To expand, the pilot’s input in the case of the 737 MAX is conflicting with the computer, which was inputting a nose down configuration with the trim motor, if I understand correctly.
Thus pilot input was being offset by the computer. Hence the reports about disabling the MCAS system and cutting power to the trim motor.
If these mechanisms fail, the aircraft is doomed. I understand your concerns, but aside from maintenance considerations, modern aircraft design for commercial travel has proved to be incredibly-reliable. The MCAS system was designed to eliminate the potential for stalling based upon the one variable engineers cannot overcome with aircraft engineering: The pilot. In this case they failed miserably by relying upon a single sensor with no redundancy.
I am incredibly critical of Boeing for this major engineering failure and the consequent investigation will conclude a new chapter in aviation...a chapter which should never have been opened. Before this crash, I was unaware of the severe dichotomy in training between US pilots and foreign pilots.
To your point, I would never willingly fly upon a foreign aircraft without US pilots, but have no bones about flying with US pilots. Of course, I may never fly again commercially due to the TSA, but that’s another matter altogether...
Thanks for the best synopsis of the Max 8 problem I’ve seen to date. I’ve seen so much garbage written and this just puts it in the right terms.
logi_cal869, you have made a very important point that is missing in almost all analysis on TV or the internet, although, I disagree as to why Boeing implemented the MCAS system into the 737 MAX.
MCAS is a stall prevention system. Normally, stall prevention systems are only implemented in aircraft that exhibit bad stall characteristics. For example, the F-104 had a stick pusher because when the aircraft stalled, the airflow over the wing blanked the horizontal stab and the aircraft could not recover. The pilot's only option was to eject.
Other aircraft have stall prevention systems because they are so aerodynamically clean that they don't exhibit any classic stall indications as the aircraft approaches stall, such as wing buffet, wing rock, nose rise, or nose slice. The only indication of stall is when the aircraft departs controlled flight.
So, the first question I would ask Boeing is: Why did you have to put a stall prevention system into the MAX? And the second question is: When did you discover the need for a stall prevention system in the MAX?
My guess is that the MAX has excellent aerodynamics and does not exhibit the classic stall characteristics and this is why MCAS was added. I also believe this was discovered late in the program, probably during flight test.
I am incredibly critical of Boeing for this major engineering failure
I could not agree more...but I also believe upper management dictated the lowest cost solution to the problem and therefore shares in the blame.