Posted on 12/12/2013 4:13:23 AM PST by Homer_J_Simpson
The News of the Week in Review
“Operations will be taken from the east, west and south.” (map) – 11
White War and Red – 12-13
On the Fronts – 13-15
Fifteen News Questions * – 16
Quotations – 16
Allied Power Tells in the Southwest Pacific (map) – 17
Invasion of Marshalls Near, All Signs Indicate (Shalett) – 18
Winter to See Climax of Air War on Reich (Middleton) – 19
Answers to Fifteen News Questions – 19
Grand Strategy for 1944 Settled (Baldwin) – 20
* Rationing.
http://www.onwar.com/chrono/1943/dec1943/f12dec43.htm
Czech president visits Stalin
Sunday, December 12, 1943 www.onwar.com
In Moscow... Dr Benes, President of the Czechoslovakian government in exile in London, visits to sign a Czech-Soviet treaty of alliance providing for postwar cooperation and mutual assistance for the duration of the war.
In Italy... The US 5th Army attacks continue. The US 36th Division of the 2nd Corps attacks Monte Lungo, near its former positions on Monte Maggiore.
http://www.etherit.co.uk/month/thismonth/12.htm
December 12th, 1943 (SUNDAY)
UNITED KINGDOM: Destroyer HMCS Athabaskan departed Loch Ewe as part of the close escort for the 19-ship convoy JW-55A, bound for the Kola Inlet. A RN battleship and several other fleet units formed the distant escort due to the threat of attack by the German battlecruiser Scharnhorst . JW-55A arrived safely on 22 Dec 43.
Frigate HMS Whitaker launched.
Sloop HMS Hart commissioned.
Escort carrier HMS Nairana commissioned.
FRANCE: The USAAF Eighth Air Force’s VIII Bomber Command flies Mission 153: Four B-17 Flying Fortresses drop 800,000 leaflets on Paris, Amiens and Orleans at 2033-2044 hours without loss.
GERMANY: Rastenburg: Rommel is appointed C-in-C of Hitler’s “Fortress Europe”, under the overall command of Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt.
During the night of 12/13 December, RAF Bomber Command Mosquitos attack three cities: 19 bomb Essen with 14 hitting the Krupps Armaments Works (with the loss of one) and five bombing the city; nine attack the city of Dusseldorf; and one bombs a castings factory at Osnabruck.
U-250, U-867 commissioned.
ITALY: In the U.S. Fifth Army area, the British X Corps extends farther eastward to relieve final elements of the U.S. VI Corps on Mt. Maggiore, and the boundary is adjusted accordingly. In the U.S. II Corps area, the 142d Infantry Regiment, 36th Infantry Division, begins preliminary operations in preparation for an assault on Mt. Lungo on 15 December; they occupy St. Giacomo Hill, between Lungo and Maggiore, and after nightfall takes Hills 141 and 72.
USAAF Twelfth Air Force B-25 Mitchells bomb the road, railroad, and landing ground at Terracina; P-40 and A-36 Apache fighter-bombers hit trucks along roads in the Chieti-Francavilla area and bomb the town of Itri; and fighters fly patrols and reconnaissance over the battle area.
MEDITERRANEAN SEA: German submarine U-593 torpedoes and sinks British escort destroyer HMS Tynedale (L 96) about 148 nautical miles (273 kilometers) east of Algiers, Algeria, in position 37.10N, 06.05E. Tynedale was escorting the slow escorting convoy KMS-34 (U.K. to Gibraltar to Alexandria, Egypt). A long hunt ensues by British escort destroyers HMS Calpe (L 71) and Holcombe (L 56) and USN destroyers USS Benson (DD-421), Niblack (DD-424) and Wainwright (DD-419). At 1445 hours, HMS Holcombe is hit by a Zaunkönig (Gnat) T5 electric torpedo fired by U-593 and sinks about 115 nautical miles (213 kilometers) east-northeast of Algiers off Bougie in position 37.20N, 05.30E; 83 crewmen are lost. The survivors are picked up by the USS Niblack. U-593 was chased by several escort vessels, being sunk after 32-hour chase. (Jack McKillop & Alex Gordon)(108)
U.S.S.R.: A Czech-Soviet treaty concerning postwar cooperation and mutual assistance for the duration is signed in Moscow.
