Morris Dees claims many things.
Explain to me why it is "abusive" for me to use a term which I did not consider offensive (would you prefer to be called a "palaeo-Confederate"? or just plain "Confederate"?) once, but not abusive for you to use the term "Damn Yankee" repeatedly?
i suggested Smith P. Bankhead as a POSSIBILITY because he was WELL-known as a hunter/woodsman/leader & was also "well-regarded on his home ground" by citizens.
So well regarded, apparently, that some of them beat him to death.
further, you have for the second time failed to notice (or possibly intentionally ignored) that he (nor any of the other CSA leaders) was NOT ordered by President Davis and/or GEN Lee to "go home, organize & continue the fight".
General Lee, who was only responsible for his own command, had surrendered. Lee had no legal authority inside or outside of the Confederacy to recruit new troops for a new mission.
Jefferson Davis, who presided over the dissolution of the Confederate government on May 5th, was a private citizen when he was apprehended. As such he also lacked any legal authority inside or outisde the Confederacy to recruit new troops for a new mission.
Jubal Early and John Bell Hood did not look to Davis or to Lee as their commanders anymore, and they took it upon themselves of their own initiative to try to start a guerrilla movement.
They failed. Hood surrendered soon after and Early fled overseas.
Early, Hood and Forrest were the probably highest ranking officers in the Confederate army yet to surrender after May 5, 1865. They were thus, by definition, the highest ranking government officials in the Confederacy and were the only people who could issue such a call under the old chain of command.
And they did issue such a call. And they were all three men of great ability who commanded great respect from Confederate citizens and Confederate soldiers. No one can say that Forrest was not a born guerrilla leader.
Their collective failure demonstrates that a guerrilla campaign was not a realistic undertaking.
There is no point in saying "if only they had." They actually did. And it didn't work.
I would also point out that during the Confederacy's successes, Jefferson Davis did not generally issue orders to Lee or any other general telling them how or when to fight.
Lee never asked permission to enter Maryland. Lee never asked permission to enter Pennsylvania. Lee basically disregarded strong "requests" by Davis to transfer troops to the west. If Lee had believed that a guerrilla campaign was winnable, he would not have awaited orders from Davis - he would have done what he had always done: made an executive decision right there on the spot, and hold himself accountable to dismissal or arrest if it went wrong.
If Lee had believed that a guerrilla campaign was winnable, he would not have awaited orders from Davis - he would have done what he had always done: made an executive decision right there on the spot, and hold himself accountable to dismissal or arrest if it went wrong. "
I much enjoy & appreciate your highly informed comments.
First:
By all reports, Lee was in the best sense "an officer and gentleman."
Indeed, he personified that ideal like no other military leader we know of, excepting of course another Virginian, George Washington.
This is in response to stande waite & others who suggested: somehow Lee COULD have, MIGHT have or SHOULD have lead a "guerrilla war," and so changed focus of military actions from ARMY vs ARMY to GUERILLAS vs CIVILIANS.
I'm saying, given his basic character, such a thing was impossible for Lee.
So fahgeddaboutit, COULD NOT happen.
It's been posted here that: the idea was even suggested to Lee and he turned it down.
But I would also note again that Lee was scrupulous in ordering his troops to behave themselves, and to pay for their requisitions in the Gettysburg campaign.
Let's see if I can nail this, by quoting Lee again, from Bowden & Ward (p 140).
[On June 21, 1863, Lee] "had issued strict orders outlining how his men would seize and pay for supplies while operating in enemy territory.
"The wanton destruction of Southern civilian property by Federals was a barbarity Lee was determined his soldiers would avoid.
"I cannot hope that Heaven will prosper our cause when we are violating its laws," Lee had informed [General] Trimble. "I shall therefore carry the war into Pennsylvania without offending the sanctions of a high civilization and of Christianity."
"General Order No. 72, promulgated on June 27, updated the Army of Northern Virginia's code of conduct.
"In addition to complimenting his men on their conduct, Lee admonished that they must remember, "that we make war only upon armed men, and that we cannot take vengeance for the wrongs our people have suffered without lowering ourselves in the eyes of all whose abhorrence has been excited by the atrocities of our enemies, and offending against Him to whom vengeance belongth, without whose favor and support our efforts must all prove in vain."
"There was more behind Lee's latest orders than a display of Christian charity. While his words do indeed reflect his strong character, integrity, and a sense of moral responsibility, they also demonstrate a realistic understanding of the current military and political realities he faced in Pennsylvania.
"Maintaining order and discipline while moving through enemy territory was absolutely vital because it kept every man in the ranks. This was especially important because Lee was already missing five valuable brigades of infantry.
"Avoiding a repeat of the widespread straggling and desertion that had so weakened the army during the Sharpsburg Campaign in the autumn of 1862 was critical to the success of the current Pennsylvania operation.
"Further, outrages against the locals would only serve to galvanize support for the Lincoln administration and fuel partisan operations against the invading southern army.
"Lee's latest general order was both militarily sound and politically astute."
Second:
On Lee's relationship to the Confederate government:
quoting from page 35 about a May 1863 conference:
"For four days Lee, Davis, and the Confederate cabinet officials were consumed with how to address the military situation facing their country.
"Eventually the choice boiled down to either dispatching reinforcements from the Army of Northern Virginia to Johnston in Mississippi [Vicksburg], or strengthening Lee for a new strike north.
"Although Lee's strategic sagacity was decidedly superior to either Davis' or Seddon's, he exhibited an almost limitless tact dealing with officials in Richmond. This verbal diplomacy put him in good stead with his president, but yielded intricatge circumlocutions during the Richmond conference.
"Still his theme and goals remained clear and consistent, and can be summarized as follows..."
Point is, Lee was expected to (and did) respectfully sell his ideas to the South's civilian government officials. They made the final approval.