Posted on 06/14/2006 1:22:02 PM PDT by Kenny Bunk
Author Jerome Corsi and Rep. Tom Tancredo, R-Colo., will be guests tomorrow on G. Gordon Liddy's radio show to discuss the White House's effort to implement a trilateral agreement with Mexico and Canada that could lead to a North American union, despite having no authorization from Congress.
Corsi and Tancredo will join Liddy for the entire 11 a.m. hour, Eastern time, and take calls from listeners.
Corsi reported this week that Bush administration working groups have not disclosed the results of their work despite two years of massive effort within the executive branches of the U.S., Mexico and Canada.
The groups, working under the North American Free Trade Agreement office in the Department of Commerce, are to implement the Security and Prosperity Partnership, or SPP, signed by President Bush, Mexican President Vicente Fox and then-Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin in Waco, Texas, March 23, 2005.
The trilateral agreement, signed as a joint declaration not submitted to Congress for review, led to the creation of the SPP office within the Department of Commerce.
Geri Word, who heads the SPP office, told WND the work had not been disclosed because, "We did not want to get the contact people of the working groups distracted by calls from the public."
WND can find no specific congressional legislation authorizing the SPP working groups nor any congressional committees taking charge of oversight.
Many SPP working groups appear to be working toward achieving specific objectives as defined by a May 2005 Council on Foreign Relations task force report, which presented a blueprint for expanding the SPP agreement into a North American union that would merge the U.S., Canada and Mexico into a new governmental form.
Bump
1) When there is CRF working paper collaborated on by some no-doubt serious thinkers, and officially published
Oh, no! A think tank, publishing papers??? What's next, a cable company distributing television shows?
2) People in offices of honor, trust and profit say, in so many words, publicly, that their aims are consistent with the CFR document, including the chief executive
In so many words? Which many words? Since when are trade agreements now a continent-wide government? That's nutty. Dare I say, insane...
3) Our chief executive meets with chief executives of Mexico, and Canada and signs agreements to consolidate into one American sovereignty,
What the copulation are you talking about? You don't even know what sovereignty means, you're like Vizzini in The Princess Bride, using "inconceivable" over and over again. I posted a nice concise definition of sovereignty (hint, "sovereignty" is not whatever you decide it is), but I guess you were too busy to notice.
consistent with the aims of the CFR document
What??? Only in your diseased mind. Where do you get this crap? There isn't anything "consistent with" anything here except your posts and manure. They're TRADE AGREEMENTS, you loony. You've started with a premise and now you'll be damned if you'll let facts get in the way.
4) There are actual actions
Actual actions, eh? Well, that shows me. Those virtual actions just don't have the same impact.
being undertaken currently
in a secret bunker under the Rocky Mountains
that execute the specific working requirements
as opposed to the inert ones
of the CFR document,
Think about what you are saying. You're saying, not the CFR, but a paper published by the CFR is now pulling the strings of everybody in government.
5) Other than extra watchers on the border, not having the power to interfere, there being no action to stem the flow of Mexicans, when executive action can remedy it completely on a relatively low budget,
Dude, I hope you don't try to order a Geno's cheesesteak, because there ain't no English in that incoherent nonsense.
Many of the statements in support of inaction on the Mexican border are routinely shown to be patently false on their face, meaning deeper motivations are implied
No duh, Sherlock, but Bush can't come out and say, "Yes, we would like very much that the Commie not win in the June elections in Mexico." That is playing a minor role in all of this, if you've been paying attention.
Unless, of course, you are in favor of the Communists...
. . .that the changes at issue here are not being in fact carried out?
You know, the weird sentence structure is supposed to sound erudite but it just makes you sound like a kid playing grown up.
These were two pretty interesting paragraphs...
Monetary Union.
Another discussion recurrent in many Canadian policy circles is that of monetary union with the United States. This potential goal has been discussed in many forms. The Canadian dollar could be linked in value to the U.S. dollar; Canada could adopt the U.S. dollar; or a new North American currency (called the Amero by one proponent) could replace the U.S. and Canadian dollars, and perhaps the Mexican peso. Generally, talk of monetary union north of the border is strongest during times of relative weakness of the loonie vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar. The recent strength of the loonie has diminished such discussion, although the idea still has some proponents.
Those who support monetary union argue that it would force Canada to make the necessary structural adjustments that would make it more competitive with the United States. In other words, dollarization or a currency union would remove the ability to cushion adverse economic conditions through depreciation of the currency. By tying the loonie to the U.S. dollar or by adopting the dollar outright, Canada would be making the unmistakable commitment to converge with U.S. macroeconomic policy. Then Canada would be able to reap the benefits of U.S. policy, which traditionally have been lower inflation, lower interest rates, and higher levels of growth than Canada has experienced. In addition, the savings in trade transaction costs would be significant for the volume of trade the two nations conduct.
How would the value of the amero determined?
There are several advantages to making the amero worth one US dollar. First, the cost of conversion would be minimized since, in the dominating, large American economy, all financial assets, liabilities, and other contracts remain unchanged. They do not have to be converted and accounting changes involve only the renaming of the currency. Second, US dollar notes and coins could continue to circulate after the introduction of the common currency. They could gradually be replaced by amero notes and coins as they wear out. Third, the opposition to the amero by Americans would be minimized as their financial transactions and accounting would be virtually unchanged.