Dr. Benes, the Czechoslovak president, today shifted his country closer to the Soviet Union when he signed a treaty of “amity, mutual aid and collaboration after the war”. With Stalin looking on, he put his signature to the treaty during a Kremlin ceremony. Molotov signed for the Soviet Union. “The day of retribution for Germany will come,” Benes said, “and our much-suffering people will have won a new, solid and lasting peace.” Molotov replied: “Our army is fighting for all people under the German yoke.”
The German XXXXVIII Pz. K. captures Radomyshl. (Jeff Chrisman)
CHINA: Forty one Japanese bombers and fighters bomb the western side of Hengyang Airfield, causing considerable damage. Thirty one USAAF Fourteenth Air Force 31 P-40s and six P-38 Lightnings intercept the Japanese force, claiming 20 airplanes shot down; two P-40s are lost. Meanwhile, nine B-24 Liberators bomb Hankow Airfield.
BURMA: Twenty eight USAAF Tenth Air Force B-25 Mitchells and 13 B-24 Liberators carry out a saturation bombing strike against a bridge at Myittha, over which a large volume of Japanese goods are flowing to the north. Despite this large air effort only the approach spans suffer effective damage.
EAST INDIES: In the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), USAAF Fifth Air Force B-24 Liberators make light raids on Ceram Island and in the far western part of the NEI.
NEW GUINEA: In Northeast New Guinea, USAAF Fifth Air Force P-40s dive-bomb Bogadjim Road.
BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO: Thirty four Australian (P-40) Kittyhawks bomb Gasmata on New Britain Island.
MARSHALL ISLANDS: Twenty five USAAF Seventh Air Force B-24 Liberators flying out of Ellice Island bases, bomb Engebi Islet in Eniwetok Atoll.
SOLOMON ISLANDS: On Bougainville, six USAAF Thirteenth Air Force B-25 Mitchells strafe Arigua Plantation; nine others, with fighter support, bomb the supply area at Bonis; the fighters afterwards strafe Japanese forces between Kieta and the Aropa River. Other fighters strafe the harbor at Tonolai and cover USN SBD Dauntless strikes against targets in the Ratsua-Porton-Chabai-Soraken areas and the Kieta Harbor-Tobera Bay area. Meanwhile, over 20 B-24 Liberators bomb the Kahili area and Poporang.
PACIFIC: From Glen Boren’s diary: Arrived in the morning with our planes flying off for the field. We got to Lugan Field about 1230, had lunch and headed for the strip for aircraft maintenance. Lots of hole patching, fixing oil leaks in the rocker box covers to stop oil from streaking the windshields, etc.
U.S.A.:
Destroyer minelayer USS Aaron Ward laid down.
Destroyer escorts USS Gendreau, Garfield Thomas, Gandy, Eisner and Coates launched.
Submarines USS Barbero and Hardhead launched.
Destroyer USS Preston launched.
Minesweeper USS Indicative launched.
Destroyer escort USS Breeman commissioned.
“If Japan had invaded Siberia at the same time the panzers were driving on Moscow, the USSR would have fallen and world history would be a lot different.”
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/3100881/posts?page=55#55
Opinions and comments, please.
Page 7, bad day for die boote.
The Germans who had a decent grasp of logistics had a tough time of it in the western 1/3rd of the old USSR. Very few roads and railroads in part doomed the German effort. (German strategy, which changed frequently, did not help either).
Take a look at the map and even if the Japanese could have jumped off from the middle of Mongolia the logistics would have been nothing short of a nightmare. I would imagine that the road/railroad network in the east would have been even less impressive than what was available in the west of the USSR
Also remember that Stalin controlled most of the news, so unless by some miracle the Japanese were able to effect some sort of major victory. I IMO all the Japanese would end up with would be a chunk of land at the end of a very long supply line.
