Posted on 09/03/2011 11:20:17 PM PDT by nickcarraway
Royal Army gains were left on the beaches at Dunkirk.
Royal Air Force Gains were matched by the Germans.
Royal Navy gains weren’t needed in a 1938 war, when the Germans had little to nothing to match them.
I gather that we won’t agree on what the British should have done in 1938, going to war unprepared against an unmobilized foe, or waiting. I will only ask you to take a hard look at what the Germans actually had available to fight with in September of 1938, and then in 1939 (let alone 1940).
Army divisions:
1938 - 36
1939 - 98
Navy:
1938 - 29 coastal submarines / obsolete and small surface combatants
1939 - ~40 submarines(90 by 1940), more surface units but still incapable of challenging the Royal Navy of 1935.
Luftwaffe:
1938 - The Luftwaffe had technical superiority over the RAF and Frency, but had vastly insufficient numbers to defend their ground forces from medium bomber attack. In short, I think the Germans would have had the upper hand, but insufficient number to transfer than advantage to a ground victory.
1939 - About 1500 more of the uprated ME-109E (vastly better than the 600hp earlier variants) had been delivered. These we know decimated the RAF and French airforces.
All of the new British battleships had little effect during the war, except for patrolling for German raider runs, which almost never came.
Did Hitler also make big improvements during that year? And how did they compare?
Absolutely. But that could have happened in 1939 from a 1938 war, and Britain would have been able to recover even fewer men - assuming they'd made it back to the coast. British troops in France, even in 1939/1940 were only ten percent of the allied force which was mostly French. When the French collapsed, the British couldn't do much at all. The same would have very possibly occurred a year earlier.
(Oh, and it's the British Army, not the Royal Army, just for the record - Bill of Rights 1689 means the Army is Parliament's, not the Monarchs, although he or she is their Commander-In-Chief).
Royal Air Force Gains were matched by the Germans.
Not in terms of technology. The BF109 was in general service by late 1937, early 1938. At the time of the Munich Agreement (30th September 1938), about 100 Hurricanes had reached squadrons, and the Spitfire hadn't even reached its first operational squadron (that happened within a week of Munich, though, so it was close). By the time the war started a year later, there were 500 Hurricanes and 270 Spitfires in service. From 100 to 770 modern fighters in that year.
Royal Navy gains weren’t needed in a 1938 war, when the Germans had little to nothing to match them.
Except the Gneisenau (the Scharnhorst probably could have been commissioned within a few weeks in a crash program as well), the Deutschland, the Admiral Graf Spee, the Admiral Scheer, the Prinz Eugen, the Blucher, and the Admiral Hipper.
Navy:
1938 - 29 coastal submarines / obsolete and small surface combatants
Obsolete and small surface combatants?
One brand new battleship of 35,000 tons. Six modern heavy cruisers of 12 - 14,000 tones.
The Kriegsmarine's light cruisers were obsolescent, but once you get smaller than that, Germany had over a dozen recent (as in less than five years old) destroyers in service.
All of the new British battleships had little effect during the war, except for patrolling for German raider runs, which almost never came.
Yes, because of the existence of the battleships. If they hadn't been there, the Germans would not have been so constrained.
He increased the size of his army quite dramatically - but a lot of that increase occurred in August 1939 with the mobilisation of the reserves, which would have happened in September 1938 if the war had started then.
Besides that, the size of the Navy (Kriegsmarine) and the Air Force (Luftwaffe) were increased as well, as more ships and planes came online, but far less dramatically than was the case in Britain. Germany was probably 60% along the way to war readiness in 1938, Britain was about 20% along the way. By September 1939, Germany was at about 90%, Britain at about 70%. That year made a lot more difference for the UK than it did for the Germans.
That year led to more German advancement than Brit. Germany invaded France with very few MkIV tanks and the majority of Rommel’s division was made up of Chek T-38s which they had curtesy of Chamberlin.
The Hawker Hurricane was still a mainstay of the Battle of Britain and it began RAF service in 1937.
Even if Britain had gone to war over Czechoslovakia, by the time any British troops had managed to deploy (given their state of readiness in 1938), Germany would have already conquered Czechoslovakia, and Rommel would have had those tanks anyway.
The Hawker Hurricane was still a mainstay of the Battle of Britain and it began RAF service in 1937.
