hon. Mr. Dench thought “the words, ‘we, the people,’ in the first clause ordaining the constitution,” and the eighth section of the first article, “would produce a consolidation of the states, and the moment it begins, a dissolution of the state governments commences.” [II. Ell. Deb. 98, 99.]
General Brooks immediately replied that the idea that this constitution would produce “consolidation” of the states, or “dissolution” of their governments, was “ill-founded — or, rather, a loose idea. In the first place, the congress under this constitution cannot be organized without repeated acts of the legislatures of the several states; and, therefore, if the creating power is dissolved, the body to be created cannot exist. In the second place, it is impossible that the general government can exist, unless the governments of the several states are forever existing; as the qualifications of the electors of the federal representatives are to be the same as those of the electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislatures. The powers to be given to congress amount only to a consolidation of the strength of the union.” [II. Ell. Deb. 99.] This is the same idea that was expressed by the president of the Virginia convention, as the object of union, viz., “to bind in one ligament the strength of thirteen states.” And all the fathers constantly kept it in view, that the states were combining their strength for defence, as well as joining for convenience, economy, and efficiency in the general government of their citizens.
Colonel Varnum said the purpose of the constitution “was only a consolidation of strength;” and that the states were not to be consolidated by it, and, moreover, that the congress provided for had no right to affect them. “It is,” said he, “the interest of the whole to confederate against a foreign enemy.” [II. Ell. Deb. 78.]
Hon. James Bowdoin not only denied that there was danger of consolidation in the system, but he spoke of it as “a confederacy, which would give security and permanency to the several states;” that is to say, preserve them. [II. Ell. Deb. 129.] Judge Sumner argued that there was no danger that “the delegation of these great powers would destroy the state legislatures, . . . for the general government depended on them for its very existence.” [Ibid. 64.] Hon. Mr. Sedgwick said that “if he thought this constitution consolidated the union of the states, he should be the last man to vote for it.” [II. Ell. Deb. 77. See also Massachusetts Centinel, Feb. 2, 1788.]
In the small volume of “debates” of the ratifying convention, published by the state early in the present century, at page 316 is to be found the following account and extracts. Mr. Shurtleff, referring to General Washington’s letter above mentioned, objected that “the convention said they aimed at a consolidation of the union.” Mr. Parsons, afterwards the Chief Justice of Massachusetts, said there was “a distinction between a consolidation of the states, and a consolidation of the union.” Mr. Jones said that “the word ‘consolidation’ had different ideas.” “Different metals melted into one mass,” he said, illustrated one, and “several twigs tied into one bundle,” the other.
Hon. Mr. Dana, afterwards Chief Justice of Massachusetts, said, in the same debate, that “ if this government was a consolidation, instead of a confederation, he should think the number [of representatives] too small. But, as it is federal, and we have our own governments to support, the expense [of a larger number] would be too great.” [Memoirs of Chief Justice Parsons, p. 93.] George Cabot, writing to Judge Parsons, February 28,1788, said that one of the great fears of the people was, that the constitution makes “ such a consolidation of the states as will dissolve their governments,” but that the equal suffrage in the senate “is security that no measures will ever pass tending in the smallest degree to consolidation.” [See Memoirs of Judge Parsons; see also Amory’s Life of Governor Sullivan, p. 534.]
