Posted on 09/21/2013 3:22:22 PM PDT by virgil283
"The story of the first semi-automatic rifle ever widely-adopted as a standard military arm began after the start of the First World War, when the inventor John C. Garand (Canadian, then living in USA) began to develop a semi-automatic (or self-loading) rifles. He worked at the government-owned Springfield armory and during the 1920s and early 1930 developed a number of designs."
(Excerpt) Read more at world.guns.ru ...
let us be even more clear, I am thinking about COMWEC weapons and weapons to be used after the leftists manage to make NATO ammo largely unavailable to civilians. I am also thinking about the handloader.
I do not mean to imply the 30/06 is better than the .308 for general military purposes. I just, generally speaking, don't find any fault in it and I find compelling reasons to have a rifle chambered for it, especially a semi-automatic rifle with a detachable box magazine. And the fact remains, anything the .308 can do, the 30/06 can do a little bit better and, in some cases, it can do a lot better. I can't imagine not having a 30/06 in your collection.
Incidentally, AR10 platforms cannot chamber the long standard-head cartridges like 25-06, 270, or 30-06; they are simply too long to fit. 7.62mm NATO barely makes it, and the platform still has to be enlarged above the M16 size receiver components. 300 Winchester Mag is out of the question.
Behold, the BN36, available in 30/06, 25/06, and .270:
I want one in all three calibers. Oh yeah. they also make one in 300 win mag BTW but it costs as much as .50 cal. It is sweeeet though.
I also would like a 22-250 chambered AR15 because nothing says destructive energy like a 55 grain V-max travelling at 3700 fps. Olympic arms makes one. I haven't heard enough good things about it to justify buying it yet. It is, however, a good idea.
Thanks. I could be wrong as well, but I don’t think the Mini 14 chambers the same round as the M14. I admit...it’s late and I’m probably confused. Anybody who can set me straight?
I think it’s the 7.62mm.
the Mimi is .223 unless it's a Mini-30, then it's 7.62x39, same-same as an AK
Thanks for clearing that up. Sounds like the Mini-30 is the one I’d be interested in.
if so, look for a one in stainless steel... not that much more $
After some more research it looks like this is probably what I’m looking for:
www.guns.com/reviews-springfield-armory-m1a-scout-squad/
In my journey I tripped over this site:
www.theliberalgunclub.com
i don't know what your budget is, but you cannot go wrong with a .308 Springfield SOCOM-16"
“I’m could be wrong but I believe it’s called the Ruger Mini 14. The Air Force Sea/Sar teams use it as well and because of poor stopping power of the 9mm pistol certain branches of the military are allowing the use of the .45 pistol ...”
No US DoD organization has used Ruger’s Mini-14 in anything but experimental/developmental quantities. It is more lightly constructed than the M-16, more difficult to manufacture, less durable, and less accurate.
To reiterate, “stopping power” cannot be found in any US DoD glossary of terms, is nowhere formally defined, and has yet to be quantified.
Forum members post as if none have heard about the JSSAP organization that conducted the M1911A1 pistol replacement demonstrations and OT&E - the group that recommended the adoption of the Beretta 92 variant now known as US Pistol, M9.
The whole effort was deliberately placed under a USAF organization at Eglin AFB on Florida’s Panhandle - a bureaucratic move that had no precedent, as the US Army had by that point owned all prior responsibility for small arms development and selection, dating back some three generations.
Via the best-conceived, most carefully planned, most rigorous, best-documented operational testing up to that date, JSSAP concluded that the 9x19 pistol round (which out-powers the 45 ACP cartridge in some loadings) led the pack in several key performance attributes, the chief of which were kinetic energy transfer to target, body armor penetration, and effective range. Added benefits: much greater number of ready rounds in the magazine, and the higher round count for any given weight load.
It was conceded that NATO’s adoption of 9x19 as the standard handgun cartridge was inescapable politically. The US was then (circa 1980) still in quite bad odor among NATO members, for forcing the issue in the 1950s on rifle/machine gun cartridge selection.
“... intell units ... conducted some extensive examination of the regular Iraqi Army and Republican Guards as well as the irregular forces ... the performance of the irregular forces that intrigued the intell guys ... discovered though in autopsies on the jihadis is that they were pumped up full of amphetamines, pain killers tranquilizers ...”