Yes, December 1937. By September 1938, there were about 100 in service. The standard British fighter plane was still the biplane Gloster Gladiator of which there were about 450 in service. By the time war came in September 1939, the Gladiator had been largely replaced in RAF service by the Hurricanes and Spitfires - but it took until mid 1939 for that to happen (RAF fighter strength in September 1938 - about 550 planes - 450 Gladiators, 100 Hurricanes - RAF fighter strength in September 1939 - about 810 planes. 500 Hurricanes, 270 Spitfires, 40 Gladiators). If the Battle of Britain had been fought a year earlier, it would have been Hurricanes and Gladiators in similar numbers and a handful of Spitfires, fighting that battle.
The Battle of Britain would not have been fought at all if they had held the line in France and the Blitz would not have worked very well with even fewer MkIIIs and MkIVs against the commpetitive French tanks.
Chamberlin’s cave-in also was a terrible blow to the German opposition to Hitler. The “success” the Nazis were able to brag about undermined the aristocratic military opposition to Hitler until the tide had turned against the Germans.
If I believed war could have been totally averted by a show of strength in 1938, as some people seem to, I could understand people wanting that. But my belief is that nothing was going to stop Hitler going to war. So it made sense to actually get the preparations to deal with that as close to completed as possible, before going to war, especially as so much improvement was going to occur between September 1938 and early 1940.
True, but the Germans had 50% of the men and almost no real tanks (Panzer I was more like the Bren carrier) in 1938. But your point is taken, that allowing a phony war period makes any allied superiority in 1938 a mute point. But the issue of will vs. capability is heart of the point that I was making.
(Oh, and it's the British Army, not the Royal Army, just for the record - Bill of Rights 1689 means the Army is Parliament's, not the Monarchs, although he or she is their Commander-In-Chief).
Interesting, I'll remember that.
Not in terms of technology. The BF109 was in general service by late 1937, early 1938. At the time of the Munich Agreement (30th September 1938), about 100 Hurricanes had reached squadrons, and the Spitfire hadn't even reached its first operational squadron (that happened within a week of Munich, though, so it was close). By the time the war started a year later, there were 500 Hurricanes and 270 Spitfires in service. From 100 to 770 modern fighters in that year.
Careful about treating the Bf109 as a standard item. The pre-E models were not at all comparable in capability to the E model, with only 60% of the hp. Additionally, the landing gear on the Bf109 was so weak, that up to 1941, half of the force would be out for damage incurred while landing at any one time.
Except the Gneisenau (the Scharnhorst probably could have been commissioned within a few weeks in a crash program as well), the Deutschland, the Admiral Graf Spee, the Admiral Scheer, the Prinz Eugen, the Blucher, and the Admiral Hipper.
The German pocket battleships and heavy cruisers were never a threat to even the vintage British battleships, as born out during the war. Really more propaganda than reality there.
Obsolete and small surface combatants? One brand new battleship of 35,000 tons. Six modern heavy cruisers of 12 - 14,000 tones. The Kriegsmarine's light cruisers were obsolescent, but once you get smaller than that, Germany had over a dozen recent (as in less than five years old) destroyers in service.
Gneisenau and Scharnhorst were not battleships. They had 11" guns. They were heavy cruisers overlapping into the light battle-cruiser category. Impressive for what they were, but a concept that never worked out. Guns won over speed at Jutland, and this continued to be the case. We built a similar type in the Guam and Alaska, and they too failed as a concept. No doubt that these heavy cruisers gave the Royal Navy much consternation, but other than threatening the northern convoys, of what real threat were they?
Yes, because of the existence of the battleships. If they hadn't been there, the Germans would not have been so constrained.
The Germans had no problems keeping the British out of the Baltic and near North Sea, without battleships. And the new battleships were still too slow to run down the Scharnhorst, so it is hard to see their great advantage. Yes, having more battleships allowed them to hold down the German fleet in Norway, but I'm talking about having fought and ended the war before Norway was occupied.
This would be a great conversation for an evening with cigars and scotch. I'll have to see if you are close enough for an invite. Alternative history is never more than a guessing game, but it does make you think, especially of the unintended consequences of alternative paths, such as Stalin jumping unexpectedly into Poland, even without a German invasion, or a German conciliation in 1938 that would have allowed them to mature the Z-plan before going to war.
All interesting stuff.
The time to stop Germany was when it stopped paying the reparations they owed for WW1 and used them instead to build a military that was in violation of the Treaty.
