This is borne out [he wrote] by the composition of the British Military Mission. The Admiral . . . is practically on the retired list and was never on the Naval Staff. The General is also purely a combat officer. The Air Marshal is outstanding as a pilot and an instructor, but not as a strategist. This seems to indicate that the task of the Military Mission is rather to ascertain the fighting value of the Soviet forces than to conclude agreements on operations . . . The Wehrmacht attaches are agreed in observing a surprising skepticism in British military circles about the forthcoming talks with the Soviet armed forces.
William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich
A close professional associate of many years sized him up like this: “Stark was the right man in the right place at the right time to get a lot of things done that needed doing.” But a Cabinet member who worked closely with Stark thought the admiral “a timid and ineffective man to be in the post he holds” and “the weakest one of all” the President’s advisers.
Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept
No, really. We mean it this time.
The leader of the British mission that will leave for Moscow this week will be Admiral Sir Reginald Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax . . .
Reggie, to his friends.
Also on this thread:
Main Points of Chamberlain Speech – 3-4
Poles to Try Nazis By Court-Martial - 5
Chamberlain Forbids His Ministers to Hold Directorships in Most Private Companies – 6
Drunkenness Ushers In Bombay Dry Law; Natives Have Last Fling as Bars Are Shut – 7*
*Rationing for non-Indians means seven bottles of whisky a month.
Oh, the humanity!
Update on the negotiations at reply #2.
Inaugural excerpt from At Dawn We Slept at reply #3.
It will be interesting to see when the NY Times first uses the term Second World War or World War II. Will the European war along with Japan's war against China count, or will it not be considered a "World War" until Pearl Harbor and America's entrance into the war?
One month to go!
Poles to try Germans in Courts Martial rather than civil courts, disarming German civilians trapped in Poland behind the artificial lines of Versailles, refusal to allow the Germans to build autobahns and modern rail lines to East Prussia, shooting down German airplanes. Polish private armies in Danzig.
How long can the Germans be expected to put up with these provocations?
I have to note the Help Wanted add at the bottom of the post. You will never see this today:
SEC’Y, Under 25, attr.
I’m assuming this means “no older or ugly women need apply...”
BTW- When did Neville actually get replaced?
At 12:58 P.M. on that day Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, who invariably left the sending of telegrams to State Secretary von Weizsaecker, got off on his own a wire marked "Secret—Most Urgent" to Schulenburg in Moscow.
Yesterday I had a lengthy conversation with Astakhov, on which a telegram follows.
I expressed the German wish for remolding German-Russian relations and stated that from the Baltic to the Black Sea there was no problem which could not be solved to our mutual satisfaction. In response to Astakhov's desire for more concrete conversations on topical questions ... I declared myself ready for such conversations if the Soviet Government would inform me through Astakhov that they also desired to place German-Russian relations on a new and definitive basis.
It was known at the Foreign Office that Schulenburg was seeing Molotov later in the day. An hour after Ribbentrop's telegram was dispatched, Weizsaecker got off one of his own, also marked "Secret—Most Urgent."
In view of the political situation and in the interests of speed, we are anxious, without prejudice to your conversation with Molotov today, to continue in more concrete terms in Berlin the conversations on harmonizing German-Soviet intentions. To this end Schnurre will receive Astakhov today and will tell him that we would be ready for a continuation on more concrete terms.
Though Ribbentrop's sudden desire for "concrete" talks on everything from the Baltic to the Black Sea must have surprised the Russians—at one point, as he informed Schulenburg in his following telegram which was sent at 3:47 P.M., he "dropped a gentle hint [to Astakhov] at our coming to an understanding with Russia on the fate of Poland"—the Foreign Minister emphasized to his ambassador in Moscow that he had told the Russian charge that "we were in no hurry."
This was bluff, and the sharp-minded Soviet charge called it when he saw Schnurre at the Foreign Office at 12:45 P.M. He remarked that while Schnurre seemed to be in a hurry, the German Foreign Minister the previous day "had shown no such urgency." Schnurre rose to the occasion.
I told M. Astakhov [he noted in a secret memorandum] that though the Foreign Minister last night had not shown any urgency to the Soviet Government, we nevertheless thought it expedient to make use of the next few days for continuing the conversations in order to establish a basis as quickly as possible.
For the Germans, then, it had come down to a matter of the next few days. Astakhov told Schnurre that he had received "a provisional answer" from Molotov to the German suggestions. It was largely negative. While Moscow too desired an improvement in relations, "Molotov said," he reported, "that so far nothing concrete was known of Germany's attitude."
The Soviet Foreign Commissar conveyed his ideas directly to Schulenburg in Moscow that evening. The ambassador reported in a long dispatch filed shortly after midnight that in a talk lasting an hour and a quarter Molotov had "abandoned his habitual reserve and appeared unusually open." There seems no doubt of that. For after Schulenburg had reiterated Germany's view that no differences existed between the two countries "from the Baltic to the Black Sea" and reaffirmed the German wish to "come to an understanding," the unbending Russian Minister enumerated some of the hostile acts that the Reich had committed against the Soviet Union: the Anti-Comintern Pact, support of Japan against Russia.and the exclusion of the Soviets from Munich.
"How," asked Molotov, "could the new German statements be reconciled with these three points? Proofs of a changed attitude of the German Government were for the present still lacking."
Schulenburg seems to have been somewhat discouraged.
My general impression [he telegraphed Berlin] is that the Soviet Government are at present determined to conclude an agreement with Britain and France, if they fulfill all Soviet wishes ... I believe that my statements made an impression on Molotov; it will nevertheless require considerable effort on our part to cause a reversal in the Soviet Government's course.
Knowledgeable though the veteran German diplomat was about Russian affairs. he obviously overestimated the progress in Moscow of the British and French negotiators. Nor did he yet realize the lengths to which Berlin was now prepared to go to make the "considerable effort" which he thought was necessary to reverse the course of Soviet diplomacy.
In the Wilhelmstrasse confidence grew that this could be accomplished. With Russia neutralized, Britain and France either would not fight for Poland or, if they did, would easily be held on the western fortifications until the Poles were quickly liquidated and the German Army could turn its full strength on the West.
The astute French charge d’affaires in Berlin, Jacques Tarbe de St.-Hardouin, noticed the change of atmosphere in the German capital. On the very day, August 3, when there was so much Soviet-German diplomatic activity in Berlin and Moscow, he reported to Paris: “In the course of the last week a very definite change in the political atmosphere has been observed in Berlin . . . The period of embarrassment, hesitation, inclination to temporization or even to appeasement has been succeeded among the Nazi leaders by a new phase.
William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich
On August 3, on board ship just coming into Honolulu after a three-month tour through Siam, Indochina, Malaya and Java, Stilwell learned of his promotion by radio message. "It can't be true," he said to Win. "Don't say a word about it. I'm going up on deck to have a walk and try to digest it." But on the Army transport the news had already spread and people crushed around to congratulate him. Everyone joined in the excitement except for one family who outranking the Stilwells had preempted the best cabin. Now entitled to it, Stilwell had no intention of pressing the claim but told Win during the stay-over at Honolulu, "Let's let them be a little uncomfortable and think we might."
Barbara W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45
Hi there. I just wanted to thank you again for these “realtime” posts and pings.
Great stuff, every day.
FRegards,
LH