Fanatics pumped up on drugs and jazzed up by propagandizers have been a longtime concern of US forces. See reports on the Philippine Insurrection, the US Army’s ugly experience of the early 20th century, the one that brought the juramentados of the southern islands up against Army regulars. The pop history / gun culture aficionadoes recall it as the conflict that enshrined the 45 cal as *the* pistol bore diameter of choice, but any beyond the shallowest study immediately reveals that no issue arms of the day could guarantee results against what are now judged to have been drug-crazed fanatics. Even the 30-40 Krag comes off as inadequate, despite close-range performance equal or superior to 7.62 NATO. The best-rated “man-stopper” - necessarily at close range - was the shotgun.
Stand by what I read friend and those who were there. Nothing stops ‘em like a 30 caliber and the Ma Deuce and the M-14 has been reissued.
“The over-all length of the rifle is not what it originally was. The barrel length is shorter, I’m not sure how much, the stock has been made shorter and some variants have a folding stock. And yes you’re correct it’s the 7.62 round. ...”
The original barrel length for the M14 was 22 inches. That did not count the flash suppressor.
There isn’t a whole lot of barrel length that can be given up, if other MIL STD components are to be retained: front sight unit, gas cylinder assembly and piston, plug, operating rod, springs and guides. Even if the front sight has been sacrificed - the likeliest, noting the advent of modular stock systems, MIL STD 1913B rails, and optical sights - that frees up only a little over half an inch.
Very little savings in weight can be realized by shortening the barrel. And it may not mean much in overall package weight, since much of the stiffness in new stocking components is created by extensive use of metal.
Shooting one of these newer ones will not be pleasant. Flash and muzzle blast climb sharply as barrel length shrinks, especially below 18 inches. Not sure how many here have employed the G3 or the BM-59, but doing so is not for the faint of heart.
“... let us be even more clear, I am thinking about COMWEC weapons and weapons to be used after the leftists manage to make NATO ammo largely unavailable to civilians. I am also thinking about the handloader.”
If clarity is at issue, let me hasten to point out that I had no intention of mixing military and individual concerns any more than I had to. I was merely attempting to describe how the defense establishment ended up in the situations in which it has found itself. Not that I can justify all the decisions made, nor defend every result.
The 30-06 indeed has the reputation of being more forgiving when it comes to handloading.
Whatever the Left contrives, the popularity of 30-06 and 308 rifles (and handguns, now) will increase the likelihood of finding non-military ammunition in military calibers, from commercial sources, and in out of the way locales. Have you visited a hardware store in any of the smaller towns, in the rural High Plains regions or the Mountain West? A box or three of 30-06 or 308 can almost always be found; 243 or 270 might be there but in lesser quantity, 25-06 rather less likely. You can forget 300 Winchester Magnum.
“I do not mean to imply the 30/06 is better than the .308 ... can’t imagine not having a 30/06 ...”
The shooting public doesn’t disagree. Last time I got any news, sales of reloading dies and components for 30-06 outnumbered every other single rifle cartridge. I cannot imagine failing to own a 30-06: I myself keep four in the home: three ex-US military and one sporter. The best is the M1 I obtained back when the CMP was still the Army’s DCM; in it I have the highest degree of confidence. The sporter, a commercial production rifle, has done its job so well and so faithfully (even against varmints, firing indifferently concocted rounds from GI cases) that I still keep it standing by, 39 years after the fact. Never saw much point in spending the cash on any of the flashier, crazier, hotter-performing civilian sporting chamberings.
“Behold, the BN36, available in 30/06, 25/06, and .270: ... they also make one in 300 win mag ...”
The choices available to the shooting consumer continue to multiply. I rejoice in the expansion of opportunity; may each find a niche in which it more fully performs the task its buyer wants accomplished.
But a BN-36 is not an AR-10, which in turn is not an AR-15. They may all claim the same parentage when it comes to design concept and operating principles, but all are differently dimensioned platforms and few parts are going to interchange.
“... I also would like a 22-250 chambered AR15 because nothing says destructive energy like a 55 grain V-max travelling at 3700 fps. Olympic arms makes one. I haven’t heard enough good things about it to justify buying it yet. It is, however, a good idea.”
Noting the unexciting barrel life I’ve observed in many rifles chambering 22-250, I’m less than hopeful. I take a similarly cautious position on the 300 Win Mag. They deliver superior performance for the sporting user, but pose immediate problems for any user in a home defense or local security situation. Flexibility of handloading is also hampered: the 22-250 in particular delivers its best performance at muzzle velocities above 3500 ft/sec, but at that speed some light-jacket bullets come apart from air resistance. And since component variety/availability can only be degraded in troubled times, these sorts of problems count against such chamberings.
At the end of the day, both the military user and the individual user run into cost constraints. Though one may coaxe truly spectacular results from a 22-250 or a 300 Win Mag, each platform is going to cost that much more. Inevitably.