After every concession to Germany, the Allies closed their eyes and hoped it would be the last.
If you don't understand it, I suggest you go to university yourself and get a Masters in military history.
The time to stop Germany was when it stopped paying the reparations they owed for WW1 and used them instead to build a military that was in violation of the Treaty.
That's a valid position, but I am talking about the decisions of Neville Chamberlain - not every decision taken by the combined governments of the allied nations from 1919-1939. I am not going to blame Neville Chamberlain. Germany stopped paying reparations in 1931 when Ramsay MacDonald was Prime Minister. Before Chamberlain took on the role in mid 1937, there was also Stanley Baldwin.
Chamberlain tends to get blamed for the decisions of MacDonald and Baldwin, Baldwin gets blamed for the decisions of MacDonald? Why? Because MacDonald was a socialist, and Baldwin and Chamberlain were conservatives, and socialists write most of our history books. It's the 'Blame Bush' phenomena a few decades earlier.
There is quite a lot of legitimate blame to be assigned to Baldwin, and some to Chamberlain, as well - but for the most part, Chamberlain was dealing with the disastrous situation he inherited from MacDonald and Baldwin - especially from MacDonald. It was MacDonald who in 1924 as Foreign Secretary supported the Dawes Plan (and note that name - Dawes. It's Charles G. Dawes, the 30th Vice-President of the United States. For some reason, the American appeasers get ignored in much of the history) which softened the reparations regime of Versailles, and actually meant the US wound up indirectly paying a lot of Germany's war debt, and MacDonald again in 1929 as Prime Minister who was unable to block the Young Plan (worked out by mostly American financiers, Owen Young, J.P. Morgan Jr, and Thomas W. Lamont) which reduced them even further, and again it was Ramsay MacDonald who was British Prime Minister in 1931 when Germany stopped paying any of its reparations - because of a one year moratorium proposed by Herbert Hoover, the President of the United States.
Chamberlain cannot be blamed for decisions taken by governments that were in place years before he became Prime Minister. He certainly can't be blamed for them when they were made by American politicians and American businessmen.
He inherited a disastrous military situation in 1937. Baldwin had started rearmament but it was in its very early stages and it was going to take time to have any effect. Chamberlain gave it as much time as he could so when Britain had to go to war, it was at least - nearly - ready.
It is somewhat ironic that the Prime Minister who finally declared war is the one who winds up being saddled by so many people with the blame for the appeasement policies. And I believe it is unreasonable and I will say so.
If you don't understand it, I suggest you go to university yourself and get a Masters in military history.
Nice 'appeal to authority' logical fallacy.
Actually, I do have a M.A. in History, although not military history.
And I wouldn't put this discussion under that category.
I see this as dealing with diplomatic or political history, not military.
[ The time to stop Germany was when it stopped paying the reparations they owed for WW1 and used them instead to build a military that was in violation of the Treaty. [
That's a valid position, but I am talking about the decisions of Neville Chamberlain - not every decision taken by the combined governments of the allied nations from 1919-1939. I am not going to blame Neville Chamberlain. Germany stopped paying reparations in 1931 when Ramsay MacDonald was Prime Minister. Before Chamberlain took on the role in mid 1937, there was also Stanley Baldwin.
Chamberlain became the poster boy for appeasement when he came back with a signed document selling out the Czech's and claimed the British could trust Hitler and there would now be peace.
What is being discussed is appeasement and Chamberlains part in it.
Chamberlain tends to get blamed for the decisions of MacDonald and Baldwin, Baldwin gets blamed for the decisions of MacDonald? Why? Because MacDonald was a socialist, and Baldwin and Chamberlain were conservatives, and socialists write most of our history books. It's the 'Blame Bush' phenomena a few decades earlier.
They all get blamed for appeasing Hitler and not dealing with reality.
There is quite a lot of legitimate blame to be assigned to Baldwin, and some to Chamberlain, as well - but for the most part, Chamberlain was dealing with the disastrous situation he inherited from MacDonald and Baldwin - especially from MacDonald. It was MacDonald who in 1924 as Foreign Secretary supported the Dawes Plan (and note that name - Dawes. It's Charles G. Dawes, the 30th Vice-President of the United States. For some reason, the American appeasers get ignored in much of the history) which softened the reparations regime of Versailles, and actually meant the US wound up indirectly paying a lot of Germany's war debt, and MacDonald again in 1929 as Prime Minister who was unable to block the Young Plan (worked out by mostly American financiers, Owen Young, J.P. Morgan Jr, and Thomas W. Lamont) which reduced them even further, and again it was Ramsay MacDonald who was British Prime Minister in 1931 when Germany stopped paying any of its reparations - because of a one year moratorium proposed by Herbert Hoover, the President of the United States.
