How can anybody think about an animated flying elephant at a time like this, with Moscow about to fall to the Nazi hordes and the war drums getting louder in the Pacific?
(Check back tomorrow for Bosley Crowther's review.)
During the period after the annihilation of the Vyazma Pocket, von K1uge's Fourth Army accomplished virtually nothing.
After spending an excessive amount of time reconstituting his army around Vyazma, von Kluge moved his divisions up to the front very slowly, despite the pressing need for infantry to support the Fourth Panzer Army. The 258th Infantry division launched a series of small probing attacks at Naro-Fominsk from 20 to 23 October but was stopped cold by the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division.
The 1st GMRD was an experienced formation that was rebuilding in the Moscow area at the start of Typhoon, but at this point its combat strength was equal to about two battalions of infantry and one battalion of BT-7 light tanks.
By 27 October, von Kluge had 11 divisions up at the front line facing the Soviet 5th, 33rd, 43rd and 49th Armies. Von Kluge held a vital 130km stretch of the front from just east of Mozhaisk to Aleksin, south of Serpukhov. Von Bock ordered the Fourth Army to develop the situation along the Nara River line but von Kluge reported that his right flank – XII and XIII Corps were under heavy attack near Serpukhov from the Soviet 43rd and 49th Armies on 26/27 October. Convinced that the Fourth Army was under heavy pressure, von Bock allowed it to shift to a defensive posture.
It is apparent now that von Kluge lied to von Bock about the scale of the Soviet attacks in order to gain permission for an operational pause, if not an outright shift to winter quarters.
An analysis of German officer casualty records for the period 26/27 October reveals that XII and XIII Corps suffered only 8 officers killed and 15 wounded in this period. Half of the casualties were in the 17th Infantry Division, with the other four divisions only lightly engaged. Despite the fact that only a single infantry division was under attack from two Soviet rifle divisions and the 20th Panzer Division was nearby in reserve, von Kluge claimed that his army was in danger and must cease any offensive actions. For the next five weeks, von Kluge allowed his front to settle into a static position, with World War 1-style trenches in some areas along the Nara river.
By conniving to opt out of Typhoon, von Kluge's army was the best prepared of any of Army Group Center’s formations to face the winter and the Soviet counter-offensive, but his selfish behavior contributed to the ultimate failure of Typhoon.
Moscow 1941-Hitler's First Defeat by Robert Forczyk
Osprey Publ