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Good points. Military service is a much different matter though than federal civilian service. The military is often a harder life, but it can also offer the potential to do much more consequential things than can be done at comparable rank in the civilian bureaucracy.

Take a look at Roger Coram's "Boyd" for an account of how one determined, maverick air force fighter pilot: wrote a seminal rule manual on fighter combat; gave briefings in the Pentagon of legendary length, intensity, and persuasive force; battled Pentagon bureaucrats and generals with no concessions toward rank or to fools, dullards, and slackers; changed the way that the Air Force designs fighters, leading to the F-16 and other superb combat aircraft; and spurred lasting military procurement and chain of command reforms.

In retirement in Florida no less, Boyd: prompted then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to press for the revision of Schwarzkoff's plan of attack in the 1991 Gulf War to include the devastating "left hook" that Stormin' Norman resisted bitterly but later took credit for with both hands; and changed the way that the US military thinks of combat and fight -- and especially so the Marines, who took Boyd's theories to heart before anyone else did.

Boyd got no higher in rank than colonel, declined a general's commission, and, sadly, neglected his family due to his utter dedication to his work.

"In retirement in Florida no less, Boyd: prompted then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to press for the revision of Schwarzkoff's plan of attack in the 1991 Gulf War to include the devastating "left hook" that Stormin' Norman resisted bitterly "

Not really.

Colonel Warden, the Checkmate Division Chief, formed the air campaign based upon his theories of air power.

Gen Horner (CENTAF and Air Component Commander) was tasked to provide Storming an air plan to stop the invasion if it came early. . .Gen Horner only could come up with a basic 3-day air war. . .the old Cold War tactical thought process that equated anything having to do with strategic bombing meant nukes."

Storming was NOT pleased with Horner and asked Checkmate at the Pentagon to give him a strategic air campaign plan that would work. Storming did NOT fight the idea of a strategic air campaign. . .he asked for one.

Col Warden was Chief of Checkmate and he formed the plan and briefed the President and Sec Def, and CJCS, and they all bought it. . .then Colonel Warden went to Riyadh to brief Horner. Horner did NOT grasp the concept of COG's and critical nodes and the 5-rings. Horner threw out Warden, NOT Storming, and Horner actually evicted him from theater.

Lt Col (now Maj Gen select) Deptula was Warden's deputy and he stayed behind and worked more diplomatically and behind the scenes and got Wardens plan approved. When it became apparent the plan was working Horner grabbed all the credit.

Thunder and Lightening by Edward Mann III, Col, USAF is a great read on the subject, as is Air Power Against an Army by Lt Col Edward Andrews.

The left hook was another revolutionary plan that Storming liked. He was disappointed in the Jedi Knights (Army version of the Checkmate planners), as they basically came up with the usual "hey-diddle-diddle, up-the-middle" plan and he wasn't buying.

Storming fought his Land Component Commanders to ensure they understood the importance of maneuver.