Basic economic principles suggest that with the amero worth one US dollar, the Canadian dollar cannot be equal to one amero also. I have encountered persons who argued that such a conversion rate of one for one in Canada would be just and that any other rate would be bad for Canada. This argument is false. If the two dollars were converted at par, it would be equivalent to roughly a doubling of the value of the Canadian against the US dollar. As a result, Canada's trade would be in very large deficit, there would be a recession, and the downward pressure on wages would be very strong. Canada would go through the same difficult process encountered by Germany, which, upon reunification with the formerly communist part of the country, decided that all wages and prices there would be converted at a rate of one East German for one West German deutschemark. The market exchange rate between the two currencies was about six East German deutschemark to one West German deutschemark. The official motivation behind this policy was that it would prevent massive migration to West Germany by workers attracted to higher wages there. In the adoption of the policy, an important role was undoubtedly also played by the pressure of unions and employers in West Germany, who had feared that low wages in East Germany would cause "unfair" competition and threaten living standards in West Germany.
It is ironic that the policy adopted reduced West Germany's living standards more significantly and for a longer period than would have occurred if wages and prices in the East Germany had initially been lower than those in the West Germany. Because of the policy adopted, it was necessary not only to invest large resources in upgrading the infrastructure in East Germany and in bailing out its unfunded pension system. But, as economists had predicted--this is most relevant to the current analysis--additional massive transfers were necessary to keep the economy of the former East Germany functioning at all and unemployment rates at a socially acceptable level. Five years after they began, the subsidies to labour and capital are continuing to flow because the wages paid still exceed the productivity of labour. Private capital still has few incentives to make unsubsidized investments in East Germany.
Most important, to finance these transfers, West Germany had to raise already high rates of taxation. As a result, the economic performance of all of Germany has been poor and there is no early prospect for improvement. There are important unresolved questions about the future. Will it ever be possible to stop the subsidies that have been built into the economic structure and are threatening to become considered a right? Canadians are familiar with the effects of continuous large transfers to the Atlantic provinces and the resultant dependency of the region on such support. Chances are that the same conditions will develop in much of the eastern part of Germany.
For economic reasons, the validity of which is evident from the German experience, the Canadian dollar will have to be valued at a rate that does not affect Canada's international competitiveness in the longer run. Such an efficient rate of exchange by definition would leave unchanged Canada's exports, imports, interest rates, capital inflows and outflows, production, employment, and unemployment.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine in practice what such an optimal rate of exchange would be. The market exchange rate is only an imperfect guide since it is distorted frequently by temporary, often speculative, short-term capital flows and random influences on trade in goods and services.
In Europe, conversion rates were established gradually during a period of ten years leading up to the official adoption of the euro on January 1, 1999. During this period, countries progressively co-ordinated their domestic monetary and fiscal policies. Increasingly stricter rules were applied to countries of the European Union aspiring to membership in the currency union with respect to acceptable inflation, deficits, and debts. This process resulted in growing exchange-rate stability and ultimately produced the rates for conversion into the euro.40 We might expect a similar, lengthy process, say, five to ten years, of co-ordination of monetary and fiscal policies to result in more stable exchange rates among the countries of North America, which would reflect national competitiveness as defined above, rates at which the final conversion would take place.
It should be noted, however, that it is not overly important that the exchange rate used for the initial conversion is precisely equal to the theoretical optimum. A deviation of perhaps two percent to three percent from that optimum would probably be eliminated quickly through normal increases in trade and productivity, without requiring changes to current rates of pay.
The external value of the amero against the euro, the Yen, and other currencies will be determined in the longer run by prices, income, and productivity in the amero region relative to those in the other zones. Chances are that the exchange rates with these large trading blocks will be close to those prevailing against the US dollar in the period preceding the union, simply because the trade and capital flows of the United States will be of overwhelming importance in the activities of the amero zone.
During the period before the union is created, speculators may distort the equilibrium dollar exchange rate. Cyclically low or high interest rates designed to minimize unemployment or inflationary pressures might result in capital flows and correspondingly distorted value of the dollar. We might see a repetition of the experience of the euro, which started life at 1.18 against the US dollar but, six months later, had fallen to near parity.
Nevertheless, just as no significant tensions and demands for change of that dollar-to-euro exchange rate have developed since its fall against the dollar, so we may expect that the amero's value will be relatively unimportant for the amero zone. The bulk of the trade of Canada, Mexico, and the United States will be with each other and will not be influenced by the external value of the amero. In 1999, fully 80 percent of Canada's trade was with the United States and monetary union would increase this figure even more.
The advantage of this relative independence of economic conditions in the amero zone from the value of the region's currency is, of course, one of the major benefits. It will allow the North American central bank to make monetary policy with price stability as its most important policy objective while the exchange rate is given even less consideration than it has been by the Federal Reserve since the 1970s.
Thanks SmartA, just not in the mood to get involved in all this deep stuff right now, lol.
I don't remember all the arguments about the Hillary! Task Force, but one of them was that she was ostensibly the head of a Cabinet-level "department," despite the fact she was neither confirmed nor subject to oversight. These other working-groups you appear to fear so much are so, whenever the superior(s) are called upon to testify to the proper Congressional committee or sub-committee.
A better example (making your case without the hysterics) would be the Cheney energy task force. While the Vice President's Office has the authority to engage in such activity, I believe the courts ordered it to turn over its conclusions. I'm not going to make your argument for you however, and I didn't follow those lawsuits very closely, either.
In any case, the notion that Cheney's task force should've been open to all public input is patently absurd. If Prof. Corsi's allegations are true, one would expect a Representative or Senator to make an issue of it . . . if they do not, then the problem is not the "working-group," then is it?
Really your use of innuendo does not help your argument. We all know how one of the tactics of the left is to paint your opponents as mentally ill, hysterics etc. You shouldn't demean yourself especially if you already have a sound argument.
I'm not going to go back over this thread to find its nutjob comments, but I'm certain they exist.
Nah. I like nopardons. She's is knowleable about several topics and she doesn't take $hit.
It is perfectly possible to be a fan of Alan Keyes and support the president at the same time.
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