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To: Homer_J_Simpson
David P. Colley. The Road to Victory: The Untold Story of World War II’s Red Ball Express. Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000. 215 pp. ISBN 1-57488-173-6.

"We were assigned where we were needed. There was no schedule because there was no schedule." - Sergeant Jack Blackwell of C Company of the 514th Quartermaster Truck Regiment

PhotobucketWhen the American army landed on the beaches of Normandy, they brought with them something that no other army had attempted before. They brought a complete commitment to the use of a fully motorized army. With this motorized army came a fully motorized logistics system to support it. The difficulties of supporting the multiple allied armies became apparent very early on in the campaign. Supporting the units in and around the beachhead using only the limited access of supplies at the beaches was tedious at best. When the armies broke out after operation COBRA, the problem only became extreme. Supplies were reaching the beaches and piling up near the Mulberry piers. But getting them to the front lines was an entirely different dilemma. A large part of the solution was the use of the trucking companies that had been landed on the beaches. These trucking companies were organized and administered in a fashion that created one-way designated roads for the supply truck going to and from the forward supply depots. The Red Ball Express was born. Though the Red Ball is well known in the lore of World War II history, not much is known about the make up and action of the express itself. David P. Colley seeks to change that in his book The Road to Victory: The Untold Story of World War II’s Red Ball Express, which is a rare examination of the trucking companies that were involved in the events that make the Red Ball possible.

Colley’s look at the Red Ball Express is a very complete accounting of the events that surrounded the units involved. He goes into detail as to the events leading up to its inception and implementation as well as some of the initial problems that came with this attempt to supply entire armies almost completely by truck. The process of operating this supply line took a tremendous toll on both its men and equipment. This book examines the hardships and breakdowns from the ground level as it recounts many of these issues from the accounts of the men actually involved it the operation.

Colley also looks at the problems with the Red Ball from the point of view of the commanders who were in charge of moving the supplies as well as the ones who were to receive them. The rivalry between the two armies which the Red Ball provided for is evident especially in the accounts of when one would get supplies over the other. Colley examines some of the chicanery that came with the competing for these scarce supplies as shown in his reports of one army stealing supplies from the Red Ball that were slated for the other. General Patton was party to this thievery as indicated in this book’s report of a letter the general sent to his wife stating that it was “sad to say a colored truck company did steal some [gas] for me by careful accident".

The more fascinating aspects of this book are in the details of the men making the Red Ball work. They remember a task which had them running the vehicles to destruction and the men to exhaustion. Many of these men in the trucking companies were black and with that came the issues of racism by other army personnel towards them. Colley takes the time to give notice to the racial problems that also came with the black trucking regiments but not at the expense of the entire story. His central theme is the logistical effort put forth by the Red Ball Express and his focus on the race issues involved are mostly designed to illustrate their own place in the difficulties of the overall project. He also takes note of those who really appreciated the effort of these black trucking companies and demonstrates that even in a time of a segregated army; there was still a degree of respect allotted to these companies.

This book is very well researched. For the macro historical facts Colley uses existing books and unit histories to piece together the story line of the Red Ball. But for the detailed stories and real meat of this book he relied on many interviews with men who were directly involved in the implementation of the Express. In all he utilized over 30 interviews with these men, most of them conducted by the author himself. The most harrowing, dramatic, and sometime funny stories all can be traced to these interviews that Colley took the time to make. The source material is formatted in an “end note” format which allows the reader to reference to statements in the book with notes in the back mater. This allows those who are not interested in where every piece of information came from to not be distracted by notation on every page.

If you are interested in the finer details of World War II, I recommend this book. It really pieces together the scope of the logistical problems that faced the Allied armies in France and what was attempted to try and remedy these problems. This book looks at a neglected aspect of warfare – logistics. This less glamorous component of warfare, while not the stuff for the next blockbuster movie, was still of vital importance to the conduct of war. This book provides a peek into just one aspect of the tremendous logistical effort that equipped the American soldier in their march across Western Europe.

CougarGA7

73 posted on 02/09/2011 5:26:11 AM PST by Homer_J_Simpson ("Every nation has the government that it deserves." - Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821))
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To: CougarGA7
David Stahel. Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 451 pp. ISBN 978-0-521-76847-4.

