“LIVING ROOM” FOR GERMANS (NYT Editorial Page-7/22/39)

Microfiche-New York Times archives, McHenry Library, U.C. Santa Cruz | 7/22/39

[Homer_J_Simpson]

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[Homer_J_Simpson]

On July 18, E. Babarin, the Soviet trade representative in Berlin, accompanied by two aides, called on Julius Schnurre at the German Foreign Office and informed him that Russia would like to extend and intensify German-Soviet economic relations. He brought along a detailed memorandum for a trade agreement calling for a greatly increased exchange of goods between the two countries and declared that if a few differences between the two parties were clarified he was empowered to sign a trade treaty in Berlin. The Germans, as Dr. Schnurre’s confidential memorandum of the meeting shows, were rather pleased. Such a treaty, Schnurre noted, “will not fail to have its effect at least in Poland and Britain.” Four days later, on July 22, the Russian press announced in Moscow that Soviet-German trade negotiations had been resumed in Berlin.

On the same day Weizsaecker rather exuberantly wired Ambassador von der Schulenburg in Moscow some interesting new instructions. As to the trade negotiations, he informed the ambassador, “we will act here in a markedly forthcoming manner, since a conclusion, and this at the earliest possible moment, is desired here for general reasons. As far as the purely political aspect of our conversations with the Russians is concerned,” he added, “we regard the period of waiting stipulated for you in our telegram [of June 30] as having expired. You are therefore empowered to pick up the threads again there, without in any way pressing the matter.”

William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich

[Homer_J_Simpson]

Saturday editorials and letters to the editor. Some of the letters are worth reading as they provide an appreciation of the moral dilemma we faced in distinguishing entangling alliance from defending national interest in this brave new world. What is Constitutionally correct where humanitarian impulse is concerned?

From the lead editorial:

If the plight of the refugees were not so desperate, if some alternative plan had been offered when the British White Paper on Palestine was issued, [See realtime post for 5/18/39 – Homer] large-scale illegal immigration and the consequent suspension of legal immigration into the Holy Land might have been avoided.

Nazi-Soviet pact update at Reply #2.

[Homer_J_Simpson]

Seeds, the British ambassador in Moscow, had wired London on July 24, the day after his government agreed to staff talks: “I am not optimistic as to the success of military conversations, nor do I think they can in any case be rapidly concluded, but to begin with them now should give a healthy shock to the Axis Powers and a fillip to our friends, while they might be prolonged sufficiently to tide over the next dangerous few months.” In view of what Anglo-French intelligence knew of the meeting of Molotov with the German ambassador, of German efforts to interest Russia in a new partition of Poland – which Coulondre had warned Paris of as early as May 7, of massive German troop concentrations on the Polish border, and of Hitler’s intentions, this British trust in stalling in Moscow is somewhat startling.

* * *

On July 24 Count Teleki, Premier of Hungary, addressed identical letters to Hitler and Mussolini informing them that “in the event of a general conflict Hungary will make her policy conform to the policy of the Axis.” Having gone so far, he then pulled back. On the same day he wrote the two dictators a second letter stating that “in order to prevent any possible misinterpretation of my letter of July 24, I . . . repeat that Hungary could not, on moral grounds, be in a position to take armed action against Poland.”

* * *

For some weeks the Duce had been worrying and fretting about the danger of the Fuehrer dragging Italy into war. Attolico, his ambassador in Berlin, had been sending increasingly alarming reports about Hitler’s determination to attack Poland. Since early June Mussolini had been pressing for another meeting with Hitler and in July it was fixed for August 4 at the Brenner. On July 24 he presented to Hitler through Attolico “certain basic principles” for their discussion. If the Fuehrer considered war “inevitable,” then Italy would stand by her side. But the Duce reminded him that a war with Poland could not be localized; it would become a European conflict. Mussolini did not think that this was the time for the Axis to start such a war. He proposed instead “a constructive peaceful policy over several years,” with Germany settling her differences with Poland and Italy hers with France by diplomatic negotiations. He went further. He suggested another international conference of the Big Powers.

William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich

[Homer_J_Simpson]

7/24/39 update at reply #4. Il Duce is getting nervous.

[r9etb]

That editorial is incredibly frustrating to read ... even 70 years after the fact. All the pieces are there -- the editor clearly sees what the Nazis are, and what dangers they represent.

But at the same time, he refuses to address the idea of actually doing something about Hitler, other than accepting the refugees that Hitler's actions have created.

"Doing something" meant war, or at least preparing seriously to do so. And the idea of going to war with Hitler was no doubt horrifying to the editor. What he didn't consider, apparently, was the consequences of not going to war with Hitler -- a problem that the free world had been refusing to address for years, by this point.

As usual in these outstanding posts of yours, we see the similarities to what's going on around us today.

[Cagey]

As always, thanks for posting.

A few days ago I finished the book “Soldat: Reflections of a German Soldier, 1936-1949” by Siegfried Knappe. After his release from Soviet prison Knappe became a US citizen. If you haven’t read this book, I highly recommend it. It’s an incredibly riveting read from the perspective of a German staff order who realized far too late of Hitler’s road to the destruction of Germany.

[Homer_J_Simpson]

It sounds like a good read. It would be interesting to read an account of a junior officer of serving in the Wehrmacht in the pre-war years. The closest I have come to that is a novel about a rifleman on the Eastern front I read years ago called, I thought, “The Forgotten Soldier.” I just went to Amazon to confirm that and there is a book there with that title on the same subject but it is described as an autobiography. Since the central character in the one I read is KIA at the end it can’t be the same forgotten soldier. Maybe I have the title wrong.

[Homer_J_Simpson]

Top Secret Update

07/25/1939 - Poland gives Britain and France a German Enigma machine each, whose codes they have broken.

http://www.worldwar-2.net/prelude-to-war/prelude-to-war-index.htm

The following site gives some background on this event.

http://www.century-of-flight.net/Aviation%20history/WW2/Enigma.htm

[PAR35]

Just trying to make your links clickable:

http://www.worldwar-2.net/prelude-to-war/prelude-to-war-index.htm

The following site gives some background on this event.

http://www.century-of-flight.net/Aviation%20history/WW2/Enigma.htm

[JLS]

1939 was really the cusp of “doing” something about the Nazis. They had been elected in 1933. They had demanded and gotten Austria and the Sudatenland. They had violated the Versailles Treaty, but as the Economic Consequences of the Peace evidences the west was split over that treaty.