Fisher Ames, the great Massachusetts statesman and orator, said: “No argument against the new plan has made a deeper impression than this, that it will produce a consolidation of the states. This is an effect which all good men deprecate. The state governments are essential parts of the system. The senators represent the sovereignty of the states. They are in the quality of ambassadors of the states. . . . A consolidation of the states . . . would subvert the constitution. Too much provision cannot be made against consolidation. The state governments represent the wishes and feelings and local interests of the people.” He further said that they would “ afford shelter against the abuse of federal power,” and that “the system would be, in practice as in theory, a federal republic.” [II. Ell. Deb. 46.] Though other extracts could be produced, these will suffice. I have piled up this mass of proof to make Massachusetts refute her own sons; to expose their offence in suppressing or garbling her record to get excuses for violating her sacred faith; and to prevent further confidence in them as to these subjects. But this is not all: for the record further shows the direct opposite of consolidation, to have been the solemn understanding on which Massachusetts ratified. Let us see.
The Severalty and Sovereignty of the States. — Her wise men in the convention gave to her, many and most emphatic assurances on this point. I have just quoted Fisher Ames as saying, “the senators represent the sovereignty of the states.” [II. Ell. Deb. 46.] Judge Parsons said the senate was designed “to preserve the sovereignty of the states.” [See his “Memoirs” by his son, p. 98.] Christopher Gore, for many years one of her leading statesmen, said : “The senate represents the sovereignty of the states.” [II. Ell. Deb. 18.] Governor Bowdoin said the states are “ distinct sovereignties.” [II. Ell. Deb. 129.] George Cabot, afterwards one of her federal senators, said the “senate is a representation of the sovereignty of the individual states.” [II. Ell. Deb. 26.] Mr. Thacher said : “The senate are elected by the legislatures of the different states, and represent their sovereignty” [II. Ell. Deb. 145.] Samuel Adams said that, under the new constitution, “ each state retains her sovereignty.” [II. Ell. Deb. 131.] Other similar quotations might be given, but it is not necessary, as none of the fathers dissented, and as the then existing federal compact, and the constitution of Massachusetts, both contained assertions of absolute state sovereignty, which the fathers neither sought to nor could go behind.
“We, the people,” means Massachusetts. — The phrase, “the people,” was then used in a general sense, as it is now; for the people of all the states were alike in political condition, had common sentiments, and aimed at self-government, not only as societies, such as they then were, but as united societies, which they were then seeking to become. Their contemplated self-federalization was for convenience, economy, and united strength. “The people,” then, only existed, and had capacity for political action, as states; and, as these bodies were equal, they must have been respectively sovereign. Consistently with this idea, the organic laws of the states generally declared that “all power is inherent in the people,”— the state making the declaration referring to herself, of course, for she made it independently, and had no right or reason to make it for any other people. Wherefore, we shall find the phrase, when technically and constitutionally used, to mean the people of a state, or the people of the states, considered as sovereignties. The records of all the states show this, as will be seen. I now proceed to give the conclusive proof Massachusetts affords. Her own record shows her to be as autocratic as the Czar in decreeing her institutions, state and federal, as well as in her present political status. When her people, as a separately and thoroughly organized colony, assumed independence, and “by a social compact” to use their own words, formed themselves into a state, they solemnly preambled as follows: Thanking God for the opportunity of deliberately entering into “an original, explicit, and solemn compact with each other,” and “forming a new constitution of civil government for themselves and posterity,” they declare that “We, the people of Massachusetts, ... do agree upon, ordain, and establish the following declaration of rights and frame of government as the constitution of the commonwealth of Massachusetts.” And it in no wise qualifies the sovereign character of the said “We, the people ” that they establish a federal government, for this must exist by their creation, hold their powers in trust, and hence remain subordinate to them. Indeed, the same fundamental law that I have just quoted from, declares that “the people of the commonwealth have the sole and exclusive right of governing themselves as a free, sovereign, and independent state,” and that they “forever hereafter shall exercise and enjoy every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not . . . by them expressly delegated to the united states in congress assembled.”

