I absolutely KILLS me that I have to go defend a paper today and can't just stay home. Oh well, here my notes for today, obviously a little longer than usual. I usually take a little more time to put them in a better order but I'm in a rush today.
- "G-2 came in and motioned me to one side. I was floored when he asked me if we could encrypt a message in purple." - George Linn, a senior Navy code breaker
- "It is just unexplainable, much worse than anyone realizes...Knox feels something terrible...Stimson kept mumbling that all the planes were in one place...They have the whole fleet in one place...the whole fleet in this little Pearl Harbor base. They will never be able to explain it." - Henry Morganthau
- "Sunday, 7 December, dawned clear and cold at the front. Early morning Luftwaffe reconnaissance flights brought back reports of continuing heavy rail traffic toward Moscow and toward Tikhvin. At ground level, plumes of blowing snow restricted visibility and the roads drifted shut. During the night, the roads running east and southeast from Klin had filled with Third Panzer Group rear echelon trucks and wagons all heading west. How far west nobody knew. The front had already begun to pull back from the Moscow-Volga Canal. First Shock Army was following hesitantly behind the panzer group which because of the weather had already abandoned fifteen tanks, three heavy howitzers, a half-dozen anti-aircraft guns and dozens of trucks and passenger cars - more material than would ordinarily be lost in a week's heavy fighting. Troops could not tow the guns out of their emplacements. The motors of some vehicles would not start; the grease on the bearing and in transmissions in others froze while they were running. The 1st Panzer Division, which had been headed toward Krasnaya Polyana, had turned around during the night with orders to block the Soviet thrust toward Klin. In the morning it was extended over forty miles, bucking snowdrifts on jammed roads, with its tanks low on fuel" - 3rd Panzer Group Evening Message
- "The Japanese are presenting at 1 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, today, what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know, but be on alert accordingly." Message from George C. Marshall to Pacific installations concerning the probability of hostilities with Japan. This message will not arrive in Hawaii until 11:45 a.m. Hawaii Time
- "Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time." - Message from Tokyo to Washington transmitted in Purple code. Translated December 7th.
- 181 Japanese fighters, dive-bombers, and torpedo planes come from the north over the hills of Kahuku Point to attack navy and army facilities on the island of Oahu.
- Across Oahu the Japanese destroyed 180 aircraft and damaged another 128.
- At 6:53 am the USS Ward reports attacking a submarine off the entrance to Pearl Harbor.
- Early in the day, Churchill learns that Roosevelt intends to announce on the 10th that any attack on the British or Dutch possession in the Far East will be considered an attack on the United States.
- Ensign J.K. Taussig got the USS Nevada underway in just 45 minutes. The ship was commanded by reservist Lieutenant Commander Francis J. Thomas with its anti-aircraft guns direct by Ensign Taussig.
- On the early morning of the 7th, the Navy did not have a translator on stations. The Navy handled Magic decrypts on odd numbered days and Captain Alvin D. Karmer was the designated translator for them. No one called him in when the message designating the time to deliver the 14 part message was intercepted at around 3:05 a.m.
- Only a few Catalina Flying boats were in the air on routine anti-submarine patrol to the west of Oahu as the Japanese approached and none of the army's anti-aircraft guns had been issued live ammunition. Additionally, the radar station at Opana, near Kahuku Point, was only operational from 4:00 to 7:00 am. Though they were operating late and spotted the Japanese formation at 7:02, they were mistaken for a flight of B-17 scheduled to come in from the West Coast.
“Early in the day, Churchill learns that Roosevelt intends to announce on the 10th that any attack on the British or Dutch possession in the Far East will be considered an attack on the United States.”
I had not seen that before. Where did you get that tidbit?
This would end the debate whether Japan could have attempted a more limited “Southern Operation” aimed at only at Malaya and the NEI without bringing the United States into war.