Most definitely. Just give me a couple of days since it's been so long, I don't remember exactly where I read it and may have to bit of digging to find it. Regardless of what I eventually locate, I will post back to you.
Again, I can't give him a pass because training in the states was lacking. He was brought in to get the Filipino Army in a condition where it could defend itself and he failed to do so.
My understanding is that MacArthur, a man who knew the Philippines and Filipino's very well never expected to get a Philippine force into a condition where it could defend itself. He anticipated a force capable of fighting a delaying action until support could be received from America.
I agree with the decision to relieve General Short for his shortsightedness at Pearl Harbor, and would have supported the relief of MacArthur for the same lack of vision.
When in possession of all information and having the perfect clarity of hindsight, it is easy to second guess decisions. However, based on what was available to MacArthur in 1941, what did he do that was so wrong as to warrant his being sacked?
Additionally, he exacerbated the situation with his decision to defend at the beaches with forces that he should have known were not in a condition to do so
Again, I think you say these things armed with all information and the clarity of hindsight. Had MacArthur instead, consolidated all his forces in Bataan, I dare say authors would be skewering him for having not met the enemy on the beaches.
and added to that his decision to uphold the Filipino laws that restricted the transport of food stocks across district borders even though they were in the process of being invaded.
I don't know about Filipino laws or their significance but MacArthur certainly did send supplies into Bataan and Corregidor upon activation of Orange.
The men in the field did an excellent job and held the Japanese off until May of 1942, but they could have held out longer had MacArthur stuck with WPO-3 which was the current Plan Orange for the Philippines in the War Department. The War Department estimated that they would be able to hold out on the Bataan Peninsula for 12 months (which granted still may have not been long enough) instead of five.
Because we are both reasonable people seeking better understandings of events, I have to ask you to provide an original source for your information about a 12 month holdout period. I'd really be interested in learning about it because from a logistical standpoint, it's really a cookbook formula. X tons of supplies are needed to supply X men for X period of time. My understanding has always been that MacArthur's entire strategy rested upon assurances by Washington of resupply and reinforcement from America... something which never happened. Not even the supply convoy enroute to the Philippines on Dec 8, 1941 was permitted to resupply the islands.
Absolutely. He knew the level in which his men were trained and as you said, he didn't expect the Philippine force to be able to defend itself. He should have known better than to spread them out thin and make them try to defend the beaches. This was a blatant waist of manpower and warrants dismissal.
If authors of today were blasting him for consolidating his position on Bataan, I would not be in agreement with them. With the condition of his forces it is only logical to minimize the front that they need to defend.
The supplies he sent to Bataan and Corregidor was just a drop in the bucket compared to what he could have sent and even less than what should have remained there in the first place. He did enforce Filipino law restricting movements of stores which increased the amount of lost stores. Then there were the additional losses due to his poor decision in initial deployment which left many rail workers, and truck companies fleeing for their lives. Trains were left on the tracks and truck fled to Bataan empty.
I'll get you the 12 month projection later tonight. I think I remember where that is, but I'll have to double check.
Ok. I found the reference I was talking about. It’s alot harder without my laptop which has my notes in it. First I should clarify that the War Plans Department estimate of 12 months was the maximum. That is a little unclear in my previous post.
This is discussed in a WPD memo that can be found in the National Archives, Record Group 165, WPD-4192 in a memo from George V. Strong to George C. Marshall
Both WPO-2 and WPO-3 both state that a minimum defense of six months be maintained so that establishes the range that was required, 6 to 12 months.