From what I've read, the Japs had superb night doctrine in pre-radar days that just about cleaned USN surface action clocks into early 1943.
“From what I’ve read, the Japs had superb night doctrine in pre-radar days that just about cleaned USN “
Ask JFK ...
The Japanese Navy’s tactics were superb using searchlights and torpedoes they wiped out the three Allied vessels without the Allies laying a glove on them.
All the ships sunk in the action were sunk by the Japanese including the accidental sinking of a Japanese troop carrier. I believe later that the captain of the destroyer who sank the troopship came to the troopship’s captain to apologise for his error, understandable in the heat of battle, the trooper’s captain silenced him and told him that he would prefer to allow the Houston to have the honour of the sinking.
It was a combination of tactics and training. Prior to Pearl Harbor and during the early days of the war, many of our ships were crewed by recent conscripts—that’s one reason that Admiral Kimmel’s predecessor as CINCPAC, Admiral J.O. Richardson fought with FDR to move the bulk of the fleet back to San Diego. He knew we needed time to train, and we would lose a lot of engagements until the training gap was closed.
Of course, we did have a few things going for us. Commanders like Halsey and Ray Spruance were first-rate; our aircrews developed tactics to lessen the Zero’s advantage until the F6F Hellcat became available, and Japan simply couldn’t match our advantage in war production.
Still, we paid a heavy price until the tide began to turn. The naval campaign that accompanied the invasion of Guadalcanal is a case in point. The first naval battle of Guadalcanal was a tactical disaster; the Admiral leading our forces, Daniel Callaghan, had ships with the latest radar, but put them in the back of the formation. He never issued a battle plan and had difficulty recognizing what the Japanese were doing and issuing orders to his command.
With IJN forces (under Admiral Abe) split into multiple columns, portions of the U.S. force found themselves caught between two Japanese elements. At one point, Callaghan issued the order, “Odd ships fire to starboard, even ships to port.” With the lack of pre-engagement planning, no one could discern which ships in the chaos were “odd” or “even.”
Admiral Callaghan was killed during the engagement (along with much of his staff) when a shell struck his flagship, the USS San Francisco. Command (literally) passed to a Lieutenant Commander named Bruce McCandless, who, along with the captain of the USS Helena, managed to lead the decimated U.S. formation through the rest of the battle.
Incidentally, Callaghan’s assignment before arriving in the Pacific was as naval aide to President Roosevelt, a job he got on the recommendation of the commander-in-chief’s military physician. Callaghan was a brave man who gave his life for his country, but you can argue he was the wrong man for leading our forces in that epic battle.
I’ve heard the Callaghan was commander because he had one month seniority over Admiral Norman Scott, who had more combat experience and also died in the battle.