And you left out the role that Keynes played as well with his criticism of the reparations.
But why should the Americans get blamed when this was a European problem that they could have dealt with if they had the will to do so?
Chamberlain cannot be blamed for decisions taken by governments that were in place years before he became Prime Minister. He certainly can't be blamed for them when they were made by American politicians and American businessmen.
He can get blamed for giving Hitler part of Czechovalika!
He inherited a disastrous military situation in 1937. Baldwin had started rearmament but it was in its very early stages and it was going to take time to have any effect. Chamberlain gave it as much time as he could so when Britain had to go to war, it was at least - nearly - ready.
Did any papers of Chamberlain ever say that was really his goal-stalling for time?
Or did he really believe that each concession to Hitler would be the last?
It is somewhat ironic that the Prime Minister who finally declared war is the one who winds up being saddled by so many people with the blame for the appeasement policies. And I believe it is unreasonable and I will say so.
He declared war when he was forced to and over the wrong issue, Poland.
It's not an appeal to authority. It's a serious suggestion. I don't think you've studied this in enough detail. Why do I think that?
Because of certain errors and omissions in your posts.
Particularly this statement:
It was Churchill that pressed for rearmament and constantly warned about the Nazi threat, while Chamberlain lived in his own fantasy world of the League of Nations.
In a discussion of Neville Chamberlain, anybody who mentions only Churchill as speaking out in favour of rearmament without mentioning Sir Austen Chamberlain (Neville's brother) in my view, probably isn't that aware of the actual history in Britain. Leo Amery and Roger Keyes were also important, but they weren't Neville Chamberlain's brother. Sir Austen Chamberlain was far more significant than Churchill in the rearmament movement. He's not as well known to the casual observer today because he died in 1937.
Largely because of his influence, Neville Chamberlain himself was an open supporter of rearmament from 1935, particularly with regards to the need to upgrade and improve the Royal Air Force. Chamberlain was not part of the appeasement faction of the British government, but part of its rearmament faction - a fact well known to any historian who has studied the period, but that a lot of people who have only read the popular works often miss, because of their focus on the "Churchill versus Chamberlain" oversimplification that some engage in.
Your mention of "his own fantasy world of the League of Nations" also makes no sense from the perspective of an historian when it comes to Chamberlain and these issues. The League of Nations was utterly irrelevant to this process. Germany had withdrawn from the League on October 23rd 1933, and from that point onwards, the League was an utter irrelevancy. And Chamberlain treated it as such.
As it happens, the League of Nations both tried to prevent the rearmament of Germany, and pushed for the allied powers to rearm and it was Winston Churchill who supported the League of Nations approach and, indeed, he attacked Chamberlain for not doing so in the House of Commons on 22nd February 1938.
Chamberlain became the poster boy for appeasement when he came back with a signed document selling out the Czech's and claimed the British could trust Hitler and there would now be peace.
Yes, he did. But being the 'poster boy' doesn't mean that the criticisms of him were accurate. He obtained the Munich agreement as an effort to buy time to continue British rearmament and also in the hope that there might be still be a way of avoiding war. Yes, the second was one of his aims - to try and avoid war if possible. But he realised it might not be possible.
As for the peace for our time speech - what was he supposed to say: "I've signed this document because we're not yet ready to fight Hitler, but just wait until 1940? I know his signature isn't worth the ink it's written in." It was a politician's speech for political purposes.
They all get blamed for appeasing Hitler and not dealing with reality.
Yes, even when it isn't true. Baldwin and Chamberlain dealt with reality. They presided over rearmament. They took the steps to prepare Britain for war. It would have been better if it had started earlier, but that wasn't their decision.
But why should the Americans get blamed when this was a European problem that they could have dealt with if they had the will to do so?
Why should the people who actually wrote the plans that actually allowed Germany to not pay its reparations - wrote them to such an extent that the plans are actually named after them be blamed for their consequences? Are you seriously asking that question?
And America didn't see it as a European problem - if they had, they wouldn't have got involved at all.
He can get blamed for giving Hitler part of Czechovalika!
