"The Next 100 Years" by George Friedman (book review)

Self | 2010 | George Friedman

[LS]

Several weeks ago I wrote a review here of Peter Zeihan's 2015 book "The Accidental Superpower." At the time I was urged to compare it with the work of another "Futurist," George Friedman, whose 2010 book "The Next 100 Years" appeared five years earlier. So this is in response to those Freepers who requested this review.

Friedman is the had of STRATFOR, obviously preceded Zeihan's "Accidental Superpower," and perhaps because of that was less specific in some of his predictions. Overall, the two books are extremely similar with perhaps one big exception, their take on Mexico/oil.

Friedman argues that as a naval power with superb international geographic positioning (i.e., no enemies on our immediate borders) has had the luxury of fighting wars in such a way as to destabilize and weaken our enemies, not to necessarily "win" and conquer them. That goes against Ronald' Reagan's maxims for war-fighting, but Friedman sees the recent invasions of the Middle East as a victory in that the Caliphate was stopped in its tracks and the "Islamic world [was] set against itself." In Korea and Vietnam, Friedman claims, the US did not need victory, only to blunt the expansionist momentum of the communists, which we did.

One thing both authors bring up is the rise of US naval power in World War II. Both emphasize the incredible cost of building up a navy (vs. an army). Neither much notes that it was WW II that accelerated the naval buildup to a point that no one else could hope to catch up. The US already had spurts (1880s, 1920s) of rapid shipbuilding, but the sheer numbers in WW II (17 heavy carriers, 25 baby flattops, more SHIPS than the Japanese had planes by 1945) meant that no one else would ever be capable of challenging US seapower.

For example, while the Chinese are attempting to build a deep water navy, their resources are a fraction of what the US has---as the Soviet Union learned in the 1960s when it tried to challenge the US on the high seas. The Soviets were able to build the fastest sub in the world---but only because they skimped on safety and designed an engine that could run for only a few minutes at highest power before blowing up ("a grenade," as one naval expert described the "Alpha" to me). And, like the Russkies, the Chinese face an entire ring of land-based air from technological powers such as Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Australia. Merely getting to sea would involve tremendous attrition. Friedman writes of the USA, "No other power in history has been able [to control ALL of its oceans."

Like "Accidental Superpower," Friedman's book argues that the post-WW II order is coming to an end for a variety of reasons, mostly the demographic collapse. As labor costs go up in industrialized countries, trade wars will necessarily occur, all to the detriment of everyone but us. Moreover, the US's capital intense system has no equal: China has already run out of labor inputs and its population will begin to decline as well (by 2030 the USA will be three years younger on average than China). But China has no capital generating ability of its own if there is no trade. Like Japan, it is entirely export driven.

This leads both Friedman and Zeihan to predict future incursions into China by Japan; the fracturing of China along coastal/interior lines; and the shrinking of China's economy.

Historically, I'm flattered that Freidman states in a geopolitical way much of what Dave Dougherty and I wrote in a historical narrative in 2012 and 2013, including the point that the US in the 1950s in fact was already undergoing a great deal of turmoil and that the sixties was not as much a break with the 50s as a culmination of movements started then. But Friedman is NOT good on his history. He claims that the naval buildup started in WW II, when it was well under way under Benjamin Harrison in the 1880s (when the US leaped to being the #2 naval power in the world behind Britain). Indeed, the US dominance at sea in the Spanish-American War should have been a wakeup call to all the other naval powers.

Freidman is especially wrong when it comes to his historical understanding of the US post 1970, where he paints America as "on the defensive psychologically." Guess he never heard of Ronald Reagan, who singlehandedly turned that around. He says the US was "surprised" when we won the Cold War. Not Reagan. He may not have known the exact day the wall would fall, but knew it was inevitable.

Likewise, both Freidman and Zeihan downplay or misunderstand the nature of Islamic radicalism, and how it is a fundamentally different force than traditional geopolitical power struggles. "What is happening in the Islamic world ultimately will not matter a great deal," he writes. I think this is wrong. It won't matter IF we correctly counter it was a RELIGIOUS force and not treat it as merely another fight between "nation states." Islam itself must be defeated, not "Iran," "Syria," etc.

