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"In retirement in Florida no less, Boyd: prompted then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to press for the revision of Schwarzkoff's plan of attack in the 1991 Gulf War to include the devastating "left hook" that Stormin' Norman resisted bitterly "

Not really.

Colonel Warden, the Checkmate Division Chief, formed the air campaign based upon his theories of air power.

Gen Horner (CENTAF and Air Component Commander) was tasked to provide Storming an air plan to stop the invasion if it came early. . .Gen Horner only could come up with a basic 3-day air war. . .the old Cold War tactical thought process that equated anything having to do with strategic bombing meant nukes."

Storming was NOT pleased with Horner and asked Checkmate at the Pentagon to give him a strategic air campaign plan that would work. Storming did NOT fight the idea of a strategic air campaign. . .he asked for one.

Col Warden was Chief of Checkmate and he formed the plan and briefed the President and Sec Def, and CJCS, and they all bought it. . .then Colonel Warden went to Riyadh to brief Horner. Horner did NOT grasp the concept of COG's and critical nodes and the 5-rings. Horner threw out Warden, NOT Storming, and Horner actually evicted him from theater.

Lt Col (now Maj Gen select) Deptula was Warden's deputy and he stayed behind and worked more diplomatically and behind the scenes and got Wardens plan approved. When it became apparent the plan was working Horner grabbed all the credit.

Thunder and Lightening by Edward Mann III, Col, USAF is a great read on the subject, as is Air Power Against an Army by Lt Col Edward Andrews.

The left hook was another revolutionary plan that Storming liked. He was disappointed in the Jedi Knights (Army version of the Checkmate planners), as they basically came up with the usual "hey-diddle-diddle, up-the-middle" plan and he wasn't buying.

Storming fought his Land Component Commanders to ensure they understood the importance of maneuver.