In this situation the Germans and Italians began to glimpse certain opportunities. Goering, who now had an important influence on Hitler in foreign affairs, saw Mussolini in Rome on April 16 and called the Duce’s attention to Stalin’s recent speech to the Communist Party Congress. He had been impressed by the Soviet dictator’s statement that “the Russians would not allow themselves to be used as cannon fodder for the capitalist powers.” He said he “would ask the Fuehrer whether it would not be possible to put out feelers cautiously to Russia . . . with a view to rapprochement.” And he reminded Mussolini that there had been “absolutely no mention of Russia in the Fuehrer’s latest speeches.” The Duce, according to confidential German memorandum of the meeting, warmly welcomed the idea of a rapprochement of the Axis Powers with the Soviet Union. The Italian dictator too had sensed a change in Moscow; he thought a rapprochement could be “effected with comparative ease.”
The object [said Mussolini] would be to induce Russia to react coolly and unfavorably to Britain’s efforts at encirclement, on the lines of Stalin’s speech . . . Moreover, in their ideological struggle against plutocracy and capitalism the Axis Powers had, to a certain extent, the same objectives as the Russian regime.
This was a radical turn in Axis policy, and no doubt it would have surprised Chamberlain had he learned of it. Perhaps it would have surprised Litvinov too.
On the very day of this discussion between Goering and Mussolini, April 16, the Soviet Foreign Commissar received the British ambassador in Moscow and made a formal proposal for a triple pact of mutual assistance between Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union. It called for a military convention between the three powers to enforce the pact and a guarantee by the signatories, to be joined by Poland, if it desired, of all the nations in Central and Eastern Europe which felt themselves menaced by Nazi Germany. It was Litvinov’s last bid for an alliance against the Third Reich, and the Russian Foreign Minister, who had staked his career on a policy of stopping Hitler by collective action, must have thought that at last he would succeed in uniting the Western democracies with Russia for that purpose. As Churchill said in a speech on May 4, complaining that the Russian offer had not yet been accepted in London, “there is no means of maintaining an Eastern front against Nazi aggression without the active aid of Russia.” No other power in Eastern Europe, certainly not Poland, possessed the military strength to maintain a front in that region. Yet the Russian proposal caused consternation in London and Paris.
William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich
The British Government had to consider urgently the practical implications of the guarantees given to Poland and to Roumania. Neither set of assurances had any military value except within the framework of a general agreement with Russia. It was therefore with this object that talks at last began in Moscow on April 15 between the British Ambassador and M. Litvinov. Considering how the Soviet Government had hitherto been treated, there was not much to be expected from them now. However, on April 16 they mad a formal offer, the text of which was not published, for the creation of a united front of mutual assistance between Great Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R. The three Powers, with Poland added if possible, were furthermore to guarantee those States in Central and Eastern Europe which lay under the menace of German aggression. The obstacle to such an agreement was the terror of these same border countries of receiving Soviet help in the shape of Soviet armies marching through their territories to defend them from the Germans, and incidentally incorporating them in the Soviet-Communist system, of which they were the most vehement opponents. Poland, Roumania, Finland, and the three Baltic States did not know whether it was German aggression or Russian rescue that they dreaded more. It was this hideous choice that paralysed the British and French policy.
Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm
More information at #2. Wooing Stalin.
Someone should dig out the footage of Hitler mocking this letter in front of the party faithful. He took particular glee, with appropriate responses, as he ticked off the nations that Roosevelt had mentioned: Finland, Estonia, Latvia...et al. Howling laughter ensured when he mentioned Great Britain, Iran.
Rahm Emanuel, who now has an important influence on Obama in foreign affairs, saw Calderon in Mexico City on April 16 and called his attention to Brazilian President Lula de Silva's recent speech tirade over "white, blue-eyed" people.
History repeats.....
This is further down the line, but I’m reading a biography on Marshal Petain. According to the author (Charles Williams) in June 1940, when the French Army was essentially beaten but holding out at the Aisne River. The French Government in Bordeaux had sent to Spain for them to request an Armistice from Berlin. But Petain who at the time had been made head of the Government, got on the radio that evening and ordered the cease fire. Problem was that Berlin had not received the request for armistice, yet. This blunder cost France dearly. The German offensive was grinding to a halt due to the resistance and thin supply lines. There was serious discussion of retreating back to Belgium to resupply.
If Petain had waited until hearing back from Berlin, before announcing the cease fire, France would of gotten excellent terms in her favor. Probably even retaining the whole country and being able to regroup and rearm. Germany may have took a step back to rethink things. At least the war could of been put off for 6-12 months. Instead upon hearing the cease fire, whole units of French troops started surrendering or melting away.
The author contributed this to the Government being to far away to get updated reports from the Army quick enough and that Petain’s mind was just to entrench in surrendering, thinking that all was lost.