Yes, he can be. But if he'd gone to war in 1938 with a military that wasn't ready, he could also have been blamed for British defeat and capitulation, and we could currently be writing these messages on www.unfreereich.com - or we'd probably have been shot, by now.
Did any papers of Chamberlain ever say that was really his goal-stalling for time?
Yes, actually.
So far as my personal reputation is concerned, I am not in the least disturbed about it. The letters which I am still receiving in such vast quantities so unanimously dwell on the same point, namely without Munich the war would have been lost and the Empire destroyed in 1938.
Yes, he did. But being the 'poster boy' doesn't mean that the criticisms of him were accurate. He obtained the Munich agreement as an effort to buy time to continue British rearmament and also in the hope that there might be still be a way of avoiding war. Yes, the second was one of his aims - to try and avoid war if possible. But he realized it might not be possible. As for the peace for our time speech - what was he supposed to say: "I've signed this document because we're not yet ready to fight Hitler, but just wait until 1940? I know his signature isn't worth the ink it's written in." It was a politician's speech for political purposes.
And you know this as a fact?
Chamberlain sold out the Czech's.
The rest of your post is simply more irrelevant nonsense.
Chamberlain was not appeasing Hitler to buy time to rearm, there isn't a shred of actual evidence to support that thesis.
Americans saw the political issue as a European problem.
That American Banks had advanced loans to Germany but that was not the reason the Germans rearmed.
It was England and France who allowed them to do that.
It was the American taxpayer who got shafted with bailing out the German debt.
As it was, the war was almost lost in 1939 and having lost the Czech's didn't make the Allies any stronger.
What saved Britain was American aid and Hitler attacking Russia-not Munich.
No, it was a polite attempt to tell you that maybe you might not want to debate this issue further with somebody who is actually quite highly qualified in this area. As you say you also have a Masters in an area of history, that's a different matter, but I didn't know that and I had no desire to risk humiliating somebody. For all I knew I could be debating with a teenager who has read one book in their life.
And you know this as a fact?
No, I just believe it as a qualified historian who has studied this issue in a fair amount of detail.
Chamberlain was not appeasing Hitler to buy time to rearm, there isn't a shred of actual evidence to support that thesis.
Which again, just demonstrates you haven't studied this.
If you want to see some of the evidence, read Keith Feiling's The Life of Neville Chamberlain, or Dutton's Neville Chamberlain, or MacLeod's Neville Chambelain or A.J.P. Taylor's .The Origin of the Second World War, or Gaines Post's Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defence, 1934-1937.
MacLeod's, in my view, is the most persuasive and accessible, and I agree very strongly with this statement from it as being the guiding principle behind Munich:
We should have fought Germany much earlier before their rearmament programme had got under way, or else that we should have avoided fighting them until much later when the full flood of our own rearmament programme had reduced the ratios of German superiority. Strategically 1938 was about two years too late and 1939 was about two years too soon.
No, it was a polite attempt to tell you that maybe you might not want to debate this issue further with somebody who is actually quite highly qualified in this area Moreover, to tell you that maybe you might not want to debate this issue further with somebody who is actually quite highly qualified in this area. As you say you also have a Masters in an area of history, that's a different matter, but I didn't know that and I had no desire to risk humiliating somebody. For all I knew I could be debating with a teenager who has read one book in their life.
First, it wasn't polite-telling someone they should to to university to get an M.A. as you did, is condescending.
Second, moreover, it was an appeal to authority since you were claiming that since you had an M.A. that should end the discussion.
[ And you know this as a fact?]
No, I just believe it as a qualified historian who has studied this issue in a fair amount of detail.
So, it isn't a fact, just an opinion.
[ Chamberlain was not appeasing Hitler to buy time to rearm, there isn't a shred of actual evidence to support that thesis.]
Which again, just demonstrates you haven't studied this. If you want to see some of the evidence, read Keith Feiling's The Life of Neville Chamberlain, or Dutton's Neville Chamberlain, or MacLeod's Neville Chambelain or A.J.P. Taylor's .The Origin of the Second World War, or Gaines Post's Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defence, 1934-1937.
And they say that Chamberlain was appeasing to buy time for England to rearm?
You just admitted there wasn't any actual evidence for that.
MacLeod's, in my view, is the most persuasive and accessible, and I agree very strongly with this statement from it as being the guiding principle behind Munich: We should have fought Germany much earlier before their rearmament programme had got under way, or else that we should have avoided fighting them until much later when the full flood of our own rearmament programme had reduced the ratios of German superiority. Strategically 1938 was about two years too late and 1939 was about two years too soon.
