logi_cal869, you have made a very important point that is missing in almost all analysis on TV or the internet, although, I disagree as to why Boeing implemented the MCAS system into the 737 MAX.
MCAS is a stall prevention system. Normally, stall prevention systems are only implemented in aircraft that exhibit bad stall characteristics. For example, the F-104 had a stick pusher because when the aircraft stalled, the airflow over the wing blanked the horizontal stab and the aircraft could not recover. The pilot's only option was to eject.
Other aircraft have stall prevention systems because they are so aerodynamically clean that they don't exhibit any classic stall indications as the aircraft approaches stall, such as wing buffet, wing rock, nose rise, or nose slice. The only indication of stall is when the aircraft departs controlled flight.
So, the first question I would ask Boeing is: Why did you have to put a stall prevention system into the MAX? And the second question is: When did you discover the need for a stall prevention system in the MAX?
My guess is that the MAX has excellent aerodynamics and does not exhibit the classic stall characteristics and this is why MCAS was added. I also believe this was discovered late in the program, probably during flight test.
I am incredibly critical of Boeing for this major engineering failure
I could not agree more...but I also believe upper management dictated the lowest cost solution to the problem and therefore shares in the blame.
Everything I’ve read is rather anecdotal, as is my experience. My first calling was aeronautical engineer and F15 driver, but neither happened. Still, the interest kept me keen to the evolution of aeronautical design.
When I read that the 737 MAX was NOT a new plane but a redesign - smaller wing and bigger engines on the same airframe - I was not alarmed. The fact that the pilots I know are not concerned demonstrates a distinct dichotomy between what we know of the planes here in the US (no reports that I’m aware of filed with the FAA regarding MCAS problems) vs. the experience of these foreign pilots in the same aircraft.
A technical article I read early on stipulated that there was a single AOA sensor feeding data to the MCAS system and it is that engineering that I cited as a failure. If there are two sensors as another FReeper cited, then certainly there are more serious issues at hand. Everyone interested in aircraft knows of the problems they had with stable flight in the early F22s (oscillation from pilot input); this could be a similar scenario. However, what concerns me are the repeated citations of “training”.
If a pilot has to disengage a safety system which was installed for reasons that remain unclear, well...you aptly-outlined the concerns and I agree.
My hunch is that the wing is too small (designed for fuel efficiency) and that the engineers were afraid the planes would be prone to stalling...harkening to your other question.
Certainly ‘something’ showed up in flight testing which prompted the addition of MCAS.
Still, I’m not aware of a single incident in the US as described overseas other than pertaining to the autopilot alone; that’s a curiosity.