There is, of course, an alternative to this strategy, requiring more risk and daring - one great sea flanking move directly to, or above the vicinity of, Naples, where a major amphibious force might be landed in an attempt to outflank all Axis troops below that point.
But such a strategy, though it might pay dividends in time if it were successful, is less sure and more risky than the step-by-step advance. Judging by past experience, we shall probably stick to caution.
Eisenhower famously told the press the date and location of the Sicily landing well in advance and relied on their discretion to avoid leaks. Is something of the same nature going on here? I just find it suspicious that Baldwin is unwittingly presenting such a fine piece of misinformation three days before D-Day at Salerno.
It is quite possible with Baldwin's fine sense of tactics and logistics that he puzzled it out for himself. Baldwin, unlike many reporters, understood the importance of logistics. As he points out in today's piece, there aren't any ports in the South capable of supporting a large army until you get to Naples with its fine harbor. He also has discussed several times the tactic of using, as he calls it, "hops" to advance in Italy's mountainous terrain, as Patton did in Sicily. So, he may have come to the conclusion on his own that the prize of the port of Naples would be worth the risk of a daring "hop" to a nearby shore.
Another possibility is that to be right so much of the time he must have had many highly placed sources and even innocuous tidbits of information could be put together to get the big picture.