I don't need to "take up a complaint" with anyone other than you. YOU are the one who invokes Prange at every turn. If another so-called historian cites Prange, he is citing errors. Clausen and Lee are the only source to correctly incorporate the relevant material, and others, including Prange, IGNORED their findings.
You can't just slough off the codes as "tangled up" and that's why I have repeatedly referred you to Jacobsen AND OTHER cryptanalysts who utterly reject Stinnett as not knowing what he's talking about. Again, if you actually LOOK at Stinnett's end notes, he doesn't support a single solid statement with a broken code or testimony. The only thing he supports are "should have/could have" kinds of statements. ALL of his claims about radio traffic have been debunked. NONE of his so-called cryptanalitic evidence has survived scrutiny of the men who did this for a living, yet you continue to obfuscate, wiggle, and otherwise ignore their testimony and analysis, which is really all that matters.
The change in the alert status was critical, because Marshall, having ALREADY TOLD KIMMEL AND SHORT TO EXPECT WAR, was confident that Pearl Harbor, on "Alert 1," was able to defeat any attack easily---ESPECIALLY AIR, because that was what they had trained for. You really think infantry was going to storm the beaches at Oahu???
To have sent a second, "here they come" message would have alerted Japan that we were reading their DIPLOMATIC AND NAVAL codes.
Your explanation of utter failure to use long-range recon was insufficient and would have gotten Kimmel and Short court-martialed in any reasonable court.
Finally, my "pals" at least pay attention when I give them genuine and real sources rather than running back to a debunked source---and again, I'm not saying ALL of Prange is worthless, just the most critical elements about the Pearl Harbor warning. But that's the part you continually cite.
In the past month or so, I've mentioned the name "Prange" dozens of times, and quoted four different passages from him.
Of the four quoted passages, three were simply snippets of what Homer had already posted -- about general warnings and top-brass awareness of threats to Pearl Harbor.
The fourth is this lengthy passage I quoted to you, demonstrating how Prange -- "fair and balanced" -- spreads the blame around to everyone from Washington to Pearl Harbor:
Quote from Prange on who was to blame
LS: "Prange is detailed, and did well for what he had at the time.
So did doctors who believed in applying leeches under the humoral theory of medicine."
No one has yet demonstrated where Prange is in actual error on anything he said.
The only complaint is that Prange didn't know as much as more recent authors have uncovered.
LS: "I don't need to "take up a complaint" with anyone other than you. YOU are the one who invokes Prange at every turn."
Yes, it's possible that you truly don't understand what's going on here, so I'll explain again.
This thread is run by "Homer_J_Simpson", whose real name I don't know (wouldn't recognize anyway), but probably a good many here do know him, and like him -- I like him, even though I don't know him. ;-)
Homer manages all of the original data which starts these threads, and I'd expect that he does 90+% of the work himself.
CougarGA7 and several others routinely contribute significant data as well.
All are hugely appreciated.
Among the items that Homer routinely posts are significant quotes from several books, including Winston Churchill's memoirs, and works of various historians, including on the subject of Pearl Harbor: Gordon Prange.
On occasion, Homer has also quoted Toland, who in that particular instance had a condensed version of the story which Prange explained in more detail -- Ambassador Grew's first warning from Japan of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor.
My point is: since Prange is Homer's "textbook", that's where we have to begin any discussion of Pearl Harbor.
So if you want to begin the discussion somewhere else, just ask Homer to use a different "textbook."
Indeed, if you truly wanted to be helpful, you'd offer to post data or quotes yourself, pal.
LS: "Clausen and Lee are the only source to correctly incorporate the relevant material, and others, including Prange, IGNORED their findings."
Both Prange and Stinnett discuss Major Clausen's investigation at length, and Prange conducted a personal interview with him.
Major Claussen was acting as General Marshall's defense lawyer, securing sworn affidavits from all levels of command.
Near the end, in 1945, Clausen even chased down Colonel Rufus Bratton near Berlin, forcing him to change his own testimony in light of Clausen's other affidavits.
I think Clausen's work was important, but don't think it was definitive.
LS: "You can't just slough off the codes as "tangled up"..."
But you yourself have already "tangled up" the whole discussion by confusing Japanese Purple diplomatic codes with their more secure Naval codes.
So all I'm saying here is: be careful, be careful what you say when you walk into this "minefield," because it's nearly impossible not to make some mistake or other in discussing the subject.
So, did Prange or Stinnett "tangle up" anything?
Sure, your former buddy Jacobsen claimed they did, but I can't verify that from sources that are readily available in print at bookstores.
LS: "Again, if you actually LOOK at Stinnett's end notes, he doesn't support a single solid statement with a broken code or testimony. The only thing he supports are "should have/could have" kinds of statements."
Actually, the afterword & appendixes of Stinnett's book include 57 pages worth of reproduced original documents and other data supporting his conclusions.
The notes with references section is 68 pages long.
LS: "ALL of his claims about radio traffic have been debunked.
NONE of his so-called cryptanalitic evidence has survived scrutiny of the men who did this for a living, yet you continue to obfuscate, wiggle, and otherwise ignore their testimony and analysis, which is really all that matters."
Nonsense. You have not cited or quoted even one actual reference.
When you do, I'll respond to that.
LS: "The change in the alert status was critical, because Marshall, having ALREADY TOLD KIMMEL AND SHORT TO EXPECT WAR, was confident that Pearl Harbor, on "Alert 1," was able to defeat any attack easily---ESPECIALLY AIR, because that was what they had trained for.
You really think infantry was going to storm the beaches at Oahu???"
Obviously, what I think is irrelevant.
What matters is, what did General Short believe that General Marshall was telling him to do.
The answer is clearly in the "war warning" Marshall sent Short -- prepare to defend against sabotage, not air attack.
Now, yes I understand, you keep claiming some misunderstanding over Short's alert codes puts all the blame on Short and takes it off Marshall and other top-brass in Washington, but I'm not so sure.
For one thing, both Short and Kimmel responded to Washington's "war warnings" with detailed reports of what they had done in response.
These details clearly demonstrated that Short was not at highest alert, but rather, as directed, had prepared to defend against expected sabotage.
So Washington's failure to understand or respond appropriately to Short's & Kimmel's status reports cannot be excused by some supposed misunderstanding of alert codes.
LS: "To have sent a second, "here they come" message would have alerted Japan that we were reading their DIPLOMATIC AND NAVAL codes."
Now you make an extraordinarily interesting, possibly unintentionally revealing argument.
Let's note first that you seem to admit our guys were also reading Japanese Naval codes.
If you'll stick to that, it could save us a lot of disagreement! ;-)
Second, how could additional "here they come" messages to Kimmel and Short possibly have alerted the Japanese?
And why would such an alert have mattered at Pearl Harbor?
LS: "Your explanation of utter failure to use long-range recon was insufficient and would have gotten Kimmel and Short court-martialed in any reasonable court."
In fact, both Kimmel and Short were cleared of wrong-doing, in this area, by their respective courts of inquiry.
Again, the key point is that full spectrum, long-range aerial reconnaissance could only be conducted for short periods after a clear warning of a coming air attack.
Neither Kimmel nor Short believed they had received such a warning.