Nice avoidance on the discussion of resolution 19 at the constitutional convention and the rejection of having the states, through their legislatures, ratify the constitution and the acceptance of the people, through representatives at a convention, ratify it.

“Every State Constitution is a compact made by and between the citizens of a State to govern themselves in a certain manner, and the Constitution of the United States is likewise a compact made by the people of the United States to govern themselves as to general objects in a certain manner....”

I don’t think this says what you think it says. It clearly says state constitutions are a compact between the people and the state. It then says “the constitution of the United States is likewise a compact made by the people of the United States”. Notice it doesn’t say the people of Virginia or New York but the people, all the people, of the United States. That is actually proof that secession by a subset of the people, say from one or more states, is not allowed.

Also nice dodge on the Texas v White decision and that decisions use by the Alaskan Supreme Court when they declared secession unconstitutional. I’ll give you points for your dodging abilities, you lost some for reading comprehension though.

woodpusher: "Until the final vote, the change was only in the Senate version of a House Bill, which was an indemnity bill."

The final Conference Committee report -- Trumbull's rewritten bill -- was approved 99-44 in the House, by voice vote in the Senate.
Therefore it's only Trumbull's bill which really matters here, and it's interesting to learn that Trumbull called his bill an "indemnity bill" because, as I understand it, the word "indemnity" does not appear in it.

If it was, in fact, Trumbull's intention to indemnify President Lincoln without using the word "indemnify", that's interesting.
It brings to mind the debate of James Madison on the authority of a President to fire appointees.
Madison did not wish to say that, in the bill then under discussion, because he did not want it to seem like Congress was granting authority which, by the Constitution's intent, the President already had.
Perhaps Trumbull -- or at least his fellow Republicans -- did not wish to indemnify Lincoln for exercising powers he already had.

woodpusher on 1862 HR-591: "There was NO RECORDED VOTE on H.R. 599. (sic HR-591)
It is contested that a call for the nays was even called and heard.
The only record of the vote is the Presiding Officer stating, The ayes have it.
The yeas and nays were not counted and recorded.
This is your claimed overwhelming majority vote. "

So here is the sequence of events:

"Introduced in the House of Representatives as H.R. 591, A bill to indemnify the President and other persons for suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and acts done in pursuance thereof by Thaddeus Stevens on December 5, 1862."
Passed the House of Representatives on December 8, 1862 (90–45)
Passed the Senate on January 28, 1863 (33–7)
Reported by the joint conference committee on February 27, 1863;
Agreed to by the House of Representatives on March 2, 1863 (99–44) and
by the Senate on March 2, 1863 (voice vote)
Signed into law by President Abraham Lincoln on March 3, 1863"

So, it was not Stevens' original HR 591 which passed, but rather Senator Trumbull's replacement bill, which differed:

"The Senate version referred all suits and prosecutions regarding arrest and imprisonment to the regional federal circuit court with the stipulation that no one acting under the authority of the president could be faulted if "there was reasonable or probable cause", or if they acted "in good faith", until after the adjournment of the next session of Congress.[27]
Unlike Stevens' bill, it did not suggest that the president's suspension of habeas corpus upon his own authority had been legal.[24]"

So, despite the name "Indemnity Bill", Trumbull's final Act did not use the word "indemnity" and I would suggest that's because Republicans agreed Congress had no reason to indemnify Lincoln for actions the Constitution authorized.

woodpusher quoting Randall: "It is significant that Stevens, the author of the indemnifying feature of the House bill, was not one of those who held, with the Attorney General, that the President had the right to suspend habeas corpus privilege.
Some who concurred in the Attorney General's opinion that the President had the full power to suspend, and to delegate such authority to subordinates, argued that no wrongs had been committed, and that no indemnification was necessary.
Conversely, the very basis of the bill of indemnity, in the minds of many who voted for it, was an assumption that the President did not constitutionally have this power, or at least a doubt as to the legality of this presidential suspension and a desire to clear up the matter once and for all."

Notice first that Lincoln's Attorney General, Edwin Bates, agreed Lincoln's actions were already authorized.

Second, here you've quoted my explanation exactly -- the word "indemnify" was removed because enough Republicans were convinced that no indemnity was necessary, while others (i.e., Trumbull) questioned if indemnity was even possible.

woodpusher: "It appears, amongst other things, that you must add the name of Thaddeus Stevens to your list of RINOs, Democrats and Traitors. "

Or perhaps that Stevens was satisfied enough with the substance of indemnity that he was willing to sacrifice the word itself, at Trumbull's insistence.

woodpusher: "It was agreed to take up the bill at 7 p.m. that evening.
Its passage was after midnight, in the early morning.
When did the filibuster take place?
When was the word indemnification (sic - indemnify) removed from the House Bill?"