Regards
alfa6 ;>}
A little past the use by date :-) but along the same lines a Freeper Foxhole article from the wayback machine regards “what if the Germans had gone to North Africa instead of fooling around with the battle of Britain?
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-vetscor/1458006/posts
Regards
alfa6 ;>}
The Russians seized the initiative that first winter with a combination of the influx of lend lease aid and very capable and cold weather equipped Siberian troops. Those troops were freed up from duty in the east because Russia had just signed a secret non-aggression pact. I think it is very arguable that Germany would have had a chance on the eastern front if those troops had not arrived. There is also the argument that if Britain had not fought and slowed Italy in Greece then Germany would have launched their invasion of Russia earlier and perhaps taken out Moscow before winter set in.
“what if the Germans had gone to North Africa instead of fooling around with the battle of Britain?
I think I'll invoke henkster's rule of alternative histories. It's not valid if the Germans aren't the Germans and Hitler isn't Hitler. Leaving the British Isles to the U-boats and concentrating land forces on the Med might have been a sounder strategy for the Axis, but I don't think Hitler was ever sold on the idea. He wanted to secure his rear so he could turn his main force on Russia.
Yea it is a what if scenario after all.
Right up there with what if Lee had listened to Longstreet at Gettysburg and Lt. Tyler had realized that the Japanese were in bound and alerted the forces at Pearl Harbor.
Regards
alfa6 ;>}
I am not so sure that the Allies aid was all that big a factor in late 1941. The supply systems were just getting up to speed by that time and a fair amount of what did arrive was not suited for use in that theater.
As an aside the three best things that the Allies supplied the Russians in WW-II were 1} Studebaker Trucks 2} Waterproof phone wire and 3} 100 octane av-gas.
In late 1941 General Winter was the Russians biggest ally in the “Great Patriotic War”.
And you are correct that the secret treaty had freed up the Siberian troops for use in the West. But treaties are made to be broken and even with the troops being sent to the West I doubt that the Japanese would have had much success in the long term.
Also the Japanese had tried pushing the Russians around in 1940 and almost had their heads handed to them so I doubt the Japanese were in a hurry to try their luck again.
Regards
alfa6 ;>}
Right as things were most dire in 41 we some emergency shipment to them. Now those were not as BIG as later stuff. but we sent supplies and things when the were extremely critical. The first aid was actually from Brittan even before we joined the war. And we sent machinery and locomotives to help them move their industry to the Urals that winter. On paper those first few shipments were not huge, but the Russians stood on a knifes edge at that time. Even a few supplies, just in time, made a big difference. IMHO. Following this thread a couple years ago changed my opinion on that.
Wow; lots of stuff to discuss here.
Yes, “henkster’s law” states that alternate histories regarding World War 2 are not valid if it involves the Germans not being the Germans and Hitler not being Hitler. Having stated the law, let’s take a look at some of the facts:
Axis Mediterranean strategy:
There was a political aspect to Axis Mediterranean strategy, and that involved the role of Mussolini and Italy. In 1940 at the time of the Battle of Britain, it wasn’t yet completely clear just how weak Italy was. For reasons of national pride, the Duce wanted the Med, Africa and the Middle East as an Italian Theater of operations. So the Germans either chose to stay out or were frozen out by the Duce. Axis success in the Med was never going to happen with Italy carrying the burden alone, but in order to significantly increase the German presence, you had to overcome the political obstacle I mentioned above. The irony of the situation was that without the Italians taking an ass-kicking, that obstacle would always be there. So, the corollary of “henkster’s law” is that a successful Axis strategy in the Med in 1940 involved the Italians not being the Italians and the Duce not being the Duce. By the time the Italians accepted the fact that German help was needed, the Germans were committed to Operation Barbarossa. The Germans didn’t have the forces to spare for what they saw as an African sideshow.
