What is the balance tab? I am assuming that is the trim tab for nose attitude.
Posted on 03/20/2019 6:17:38 AM PDT by central_va
I have about 200+ hours in single engine and some instrument time though I never got that ticket. VFR for ever.
Ok, let me ask you pro's: Even if the elevator trim is jammed nose down (FOR WHATEVER REASON!) in a commercial jet and cannot be neutralized ( FOR WHATEVER REASON) can human strength overcome that and pull the nose up anyway?
Can someone please answer that question?
You’re correct. They manage the avionics in-flight and even only manage the avionics during landing in some models. The SF crash was due to foreign pilots who had poor experience in manual landings.
I share your concerns. But again, I have better faith in US pilots than otherwise. I believe the aircraft are safe.
What say you?
Since 737 Max is fly-by-wire then wouldn’t you be trying to overcome the computer? Strength doesn’t enter into it.
Should be called death-by-wire.
Thanks for the best synopsis of the Max 8 problem I’ve seen to date. I’ve seen so much garbage written and this just puts it in the right terms.
The pilot cannot get the nose up enough. Nose up determines wing angle of attack and affects lift when above stall speed.
Possible mitigation would include setting flaps, effectively reshaping the wing, but flight speed must be quite low to accomplish flaps successfully.
Regaining manual control of the vertical trim mechanism by disconnecting computer control is a significantly different question and far from aeronautics.
Remember I am a pilot too so I get that. I have never flown a fly-by-wire aircraft and never will. But am I to understand when the pilot pulls the little joy stick thingy back( Make the houses get smaller) the computer can override that? Really? How f---ed up is that? Another question is this: The hydraulics of the horizontal stabilizer can over come full nose down trim, they have the power to be able to do that? Right?
Simple answer - No
Whole answer - This is fly by wire. There is no mechanical/hydraulic linkage between the stick and the control surface. Think of your computer and a wireless mouse. If your computer crashes no amount of moving your mouse is going to do anything to the computer.
Crickets.
The engines have more power. When you add power to any aircraft the nose goes up.
The fix was in the flight manual, somebody just had to read it. Lack of training was a huge factor here. The OP stated he had 200hrs TT and a private ticket, had not yet attained IFR status. The right seat on the Ethiopian plane reportedly had 200hrs TT. No way should that plane have left the tarmac with that level of competency in the cockpit.
Or is there really a trim tab at all? Maybe the whole stabilizer is used to trim and there is no separate trim tab at all? If so then that is f'd IMO.
That crash was due to a mechanical failure which left the elevator disconnected, and no means for the crew to control “pitch”.
Different category of problem.
What is the balance tab? I am assuming that is the trim tab for nose attitude.
-PJ
With the new Facebook Flight Control software, 10th grade school girls will be competent to fly this aircraft.
The computer systems often get bad inputs from faulty or stuck sensors. If the AoA sensor erroneously says the craft is nose-up and stall is imminent, the control system pushes nose down. This isn’t limited to Boeing aircraft, either.
When the pilot makes an input that should immediately override all software control but apparently it doesn’t. Why do you guys put up with that?
In the case of the 737 MAX - from which I presume your question originates - a single sensor inputs to the computer to determine angle of attack, prompting the computer to override manual input to move the elevator to push the nose down corresponding to sensor readings of the nose angle. The reason for the pitching up & down is rooted in pilot attempts to override the computer, for which it’s now asserted that there are 1 or 2 switches.
Lots to unpack there. First of all, there’s not one but two AOA sensors. Second, inputs from the AOA sensors are not all the imputs that determine stall override conditions by the MCAS. Third, as in Lion air we will probably find the pilots made futile attempts to hand fly the aircraft when doing any one of three things may have saved the plane.
One, disengaging the MCAS. Done by simply switching off a toggle on the center console located by the right seat pilot (the pilot with 200 TT flight hours). Two, Scrolling the pitch trim handwheel located next to each pilot (visual and audible indicators alert the pilots to trim being adjusted). Manual adjustment of the pitch trim disables the MCAS for five seconds each time. Third, engaging the autopilot and letting the autopilot fly the plane (last choice, AP may not have been configured for climb out). Engaging the AP disengages the MCAS.
Training error, but Boeing is culpable too.
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