Yes, he did. But being the 'poster boy' doesn't mean that the criticisms of him were accurate. He obtained the Munich agreement as an effort to buy time to continue British rearmament and also in the hope that there might be still be a way of avoiding war. Yes, the second was one of his aims - to try and avoid war if possible. But he realized it might not be possible. As for the peace for our time speech - what was he supposed to say: "I've signed this document because we're not yet ready to fight Hitler, but just wait until 1940? I know his signature isn't worth the ink it's written in." It was a politician's speech for political purposes.
And you know this as a fact?
Chamberlain sold out the Czech's.
The rest of your post is simply more irrelevant nonsense.
Chamberlain was not appeasing Hitler to buy time to rearm, there isn't a shred of actual evidence to support that thesis.
No, it was a polite attempt to tell you that maybe you might not want to debate this issue further with somebody who is actually quite highly qualified in this area. As you say you also have a Masters in an area of history, that's a different matter, but I didn't know that and I had no desire to risk humiliating somebody. For all I knew I could be debating with a teenager who has read one book in their life.
And you know this as a fact?
No, I just believe it as a qualified historian who has studied this issue in a fair amount of detail.
Chamberlain was not appeasing Hitler to buy time to rearm, there isn't a shred of actual evidence to support that thesis.
Which again, just demonstrates you haven't studied this.
If you want to see some of the evidence, read Keith Feiling's The Life of Neville Chamberlain, or Dutton's Neville Chamberlain, or MacLeod's Neville Chambelain or A.J.P. Taylor's .The Origin of the Second World War, or Gaines Post's Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defence, 1934-1937.
MacLeod's, in my view, is the most persuasive and accessible, and I agree very strongly with this statement from it as being the guiding principle behind Munich:
We should have fought Germany much earlier before their rearmament programme had got under way, or else that we should have avoided fighting them until much later when the full flood of our own rearmament programme had reduced the ratios of German superiority. Strategically 1938 was about two years too late and 1939 was about two years too soon.