And too inflexible. Molke the Elder once said that no operational plan survives first contact with the enemy. When thing began to go wrong for Nagumo’s force there was no way to make the adjustment necessary to even attempt to correct the situation. The northern force was too far away to shift and give aid. The shifting from torpedoes to bombs and back to torpedoes on the Kaga and Akagi made them floating powerder kegs as Nagumo was trying to react to the situation. Air crews were wedded to their carriers making the option of using one of the CVL’s as a CAP screen carrier an impossible option. Even the Shokaku and Zuikaku show the Japanese inflexibility. One ship is damaged, one is missing its flight compliment. You would think they could have shifted the planes and pilots from the damaged ship to the one missing the airmen and have a 5th main carrier for the battle, but they couldn’t even make this simple adjustment.
If you haven’t read it, got a book for you:”Midway Inquest”, by Dallas Woodbury Isom, Indiana University Press.
turned what I thought I knew about 70 degrees off course.And while Nagumo has his share of screw ups, it’s pretty plain that the major share for the failure at Midway is Yamamoto.
Hell, if he’d scrapped the Aleutians operation, and taken his fleet out with those ships, and Nagumo’s, he could have put a loudspeaker on YAMATO, like some sort of seaborne demented MR. SOFTEE truck, playing “I’m Here”! over and over again.