"Indemnity" does not appear in the final version.
Democrats attempted to filibuster the evening of March 2.

several Democratic Senators attempted a filibuster

woodpusher: "You copied and pasted a list of various proposals for Reconstruction.
The proposals are characterized by the Wikipedia source as a bill, a constitutional amendment, a joint resolution, and an amendment proposal.
While the article makes no claim that these things are the same, or virtually the same, if it makes you feel better to believe that a proposed constitutional amendment, a constitutional amendment, a joint resolution of Congress, and a bill are all virtually the same thing, I say go for it.
Bless your heart."

Thanks, what a swell guy you are.
</sarcasm>

One thing I’ve realized in studying the history of America is that democrats have been the cause of a lot of the problems in this country.

woodpusher quoting Justice Story: "§ 321. The obvious deductions, which may be, and indeed have been, drawn from considering the constitution as a compact between the states, are, that it operates as a mere treaty, or convention between them, and has an obligatory force upon each state no longer, than suits its pleasure, or its consent continues; that each state has a right to judge for itself in relation to the nature extent, and obligations.
Of the instrument, without being at all bound by the interpretation of the federal government, or by that of any other state; and that each retains the power to withdraw from the confederacy and to dissolve the connexion, when such shall be its choice; and may suspend the operations of the federal government, and nullify its acts within its own territorial limits, whenever, in its own opinion, the exigency of the case may require.
These conclusions may not always be avowed; but they flow naturally from the doctrines, which we have under consideration.
They go to the extent of reducing the government to a mere confederacy during pleasure; and of thus presenting the extraordinary spectacle of a nation existing only at the will of each of its constituent parts."

woodpusher "That is the more mature and considered opinion of Joseph Story.
You may wish to rethink your support for the early Joseph Story who stated in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, that the Constitution was a compact.
Oh my, just look at what flows from such finding, according to Story."

Obviously, Joseph Story did not intend to imply -- in 1816 by his use of the word "compact" -- the freight of inferences loaded on that word by the time of his Commentaries in 1833.

And just so we're clear on this: some of our Lost Causers rank Justice Joseph Story right up there beside Chief Justices John Marshall & John Jay along with Alexander Hamilton, John Adams & others, as not just dreaded horned-Federalists, but also "Arch-Villain's of the Republic" -- tyrants, oppressors, liars, nationalists, consolidators and whatever other nasty names they can coin.
And why is that?
For one, in this example, Story decries the "obvious deductions" from "considering the constitution as a compact between the states".
Story was against doing that.

OIFVeteran to woodpusher: "I stand by my statement that there is no antebellum case by the Supreme Court that said, in either ratio decidendi or obiter dictum that the states were party to ratification of the constitution.
If you believe there is I would be interested in seeing it.
I do give you points for selectively quoting."

Not just selective quoting, but seemingly interpreting quotes to mean the opposite of their authors' intentions.

The issue of "states rights" is resolved when we remember, as Jay, Story & others pointed out, that all governments, whether local, state or Federal are merely creations and extensions of sovereign citizens and have such powers as citizens deem appropriate to them.
So clashes among government entities are metaphorically like one hand claiming some authority or "hands-rights" over the other.
It's ridiculous, especially in the case of citizenries split-minded and unable to bring both hands to coordinated actions toward some rational goal.

Of course, human nature is such that we are not always as clear-thinking and organized as we should be, but if we move one hand to punish the other, or use the other to undermine the one, then it is always the whole body politic which suffers most.

So the "debate" continues as to whether or not President Andrew Johnson was impeached for breaking the 1867 Tenure of Office Act.
Woodpusher says "no" because in 1926 that law (repealed in 1887) was declared "invalid" by SCOTUS.
But woodpusher also admits that any law must be treated as valid until declared otherwise by the judiciary...

woodpusher: "It is good to see that you agree with the Opinion of the Court."

We should first notice that woodpusher only considers SCOTUS authoritative in rulings he agrees with, otherwise, not so much.

woodpusher: "The 1926 dissents were the losing side.
They played no role in the Opinion of the Court."

