William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich
Editorials 14-16
Road to Victory
War Mobilization
The Poll Tax Issue
Radar
The Guns Catch Up
Apple Blossoms
Topics of the Times
The New York Times Magazine
When Will the War End (Sulzberger) 18-20
* Dont miss this installment of Baldwins 12-part analysis of the ETO situation. It could have served as the basis for a briefing to American political and military leaders in May 1943 and it serves today as a historically valuable look (in my highly unqualified opinion) at the state of our military on the eve of the war on the European continent. Ill copy a few highlights below, but just about every paragraph provides something to think about HJS.
. . .[J]ust as Pearl Harbor reflected the national sense that it cant happen here, so Tunisia has reflected the effects of years of rather easy living and thinking in America.
In one instance a unit of about thirty men bivouacked at night on one of the hill slopes near the front. They woke up in the morning and roundly cursed the thieving Arabs because much of their equipment was missing. They were near the enemy, but they had posted no sentry; the young non-coms excuse was that there were so few of them they wouldnt get enough sleep if they posted sentries.
The defeats we suffered in Tunisia were tactical defeats of detail. The enemy got thar fust with the mostest men. The old plug-the-gap strategy of January and February gave way in March and April to the victorious policy of concentration of effort.
Psychologically, we should take to heart the oft-repeated lesson of North Africa and the Pacific that the truth always pays in the long run, that public relations is a very important war weapon, that news must come quickly from every battlefront, and that censorship must be reasonable, not stupid.