As I said before, the key is stopping at the office to get the permission to proceed past the office. And you’ll recall that I also said that I had been “waved on” once. But I always check in.
A “blur of a person” rushing past the office could be a killer or a murderer or a non-custodial parent who may be trying to steal the kid. That’s why all people are to stop by the office.
How can “a blur of a person” “[rush] past the office”, unidentified, when the staff member responsible for buzzing the person in has to *look and see who is at the door*?
Moreover, the parent was seen and identified by another teacher by name and conversed with the parent (briefly) apparently without incident or cause for alarm.
The notion that someone can be “a blur” and rush in unidentified is nonsensical.
But thank you for doing your part to “break through our kind of private idea that kids belong to their parents, or kids belong to their families, and recognize that kids belong to whole communities.”
How are you coming on explaining how a parent checking on her own child is a danger to other children?
Anyone passing preliminary inspection and allowed access thru a security door has already breached the first security protocol. There should be a prepared security operative as a layered defense to further evaluate anyone seeking passage thru the secondary screening .
Signing a piece of paper doesn’t add to security if the credential check allows uncontrolled face to face presence with the person deciding entry. Anyone seeking illicit entry will take down the buzzer operator if the first door allows uncontrolled access to interior spaces. Obviously uncontrolled entry was possible based on the news report information; thus, security at this facility is an illusion.
Most likely one person called the mother and alerted her to a problem with the child. This person either was responsible for her entry or passed word along facilitating entry at the security door. The principle was out of the loop until someone in the office passed along a complaint that the sign-in was bypassed and attempted CYA as an afterthought. Their slack procedures and poor information management goosed the principle first toward a default lock down and police response, not having been brought up to speed on pertaining circumstances. After this point the principle discovers the person in the facility is not dangerous as evidenced by their in person confrontation before police arrive.