And that is also my view of anti-Federalists who lost their battle to prevent ratification of the Constitution, but later reemerged as Jeffersonian Democrats to nullify, eventually secede and declare war against the United States.
Their opinions are of no value in defining Founders Original Intent.

woodpusher: "It is not a dictum when it is necessary and central to the case...

'In 1926, in the case of Myers vs. United States, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft, held unconstitutional a law requiring the consent of the Senate for removal of certain non-Cabinet officials.'

"Aside from the observable fact that it is not a dictum, my source here is a law school faculty, yours is Wikipedia.
That is aside from the fact that one of us reads court opinions and the other seems allergic to them."

"One of us", that would by woodpusher, consistently misrepresents his own quotes.
In this case your quote refers to "certain non-cabinet officials" and that was the 1876 law which was central to the 1926 Meyers ruling, not the repealed 1867 law, which was not directly involved.

"In 1926, a similar law (though not dealing with Cabinet secretaries) was ruled unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Myers v. United States, which affirmed the ability of the President to remove a Postmaster without Congressional approval.
In reaching that decision, the Supreme Court stated in its majority opinion (though in dicta),
'that the Tenure of Office Act of 1867, insofar as it attempted to prevent the President from removing executive officers who had been appointed by him by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was invalid".[3]

It appears to me that at least some legal observers consider the 1926 Meyers' reference to the 1867 Tenure Law as "in dicta", so I'll take that as valid until I see something more than woodpusher's rantings to the contrary.

woodpusher: "You cite the dissenting opinions to do what?
To establish that your argument, along with their argument, is the losing argument?
Do make up you mind whether you agree with the Court ruling or the losing arguments of the dissenting justices. "

I agree the President can fire postmasters and the 1876 law was invalid.
That was the central issue in the 1926 Meyers ruling.
In 1926 the repealed 1867 Tenure law was not the issue and so was mentioned in dicta as also "invalid".
But you yourself posted:

"The other branches treat a statute as law until the Judiciary proclaims otherwise."

Since "the judiciary" could conceivably proclaim any statute unconstitutional, the government can in no way determine which laws may, 50+ years in the future, be declared "invalid".
That's why Tenure was valid law in 1868, so far as anyone then knew.

woodpusher: "Statutes are treated by the other branches with a presumption of regularity until the Judiciary decides otherwise.
A judicial holding of repugnance to the Constitution holds that the offending statute never became a law.
Your ignorant blustering is no substitute for knowledge."

And yet... in historical fact the 1867 Tenure Act was treated as law up until the date of its repeal, in 1887, still ~40 years before the SCOTUS 1926 ruling against it.
Your ignorant blustering is no substitute for facts.

woodpusher: "SCOTUS has repeatedly ruled that every statute struck down as repugnant to the constitution was a nullity.
It was not a law, it never became a law.
It only had apparent existence as a law.
In legal contemplation, it never actually existed as a law.
For your juvenile logic to apply, you must adopt the position that an unconstitutional act of Congress strikes down whatever of the Constitution it conflicts with, until a Court decides it is unconstitutional."

That last is total nonsense because the truth is you yourself have posted:

post #300: "The other branches treat a statute as law until the Judiciary proclaims otherwise."
post #300: "Statutes are treated by the other branches with a presumption of regularity until the Judiciary decides otherwise."
post #310: "Statutes are treated by the other branches with a presumption of regularity until the Judiciary decides otherwise."
post #312: "Let me clarify for the willfully, legally, incompetent.
The other branches treat a statute as if it were a valid law until the Judiciary proclaims otherwise.
Only the Judicial Branch is vested with the power to establish that a Statute was and is unconstitutional, repugnant to the Constitution, and therefore null and void, and never capable of having become a valid law. "

So you have repeatedly confirmed my point, all the while heaping scorn on me for raising it.

woodpusher: "I must admit it is fun reducing your rants to the incoherent babbling that they really are."

It seems your idea of "fun" is to lie and lie big, but in doing so you only mock & embarrass yourself.