PhotobucketAt 3:15 a.m. on June 22, 1941 the skies opened up with the thunderous boom of artillery fire. After months of preparation, the German invasion of the Soviet Union had begun. Though Hitler wouldn’t know it at the time, this was the most fatal mistake he would make in the entire war. The decision to invade the Soviet Union would eventually lead to Germany fighting a two and even three front war as Britain held out and America joined the fray. The Soviet colossus did not crumble as had every other adversary the Wehrmacht had faced and by the end of the year it was clear that they would be in a long and probably losing battle with the inexhaustible mass of Russia.

Contemporary histories often portray operation BARBAROSSA as the triumphant 1st phase of Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union that had brought the large country to the brink of collapse. They also tend to credit the Russian winter as the event that finally brought the German armies to a stop and in turn saved the Soviet empire. The reality couldn’t be farther from the truth. David Stahel’s book, Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East is a study of the problems that really had doomed operation BARBAROSSA from succeeding before the invasion even began. Set before the start of the invasion and only tracking events to the end of August that year, David Stahel demonstrates to the reader how the problems that faced the Wehrmacht were insurmountable in light of the resources they had available and the leadership they had to command it. By August, long before the first rains or freezes of autumn, the German army was already at the end of its strength and was truly in dire straights.

David Stahel focuses on two major aspects that led to the German defeat in the east. These points of focus are not only vitally important to understanding the situation for Germany in operation BARBAROSSA, but they are also aspects that are usually ignored by common histories. The first of these issues is with the leadership driving the armies themselves. Much has been made of bad decisions made by Hitler during the course of the Second World War, but more often than not, the German generals who followed his orders are portrayed as brilliant strategist, with their only failings being the burden of trying to follow impossible orders from their Führer. Stahel goes beyond the erratic whims of Adolf Hitler to show the flaws within the leadership of the Germany armed forces as well. From Franz Halder’s manipulations of orders to try and force a move on Moscow (contrary to Hitler’s wishes) to Guderian’s over extension of his lines and even Paulus’ inability to show the flaws in the invasion plans in his pre-invasion war games, the flaws in the German command are shown for the fallacies that they really possessed. David Stahel explains to his readers the infighting, uncertainty, and just poor judgment that plagued the generals of Germany.

The second aspect focused on by Stahel is the logistical nightmare that was operation BARBAROSSA. He shows that even before the invasion began there were already critical shortages on vital supplies including seemingly trivial things like tires for the support vehicles. Once the invasion had begun, problems with supplies only continued to get worse. Stahel demonstrates that not only was the well know problem with the different rail gauges a problem for logistical support of the armies, but it was impossible to make up the difference with the other support means at the Wehrmacht’s disposal. The supply vehicles that would be needed to provide the supplies to the front were too few and to fragile to do the job. The horses that made up a large portion of the supply system as well as for the transport of men and artillery were simply not conditioned for the harsher Soviet conditions and suffered from a very high rate of attrition. Before the autumn rains got equipment stuck, the sandy roads clogged engines, and choked men. As Stahel shows in his analysis of logistical support, not only were many of these divisions not getting new equipment and tanks to replace their losses, they also were not receiving the parts they needed to recondition the repairable fighting vehicles they had. In this Stahel shows how the vaunted blitzkrieg was ground to a halt well before the Russian winter began freezing troops and engines.

The research for this book is extremely detailed. Stahel uses detailed footnotes at the end of each page to not only reference his source material, but to expand on the reference or recommend other sources of information for the particular piece of information. In short, this book has nearly as much “back matter” as it has writing. For this reason, the book reads much like what it likely is. It reads as if it is a doctoral dissertation that is designed to be readily defendable. For the reader of popular histories this book may not have the trappings to keep up their interest. Its attention to detail comes at the expense of leaving out some of the more interesting side notes that you would see in a general history book and some portions of it are a bit dry. However, for those who are really in search of understanding the detail of what went wrong with the German invasion of the Soviet Union, this book will deliver in spades. Another author and expert on the Eastern Front, David Glantz has referred to this book as the “state of the art” on the subject of operation BARBAROSSA and this author would have to agree completely. If you want to understand operation BARBAROSSA and those first critical months of the war in the east, this is the book to get.

CougarGA7

74 posted on 04/20/2011 8:50:18 PM PDT by Homer_J_Simpson ("Every nation has the government that it deserves." - Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821))
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