The atom bomb and the B-29 were about two years behind schedule. (What else is new with government projects?). First use was intended on Germany.
What if Patton had release authority for six atom bombs in August, 1943? My own guess is he'd have used one on Berlin, and the rest on the USSR. By 1950, Europe would look politically like it does in 2004, although it would still glow a bit in the dark.
I actually think we owe Kim il Sung, the fat crackpot commie dictator of N Korea, a debt of gratitude. He forgot the promise he made to Mao and Stalin, and jumped the gun on his part of the war. I've read some convincing arguments that Stalin was planning on launching World War III in Europe in 1952, with the invasion of Taiwan and S Korea as supporting moves. The USSR still had massive conventional forces in Europe, while the US and England unilaterally disarmed, and the rest of western Europe was militarily worthless. And he'd have enough nukes to deter any American nuclear response. The conquest of Taiwan and Korea would be icing on the cake, with a cherry on top.
By being too eager, North Korea, which was never a match for any substantial American forces, short-circuited Stalin's plan, and forced the USSR and red China to bail him out of a deep hole.
If either the atom bomb arrived on time, or Kim il Sung kept to the original plan, the whole world could have turned out a lot better, or a lot worse, than it did.
Very interesting comments. Any recommended reading on any of that?
On the a-bomb schedule, another interesting thing I've read is an argument that Werner Heisenberg sabotaged the Nazis' a-bomb program, otherwise they might've had one before we did. Japan was also close to getting one, according to this book I got recently but haven't had a chance to finish yet (Philip Henshall, "The Nuclear Axis: Germany, Japan and the Atom Bomb Race, 1939-1945").
On the Soviets' European plans, Anthony Cave Brown's "Dropshot" is really interesting. It records that after the Soviets dropped their first a-bomb in 1949, the Pentagon did a study assessing the threat and possible responses. A pre-emptive strike was considered by Sec. Defense Louis Johnson but ruled out, and instead a war plan was drawn up for the contingency of a Soviet first strike. The wargame scenario was premised on the assumption that war would break out by about 1957 (a date chosen somewhat arbitrarily but based on estimates of anticipated advancements in the Soviet nuclear program); however in real-time the goal was for US forces to be combat-ready by 1950. Based on wargame calculations, the Dropshot planners concluded we needed more strategic air build-up in order to sustain the logistics of a sufficient bombing campaign. The conclusion was that, "In the event of war in 1950, the Air Force can a) complete the atomic phase of the planned strategic air offensive b) provide inadequate air defense for the United States and Canada c) initiate mobilization and training." The Air Force could not "a) complete the entire air offensive called for or b) provide the air defense for the United States and Alaska with the maximum risk we can afford to take."
Why.....it's almost Providential the way things worked out. ;^)