What the cryptanalists will tell you is that you don't just "intercept" something like you see on TV then run to the commander and say, "oh, Admiral, they're coming." Consider that after we intercepted the famous Midway "water condenser" false message, we STILL didn't know exactly where the Japanese would be or in what force level. But anyway, since you don't want to take the time to educate yourself on this, I'll make it simple (and Stinnett completely obfuscates this): a message from the JN-25b Code would be intercepted. It first had to be decrypted. Even with the code breaking in operation, that wasn't done quickly: such a code had to be verified that, in fact, it was real and not some jibberish decoy. Then it had to be analyzed. This is the tough part. Many codes from 1941 were not analyzed until 1944. There were simply too many. Figuring out which ones were "the most important" was a rather significant job, and extremely time consuming. Rochefort got lucky with the "water condenser" message because it was something he could test pretty easily. Most weren't like that. Once decrypted and analyzed, they were passed simultaneously to CINCPAC and to Washington. Either or both might take the message seriously, or might conclude that it meant something just the opposite of what the codebreaker thought it meant.
And, yes, Stinett badly "tangled up" the codes and decrypts. I wrote a review of his book in Continuity; Jacobsen has written several article-length reviews. Not ONE of his "is" statements has a matching note---the only statements he supports with citations are the "could be/should be/could have/would have." That is to say, he doesn't understand codebreaking, or what the cryptanalysts were saying, and Jacobsen (and his colleagues) called him on it at length.
Now, I don't care if it's Homer Simpson or you, whoever relies on Prange for certain information is going to get bad information. Yes, he cited Clausen but clearly didn't understand what Clausen said to him in an abbreviated interview so he basically ignored the impact of Clausen's comments. As for Toland, really. His whole "Seaman Z" thing was blown out of the water and he was exposed as a fraud by Seaman Ogg himself. Churchill? As much as I like Winston, his study on the Second World War is not accepted by any mainstream historians as accurate.
Seems to me there should be a huge customer demand for an absolutely honest and accurate book on Pearl Harbor, one which addresses all the myths, issues and questions with facts and reason -- and showing a bit more scholarly respect than simply saying: Oh that Author "X", he was such a fricken idiot we have to ignore him.
The fact is, on Pearl Harbor there are several "Authors X" and their books are selling every day.
So, whatever falsehoods they contain can only be effectively countered by better explanations of the truth.
LS: "What the cryptanalists will tell you is that you don't just "intercept" something like you see on TV then run to the commander and say, "oh, Admiral, they're coming." "
No kidding, as a result of previous discussions going back many months ago, I've read up considerably on this subject, but don't claim to be in any sense an expert.
What I do understand is that at best code-breaking was difficult and time consuming, requiring many steps to produce an actual message translated into English for our top-brass to read.
Often, the best they could do was figure out the source and general subject of a message.
Sometimes all they could do was estimate the direction and distance of a coded radio transmission.
So no author says that code-breaking was easy, especially the more complex Japanese Naval Codes.
The question is whether, regarding the attack on Pearl Harbor, it was done at all, and did any messages suggest that those Japanese carriers, which had disappeared from "sight" were actually headed towards Hawaii?
Prange never says they did, although there is an interesting discussion (page 459 in the paperback) about Commander Rocheford's success decrypting diplomatic messages in the week before 12/7, which logically suggests he might have.
LS: "And, yes, Stinett badly "tangled up" the codes and decrypts.
I wrote a review of his book in Continuity; Jacobsen has written several article-length reviews.
Not ONE of his "is" statements has a matching note---the only statements he supports with citations are the "could be/should be/could have/would have." "
I've said all along, there is no legal "proof" -- no "smoking gun" -- that "Roosevelt knew and let it happen."
Had there been such proof, the debate would have ended many decades ago.
But there is a lot of evidence suggesting what "could be" or "could have" happened, of which Stinnett produces some.
I'd say Stinnett draws reasonable conclusions from that data, but if someone can use it to make a different case, why not write a book about it?
LS: "Now, I don't care if it's Homer Simpson or you, whoever relies on Prange for certain information is going to get bad information...."
Again, here's what you need to keep in mind:
Prange's book At Dawn We Slept is copyright 1981.
Toland's book Infamy is copyright 1982.
Stinnett's book Day of Deceit is copyright 2000.
Victor's book The Pearl Harbor Myth is copyright 2007.
My question is: what more recent book explains all the events, addresses all the issues and answers all those questions in a scholarly and reasonably respectful way -- dealing with actual facts as opposed to unbridled character assassination?