And that says nothing about Chamberlains own motives for appeasement.
Moreover, it is also only an assumption that war would have been fought had Munich not occurred.
The Germans might have backed down, fearing the combined arms of England, France and the Czech's.
The German General Staff was very wary of fighting another war with the Allies but each concession emboldened Hitler.
Now, what you are looking at is a single positive aspect of Munich, the fact that the English had an extra year to rearm, a very myopic view at best.
If I wanted to be condescending, you'd be left in no doubt about it. I have attempted to be polite to you, but the simple fact is, I don't think you've studied this in any type of detail. You are repeating claims first made in the 1940s that are long since discredited. You do not seem to have been aware of any of the major players except Chamberlain and Churchill. You talk about Chamberlain having some sort of focus on the League of Nations, when, in fact, he did not - simply because by the time he was Prime Minister, the League was no longer relevant (if it had been - if Germany had still been a member - I'm sure Chamberlain would have tried to use it, but it wasn't, and he didn't) - and in fact, it was Churchill who wanted the League to be involved - albeit, a much more interventionist League.
So, it isn't a fact, just an opinion.
Yes - but so are the ideas that you are presenting about Chamberlain. The opinions of people like Michael Foot, a socialist who would later be the Opposition Leader in Parliament against Margaret Thatcher, and so somebody who you can not really regard as likely to treat any conservative politician like Chamberlain in a good light, and Frank Owen - a failed Liberal Member of Parliament, who cowrote Guilty Men in 1940, the work that has coloured most later perception of Chamberlain. It was a political hit piece by his left wing opponents. And you are repeating their case (Note - it is true that they also had a Conservative journalist as their third co-author, Peter Howard, but he repudiated their case in Innocent Men only a year later. Others who attacked Chamberlain in their writings were Geoffrey Mander - a Liberal MP - who was again, attacking a political opponent when he wrote We Were Not All Wrong and Aneurin Bevan, a Labor MP (later Deputy Leader of the Labor Party, in fact) in Why Not Trust the Tories?
In other words, the case you are supporting is a case that was developed by the left wing of British politics in the early 1940s and has little to do with any type of fact, but was purely politically motivated. It is very much like taking seriously a book by Hilary Clinton blaming President George W. Bush, for 9/11. The sources political bias is obvious (Foot, Owen, and Bevan, even tried to conceal their identities by writing under pseudonyms) and their case was a political case not a factual one.
And they say that Chamberlain was appeasing to buy time for England to rearm?
Yes, they do.
You just admitted there wasn't any actual evidence for that.
No, I did not admit that at all. What I said was that it can't be proven as a fact. Very little about the motivations of politicians ever can be.
But there is considerable evidence for the position. Dutton and Post, in particular, base their position on Chamberlain papers and the Cabinet papers which show the course of discussion. Feiling didn't have access to the papers - it's not clear if MacLeod did (he shouldn't have, they were still classified at the time he was writing, so he never said he did, but a lot of what he says does seem to suggest he'd seen at least some of them).
And that says nothing about Chamberlains own motives for appeasement.
No, but as Chamberlain had been supporting rearmament since at least 1935 (possibly 1934) including delivering two rearmament budgets as Chancellor of the Exchequer and constantly knew both the current capabilities of the British forces, and knew when new capabilities would be acquired, any conclusion other than the one that he was trying to get Britain to a stage where it was capable of fighting a war is very hard to substantiate.
Moreover, it is also only an assumption that war would have been fought had Munich not occurred.
Yes, but it's an assumption that is generally accepted. War might not have come instantly but Hitler wanted his Reich.
The Germans might have backed down, fearing the combined arms of England, France and the Czech's.
Unlikely, but not impossible.
The German General Staff was very wary of fighting another war with the Allies but each concession emboldened Hitler.
If the German General Staff had been in charge, war wouldn't have come in 1939 either. It was Hitler who wanted war above all others.
Now, what you are looking at is a single positive aspect of Munich, the fact that the English had an extra year to rearm, a very myopic view at best.
No, actually, that's not all I'm looking at. It's just all I have bothered to discuss here.
No, I did not admit that at all. What I said was that it can't be proven as a fact. Very little about the motivations of politicians ever can be.
That comment says it all.
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