On autopilot: 'Pilots are losing their basic flying skills,' some fear after Boeing 737 Max crashes

USA Today | May 25, 2019 | Chris Woodyard

[logi_cal869]

Link only

[FtrPilot]

...The elimination of the position of ‘flight engineer’. The FE was responsible for all of the aircraft’s systems...

Primary responsibility of the FE was monitoring the engines. FADECs and improved engine reliability have pretty much eliminated the need for FEs.

[Roccus]

Instead of heading North further inland, making a slow right, going a bit over the markers and making a hard right onto the NW to SE runway at JFK, he made a hard right too soon (no markers) and lined up on the SW to NE runway at FBNAS.

The zig-zag correction back to the approach path must have been interesting for the passengers also.

[FtrPilot]

I would have thought that when they modified the plane and had an angle of attack indicator one one side they would have jumped at the opportunity of having another one on the other side of the cockpit...

All Boeing 737 aircraft have 2 AOA sensors. The issue is the MCAS architecture where MCAS only receives data from one AOA sensor at a time. If that sensor malfunctions, MCAS has no way to determine that the sensor has malfunctioned and reacts to the AOA data being provided by the sensor.

The safety features that were extra cost options are AOA display on the PFD (see pic below. It's the gauge to the right of "CMD" with a readout of 5.2) and "AOA disagree" warning message.

I still don't know why Boeing made these extra cost options.

[logi_cal869]

Ummm....no. I’m not sure what your intent is to deflect from my comment, but the FE had far more responsibility than can be described with “monitoring the engines”. Military job description follows, but is still apt:

http://www.foreverwingman.com/career_fields/1a1x1-flight-engineer/

I’m not going to debate this. It is IMHO as a corollary to discussion of the dangers of flight automation. Using statistics to justify removal of one member of the crew who could literally occupy a space not much larger than a jumpseat is the real canard here.

Obviously it will take many more crashes for aircraft designers and the airlines to acknowledge that their beloved computers are not accomplishing the goal of precluding a flight engineer. That’s what we’re really discussing here. If the flying public is lucky, those crashes will stay below the threshold.

“Lucky.” And Boeing is content to design deficient systems with no regard for informing the pilots; clearly the problem is industry culture.

When I read reports of pilots reviewing manuals and checklists in the midst of an emergency juxtaposed against reports of pilots who are unable to focus on flying the aircraft due to “task saturation”, it is clear that the industry has a problem they refuse to acknowledge.

The fact that they have a term for it (task saturation) illustrates the problem perfectly. I described it previously as a canard; I stand behind that statement.

The term implies that pilots are capable of managing the shortcomings of automated flight control systems while flying the aircraft; the industry response has been to highlight the shortcomings of pilots’ ability to manage aircraft control systems and minimize their flight shortcomings as a result of lack of manual flight experience.

Their solution is “more simulator time” and “more automated flight control systems.”

There’s a word for that...

[neverevergiveup]

I wonder if the naval air station runway was still intact enough to avoid a disaster.

[Capt. Tom]

All Boeing 737 aircraft have 2 AOA sensors. The issue is the MCAS architecture where MCAS only receives data from one AOA sensor at a time. If that sensor malfunctions, MCAS has no way to determine that the sensor has malfunctioned and reacts to the AOA data being provided by the sensor.

Thanks for the info.

Still, what is the point if they are both not hooked up?- Tom

[Roccus]

During the 1995 50 year anniversary celebrations for the end of WWII, I witnessed a B-29 Superfortress land and take off from that strip. It then proceeded to buzz the tower at JFK....twice. lol

I doubt that it is good or long enough to handle a 747, but I’m NO expert.

There were a lot of vintage aircraft in the NYC area at that time. One day there was a fly-by of the City down the Hudson by all the craft...a parade in the sky.

[neverevergiveup]

“One day there was a fly-by of the City down the Hudson by all the craft...a parade in the sky.”

Sounds fantastic. I wonder if there is footage of it.

[Roccus]

The fly-by might have been on Veteran’s Day. I remember it was an overcast, misty day with low visibility. I was fortunately able to park on the Henry Hudson PKWY bridge at about 155 St. and had an unobstructed view of the aircraft as they came down the Hudson.

[FtrPilot]

...what is the point if they are both not hooked up?

Exactly!

Once the proposed fix is implemented, MCAS will use data from both AOA sensors. If the sensors disagree (outside a certain tolerance) MCAS will be disabled. Also, the "optional" safety features will become "standard".