That gets us to Operation Barbarossa. The failure of Barbarossa was predicated upon the following things:
1) The German general staff sold Hitler on the idea that the USSR could be defeated in one summer campaign season;
2) The German strategy to defeat the USSR was to destroy the Red Army west of the Dnieper River, and then march unopposed on Moscow;
3) The strategy failed because of the efforts of one guy who gets very little credit: Marshal Boris M. Shaposhnikov, Chief of the Red Army General Staff. He was the guy who developed the Red Army mobilization machinery before the war. When war came, this machinery was in place to continuously create new divisions and armies to replace the ones the Germans destroyed. So while the Germans did destroy the existing Red Army on the Western axis in front of the Dnieper, and eventually the Southwestern axis at Kiev, the Red Army was continuously regenerating itself to oppose the Germans.
4) The German goals for the one summer campaign season were logistically impossible, and the staff officers of the German Army should have realized this.
In order to defeat the USSR, the Germans had to be prepared for a two-year campaign, with pauses in offensive operations during the mud seasons to rest, refit, and resupply their forces. They needed to crank up their war industry for a full-war footing. They needed to better exploit French industrial capacity. Instead, they tried to take on the USSR while still having a large consumer economy and failed to mobilize their economic resources. By the time Albert Speer accomplished this in 1944, it was too late.
But that would involve the Germans not being the Germans and Hitler not being Hitler. Hitler did not believe the Germans would support a long war of attrition. Irony again: what Hitler wanted to avoid caused him to pursue a strategy that guaranteed it would be what he got.
As for Japanese intervention in the Far East against the USSR in 1941, that involved Japan not being Japan. While the Japanese did make plans for a “Northern Strategy,” it was never a viable one. Japan’s war aims were 100% economic. She needed oil. Coal, iron, and other raw materials she got from Manchuria. But her Achilles Heel was oil. She needed it and she needed it NOW. Sure, there’s a lot of oil in Siberia. The problem is that most of it is in Western Siberia, several time zones away from the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. There are probably oil resources in Eastern Siberia, too, but in 1941, NONE of those resources have been developed. There are no active wells, no pipelines, no refineries, nothing. And the technology to exploit them is fairly primitive; it would cost a great deal in money and time to bring those resources into the Japanese Empire. And time was a luxury the Japanese didn’t have.
Japan had no choice other than the seizure of the oil resources in the NEI. They were already developed, and it was easy to ship the oil to Japan by tanker. And they knew that this move would bring war with the United States. They knew war with the United States was going to be a colossal undertaking, although they underestimated just how colossal it would be. But they knew enough to know that the “Southern Operation” would take every naval, air and shipping asset and their entire industrial base. There was no reason or ability to also go north into Siberia.
Finally, a footnote. The USSR stopped the Wehrmacht at the gates of Moscow with what they had on hand. Lend-Lease didn’t have an impact until 1943. Until then, the Soviets pretty much kept the Germans at bay with what they had on hand.
Generally concur with your reply.
It has oft been said that had not Italy screwed the pooch in the Balkans the Germans would have started Barbarossa “on time” in May and the extra time would have made all the difference.
Maybe, maybe not. As you pointed out the Germans were not on a total war footing and the General Staff greatly underestimated the details of the Russian campaign.
Thanks for the name of Marshal Boris M. Shaposhnikov, I will need to look into him one of these days.
Regards
alfa6 ;>}
The way that p4 article reads, if the Germans don’t abandon Cherkassy soon, they’ll be cutoff.
Thanks, henkster, for your interesting and thoughtful comments.
Hitler wasted time and resources taking Kiev when he should have put everything into the Moscow push. An assault by Japan would have been a very ill-advised distraction for the Japanese, and probably wouldn't have made as much difference to the overall result as the news that Stalin had had to flee Moscow for his life one step ahead of Guderian's panzers.
Also, Hitler made no effort to turn the "liberated" Ukrainians and Belorussians into strong allies against Stalin, which he could easily have done. With well-armed new puppet states in place and a fallen capital, the Russians would probably have had to retreat beyond the Urals and sue for peace.
Once Hitler turned on Stalin, the American left suddenly became warhawks.
As for the Japanese opening up an Eastern Front in Russia, Hitler didn't understand the effect to the Japanese psyche of the bloody nose they received at the battles of Khalkhyn Gol.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.