“Stand by what I read friend and those who were there. ...”
It may unsettle the average civilian gun enthusiast to realize this, but wars are poor places to collect data on system effectiveness.
It’s nice to say “We won World War Two because we built and fielded superior weapons.” It might be true, but we cannot do much with such an assertion. Because it conveys precisely nothing about which weapons were superior or why, and still less about just how much better they were.
Doing the scutwork of finding out what happened, drawing solid conclusions, and attributing results to the right gadgets (and people) are not cheery tasks, nor romantic, nor indeed terribly inspiring.
But they must be done, if we entertain any hopes of taking an accurate read on what happened. Still less pleasant, but perhaps more cogent, are the tasks of predicting what might happen in the future, forecasting the best way to organize/train/equip forces to prevail - or just survive - the next time.
In the book the author tells of Marines and Army units finding loads of morphine, amphetamines, uppers downers, all kinds of crap. The initial encounters with ex- Iraqi military and Egyptian , Jordanians and Syrians wasn't anywhere near as bad as when our guys began to encounter Chechens. Those bastards fought mean and were skilled. Another great book is "Thunder Run. The Armored Strike To Capture Baghdad'' by David Zucchino. This is another awesome account of the battle. Where "New Dawn'' is all house-to-house, room-to-room and claustrophobic, this is wide-open, free-wheeling, bullets, bombs and RPG rounds going everywhere. This was billed as ''the largest drive by shooting in history''. To give you an example of the Iraqis fighting capability here's an excerpt, (page 14) "The Iraqis seemed to have no training , no discipline, no coordinated tactics. It was all point and shoot. A few soldiers would pop up and fire,then stand out in the open to gauge the effects of their shots. The big rounds from the tanks and Bradleys sent chunks of their bodies splattering into the roadside...''.
“...’New Dawn, The Fight For Fallujah’ by Rich Lowy. ... without a doubt the most hair-raising, bloody and inspiring account of raw combat ... wasn’t anywhere near as bad as when our guys began to encounter Chechens. ... ‘Thunder Run. The Armored Strike To Capture Baghdad’ by David Zucchino. ... wide-open, free-wheeling, bullets, bombs and RPG rounds going everywhere. ‘... no training , no discipline, no coordinated tactics. It was all point and shoot.’ “
Ground forces seem to have arrived late in discovering the formidable aspects of the Chechens, who had been fighting the Russians for generations before the Soviets arrived; by the 1960s, killing a Red Army (Russian) soldier had become a rite of passage for Chechen males. Doesn’t speak well of Western doctrine, training, or intel establishments that in the 2000s it came as any sort of surprise.
The great variations to be found in combat conditions ought to make it clearer to the forum, that one single weapons system will not deliver superior performance in every situation. It holds true concerning small arms also.
In the First World War, US Army Air Service, AEF discovered that the method of system evaluation apparently endorsed by the authors of _New Dawn_ and _Thunder Run_ was not at all reliable. “Let the ‘experts’ wring out the new gadget” and “Listen to the vets” were found to be wanting. The military paid a heavy price to learn the lesson, then pretty much abandoned better methods before WWII, during which the earlier concepts had to be learned all over again, at greater cost. See _Ideas and Weapons_ by I.B. Holley Jr.
Collecting war stories from combat veterans, then insisting that the massive nature of their very agglomeration bestows unchallengeable status is not foolproof, but the hope is slim indeed that American ground forces can acknowledge as much. S.L.A. Marshall is still revered inside US Army training and doctrinal circles, though ever greater doubt has been cast on his methods, and his conclusions.
At the end of the day, one of the less-than-glorious insights illuminated by operational testing is that it delineates system limitations that the operator will simply have to live with.
Who did you serve with?
“Who did you serve with?”
May have lost the bubble here, but on the assumption (very provisional) that jmacusa is asking whether I put in any time wearing the uniform, the answer is yes:
almost 29 years of it.
Four years at a federal service academy, then more than 24 and half years active duty commissioned time. Operational units and staff, plus a little overseas time. More than half as an operational tester at major command level, and as a scientific analyst in a Joint billet.
I was privileged to serve with all manner of officer and enlisted troops, from E-1 all the way to four stars. And a bundle of DoD civilians, to and including several SES grades.
