His estimates of Allied causalities are pretty close to what they turned out to be. He also makes note of the little known fact that the Germans have been transiting troops through Finland (and Sweden) with the supposed object of reinforcing their troops in Norway. The major reason, which he couldn't know, was to prepare for the invasion of the Soviet Union. The Russians had petulantly watched the Germans moving into Finland but aside from sending a note to Germany protesting the fact, there was little they could do. While Baldwin pays lip service to Churchill's banality of a 'moral victory' in Greece he is realistic enough to know that the loss of so much valuable equipment, especially armor and artillery, could not come at a worse time what with Rommel again causing trouble and Crete being next on Hitler's menu.
One thing many people were not aware of at the time was just how important Swedish high-grade steel was to the German war economy. It was once explained to me by a Swedish representative of Sandvik that it was the quality of Swedish tool steel that made all the difference and it is questionable, by some, whether Germany could have continued the war after 1943 without that steel.
Yesterday I made a mildly derogatory remark about Baldwin's failure to predict an airborne assault on Crete. On further thought I realized that is taking unfair advantage of 20/20 hindsight. At this point in history I don't believe a major airborne assault comparble to the upcoming Crete attack had ever been attempted. (I'm sure I will be corrected on this if I am wrong.) Even an expert military analyst can be forgiven for not predicting an historical first like that. Especially since the British supposedly control the sea of the eastern Med.