[Mikey_1962]

I wonder how many Marine lives would have been saved if they followed the Navy’s Battle plans for the Pacific instead of MacArthur’s.

[fso301]

I wonder how many Marine lives would have been saved if they followed the Navy’s Battle plans for the Pacific instead of MacArthur’s.

Well, how do Marine casualties compare in the Southwest Pacific Area versus those in the Pacific Ocean Areas?

[henkster]

American soldiers took casualties wherever we faced the Japanese.

Having dual tracks across the South Pacific and Central Pacific axes was a valid strategy. It kept the Japanese off-balance and they had to divide their limited forces to both fronts, particularly in naval assets and increasingly scare merchant shipping. While there was competition for resources between MacArthur and Nimitz, American industry was able to adequately supply both drives.

We will see how this pays off next June when MacArthur lands forces on Biak at the northwest end of New Guinea, triggering the Japanese naval response in Operation KON. A few days later Nimitz lands Marines on Saipan, a far greater existential threat to the Japanese Empire. The Japanese have to hurriedly scrap Operation KON, and shift to A-Go, the plan to fight for the Marianas. The IJN carrier fleet and aviation is gutted at the Battle of the Philippine Sea, while MacArthur gets a pass to seize land within B-24 range of the Central Philippines.

[colorado tanker]

Eventually MacArthur modified his plan and took a page from Nimitz's by surrounding and neutralizing Rabaul rather than taking it. He then leapfrogged across New Guinea.

Now, I would concede this was not exactly Gen. MacArthur's original idea but basically was forced on him by high command not giving him all the forces he needed to accomplish his original plan. The leapfrogging plan worked very well and got him where he wanted to go - the Philippines.