God bless you. No I haven’t ‘’lost the bubble’’. You speak with authority, that’s why I asked. However I do place a lot of credence in what those at the pointed end have witnessed, seen and done in combat. Like the WW2 guys who were in armored divisions driving Sherman tanks and telling me the horrible, sinking feeling of watching 75mm rounds do nothing more to a Mk 5 Panther or Tiger Mk 6 tank than piss it off and tell it where that round just came from. Or a buddy of mine telling me of walking across a rice paddy in the Mekong Delta lugging a BAR(yup, a BAR) and his buddies have M-16s. A VC pops out of the tree line and opens up on them with an AK-47. They all hit the deck and come up and their M-16s wouldn’t fire. His BAR caught the VC in the chest , neck and face and blew his head off. When they checked out what was left of him my friend told me the VC had the AK chained to him.
“...I do place a lot of credence in what those at the pointed end have witnessed, seen and done in combat. ...”
It cannot be doubted that the troops who go in harm’s way deserve our respect, even our deference. All the rest of us - and everything we do, we say, we hope for, we build - stand on the foundations laid by others, but forged into one, by the sacrifices of troops, and of them alone. And all of it would vanish in the blink of an eye, if their modern counterparts did not stand endless guard. Without them, the finest weapons ever made are nothing more than so many soulless chunks of metal, plastic, wood, fabric.
And it cannot be doubted that they endured a great deal.
But all of it tells us precisely nothing about which systems were effective, nor why. Nor what level of effectiveness was attained.
By explicit DoD directive - spelling out the details of how public law, passed by Congress, must be implemented - decisions about system effectiveness (and a number of other attributes) must be made on a quantitative basis, as much as possible. We cannot set store by stories, no matter how many tell them, no matter how movingly and convincingly. We have to KNOW. We have to know numbers: that means measuring.
Which means criteria must be set, results tallied, details set in order, conclusions drawn.
Therefore, the military builds, maintains, and uses a number of facilities where testing is done. And each armed service has called into existence organizations given the formal mission of planning, conducting, analyzing, and reporting on tests thus accomplished.
Life and death for gigantic programs is thus decided; tactical concepts proposed, validated, discarded, reinforced; careers are made and destroyed, fortunes won and lost (mostly by system builders and supporters, it’s true).
All of which are but small potatoes, compared to the penultimate purpose of such systems, the “real reason” the nation lays out chunks of cash to design, build, maintain implements of war: to go into action. That means battles small and large, operations succeeding or failing, wars won (one hopes) - or at least not lost.
So entire outcomes hinge on how well systems are designed, constructed, maintained, employed, intermeshed with other systems. The stakes can get big.
Does the forum, then, prefer to trust all of it to the memories of veterans?
Assuredly, those vets did great deeds. But being in the midst of the mad scramble that is combat does not mean - necessarily - that their memories are accurate.
Even when recollections are spot-on, it is never possible to go back to the battlefield, to measure exact ranges, elevations, angles, temperatures, weather, ambient light, air pressure, soil densities, color tone and contrast. Still more fleeting are the anatomy and physiology of the combatants (either side). No one knows exactly where the vital organs were, nor how much adrenaline was pumping (one infers a lot, but that’s simply not good enough). And for the dead, none of it can ever be recaptured.
And this is only the shortest, simplest, most superficial list of “stuff” that might be measured. When large distances and more esoteric systems become involved (think radar or infrared, just for starters), the number of such attributes grows to a total of hundreds. Multiple hundreds.
Which leads to only the lightest of validations, of the assertion:
Wars are not the best venues in which to collect data.
If forum members are having trouble grasping such truisms on an elevated conceptual level, I’ll circle back to something more substantial: jmacusa’s buddy’s rice paddy experience.
At the outset of WWII, S.L.A. Marshall conned Army brass into accepting his claim, that he could “interview” hundreds of infantry combat vets in nothing flat, just after they’d been through a firefight. He came up with the then-controversial theory that aimed fire was next to meaningless, and the Army transfigured that into their modern firepower concepts, that volume of fire transcended all other considerations, which led directly to the small bullet fired by the M16.
That’s right, the same M16 said to have failed American troops at very inconvenient times. There were of course a host of other reasons for its shortcomings, most of which jmacusa’s buddy could not have known about, and which were beyond his control.
But the chief reason the rifle was there, at that time, was because “SLAM” (Marshal was said to have loved the nickname) was a big talker, a man of no small ego. He sweet-talked decisionmakers - leaders - into believing he could deliver. He delivered a bunch of war stories, lent greater credence by weight of numbers and greater intensity by recency, and people who should have known better let him have his way. Indeed, he attained immortality, in institutional terms - decades after his death, he is still honored in some circles.
It strikes me that none of this touches on optimizing performance, within constraints. A lesson, perhaps, for another time.
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