Conversely, both Friedman and Zeihan ignore or minimize the role of Christianity---especially Protestant congregationalism---in shaping American exceptionalism. He says that the US "values getting things done and not worrying too much about why whatever thing you are doing is important." That is patently false. In almost all cases, the things Americans GET DONE are undertaken precisely because of a sense of nobility, service to humanity---the old "pay any price, bear any burden" of Kennedy. Americans HAVE THIS ATTITUDE BECAUSE OF WHAT THEIR RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS HAVE MADE THEM. We don't re-hash the arguments any more (at least, not until the 21st century) because in general Americans have agreed on the fundamentals---tyranny is wrong, large pockets of unfree people under the control of a tyrant ARE a threat, and our intentions are usually good.

Now to the two "biggies" in Friedman's book, China and Mexico. I think he gets one right and one wrong. He correctly notes that China is totally dependent on the USA. "China sends almost one-quarter of all its exports to the United States," and if we barred those goods or imposed tariffs, "China would face a massive economic crisis." (The same is true for Japan, he argues). "So East Asia has no real effect counter to an American military or economic move." This means that China and Japan will have no choice but to try to increase their military power in the region.

China, he argues, is "Japan on steroids." It values social relations above economic discipline, and won't allow market forces to cull out the inefficient and unprofitable. But whereas Japan voluntarily let a recession impose discipline in the 1990s, China cannot. It has instead simply gone into more and more debt. Freidman estimates the debt to be around 40% of GDP (compared to Japan's 20% in 1990). Friedman wrongly says no one predicted these trends, but George Gilder did in "The Spirit of Enterprise." Indeed, Gilder, while poor as a stock-picker, has been terrific as a "futurist."

China has rested on three pillars: a massive bureaucracy, a military-security complex that imposes fear and control, and the ideological principles of the Communist Party. But the third pillar, he argues, has disappeared and been replaced by the broader notion of "China as a great power." This is how he predicts Peking will generate support for the regime, but this is extremely tenuous, as the coastal (rich) cities increasingly look different from the rest of the country. Friedman (again, this was 2010) predicted China's growth would slow (it has, dramatically) and that would either cause it to fragment or to crack down in a massive new Maoist revolution. The "least likely" scenario, he says, is a continuation of the current situation.

I will not go into his lengthy predictions for a third world war in 2050 involving Japan, large numbers of hypersonic aircraft and missiles, and space war. (He predicts the US will put in place three "Battle Stars" controlling and directing earthly space that will choke Japan and Turkey and will go up with "breathtaking speed."

I do want to spend a minute on his Mexico prediction, an offshoot of the demographic argument that with collapsing birthrates the US will have to import Mexican workers and that a real, genuine "reconquista" war will erupt in the Southwest. To his credit, Freidman did predict a wall would go up---but claimed it wouldn't help. He mistakenly sees the southwestern Hispanics as a seething resentful mass of loyal Mexicans. Sorry, but I've lived in AZ most of my life and that's not the case, either culturally, politically, or most important, religiously.

It MAY be the case in parts of LA or southern CA. But for the most part, even with recent influxes, Hispanics here are Americanized and they practice an American brand of Catholicism that is radically different from the religion in central Mexico. This region was so different that Mexicans both in CA and in TX fought WITH the Americans against the Mexican government both in 1836 and in 1844. They were, for 40 years, viewed as second class citizens and the upper tier of Mexico, until recently, had no loyalty at all to Mexico City.

There has been a change, first in the narco controlled areas (which is not loyalty to Mexico City but to drug lords) and to the radicalized youth attending America-hating schools. Still, these groups make up a relatively small part of all Hispanics in the US, especially on the southern border. One unnamed pollster has told me his findings shocked him, that, for example, the Ecuadorians who have come in recently resemble the CUBAN-AMERICANS in their high levels of "American-ness" and patriotism. (He has not polled the southwestern hispanics).

Anyway, that's Friedman's predictions. I think his historical take on the US is badly flawed in a number of places, and that makes me doubt his take on this. But his theories about China and the collapse of Russia---making it more aggressive---line up perfectly with "Accidental Superower."

[Southside_Chicago_Republican]

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