Units of the 36th division, en route to the far east, were two days out from Pearl on Nov. 26 when the ship went on blackout and radio silence and the troops were told to expect a Japanese attack at any time.
After departing Hawaii, the convoy was routed south to Australia instead of west, so that it would not run into the approaching Japanese fleet.
Given the posts you’ve supplied, I don’t understand how anyone could say with a straight face that the high command was not aware that an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent.
i dont know what you mean by “high command”, but no, the senior commanders at Pearl and Washington were not aware that a Pearl attack was imminent. They believed that IJN would attack somewhere, but they didnt know where and they seemed to have thought that Pearl was the least likely target because it was viewed as an impregnable fortress and the chance of an attack transiting undetected was nil. So they alerted everyone with “war warnings” which werent very useful since everyone got them.
I ll post some stuff from “at dawn we slept” as we get closer, but like 9-11, there were plenty of “dots” that could have, but were not, connected.
You are referring to the "Vacant Seas Order" which Stinnett discusses at some length, and for which I've not seen an adequate explanation.
Admiral Kimmel's major fleet training Exercise 191, beginning November 21, also included in it's operation order the warning that hostile warships might be discovered at any moment.
The code signal for such an encounter was:
PAR35: "Given the posts you’ve supplied, I don’t understand how anyone could say with a straight face that the high command was not aware that an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent."
There is no evidence Kimmel himself knew the attack was coming, just the opposite, he manifestly did not know.
Evidence suggesting that others in Hawaii and/or Washington knew or suspected is, ahem, er... disputed, not least by Free Republic's own CougarGA7, LS and henkster.