Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
Masoud Pezeshkian attended a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in China on August 31 and September 1. Iran views multilateral institutions such as the SCO as necessary to counter and undermine the US-led international order. The SCO, which Iran joined in 2023, is a multilateral forum that was established by Eurasian countries, including China and Russia, to coordinate on political, military, and economic issues.[7] Representatives from China and Russia, among other countries, attended the summit. Iran, China, and Russia jointly seek to counter Western influence, bypass international sanctions, and undermine US interests. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated prior to departing for China that the SCO aims to “confront unilateralism and totalitarianism.” Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh similarly stated that organizations such as the SCO and BRICS can help Iran confront “unilateralism.”[8]
Iran seeks to deepen its ties with SCO member states to undermine international sanctions. Pezeshkian proposed the formation of a “shared digital infrastructure” using central bank digital currencies to circumnavigate financial sanctions during his speech at the summit.[9] Pezeshkian met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, and Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the summit. Pezeshkian and Putin discussed economic cooperation and political alignment on Iran’s nuclear program.[10] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately met with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, on the sidelines of the summit.[11]
Israel located and killed Iranian officials during the Israel-Iran War by tracking their bodyguards’ cellphones, according to Israeli and Iranian officials speaking to the New York Times on August 30.[12] Israel used the cellphone location of Iranian officials’ bodyguards to attack a Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) meeting on June 16. The SNSC is Iran’s highest foreign policy and national security decision-making body and includes the heads of Iran’s three branches of government and senior military commanders, among other officials.[13] Israeli and Iranian officials told the New York Times that Iranian bodyguards’ “careless” use of cellphones played a “central role” in Israel’s ability to kill Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists during the war.[14] Israel similarly exploited lapses in Hezbollah’s operational security following the Israeli pager and walkie-talkie attacks in September 2024 to kill senior Hezbollah officials.[15]
The Iranian regime has continued to crack down on Israeli infiltration following the Israel-Iran War. Three senior Iranian officials and a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) told the New York Times that Iranian authorities have arrested or placed under house arrest dozens of military, intelligence, and government officials, including high-ranking officials, for spying for Israel.[16] The Iranian regime has also arrested hundreds of civilians since the end of the war for allegedly spying for Israel.[17] The IRGC Intelligence Organization recently announced on August 30 that it arrested eight individuals linked to Mossad in Iran’s northeastern Khorasan Razavi Province.[18] The IRGC Intelligence Organization claimed that the individuals had provided Mossad with coordinates for “vital and sensitive” Iranian sites and information about Iranian military officials during the war. The IRGC Intelligence Organization added that the individuals planned to conduct attacks targeting unspecified important sites in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province.
Iranian parliamentarians introduced a three-part bill on August 28 to withdraw Iran from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), likely to pressure the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to not reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran.[1] The bill would require Iran to leave the NPT and the Additional Protocol, end all negotiations with the United States and the E3, and terminate cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[2] The Iranian parliament recently passed a law on June 25 that suspended Iranian cooperation with the IAEA, which makes the last clause largely performative.[3] The E3 triggered the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism on August 28.[4] The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran in the event of Iran’s “significant non-compliance” of JCPOA commitments.[5] The process to reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran lasts 30 days, and Iran likely seeks for the E3 to reverse its decision to reimpose these sanctions during the 30-day period.
The introduction of this bill may reflect differences between various regime institutions about how the regime should respond to the E3 decision to trigger the snapback mechanism. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi wrote a letter to the European Union on August 29 in which he stated that Iran “remains committed” to diplomacy and is willing to resume negotiations to reach a “fair and balanced” agreement.[6] This statement contrasts with the three-part bill, which would suspend all negotiations between Iran and the United States and the E3. The difference between parliament and the executive branch’s views comes after hardline parliamentarians recently criticized the Iranian government for allowing IAEA inspectors to return to Iran. Parliamentarians claimed that the decision violated the law that parliament passed on June 25.[7] IAEA inspectors returned to Iran on August 27 to supervise a fuel replacement at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. IAEA inspectors do not have access to other Iranian nuclear facilities, such as Natanz or Fordow.
Iran called on the UNSC to approve a Russian-Chinese draft resolution that would extend Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA until at least April 18, 2026.[8] The snapback mechanism is currently set to expire on October 18, 2025. Iran’s Mission to the UN said on August 28 that UNSC members face a “decisive” choice between backing the Russian–Chinese resolution and preserving diplomacy or reimposing UNSC sanctions, which it claimed would cause “grave consequences.”[9] Iran previously rejected an E3 proposal to extend the snapback deadline by six months, arguing that extending the snapback deadline gives the E3 more time to reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran.[10] The E3 offered to extend the snapback deadline in return for Iran resuming full cooperation with the IAEA, resuming negotiations with the United States, and accounting for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[11] The Russian-Chinese resolution does not appear to include these conditions and simply urges all parties to resume negotiations, which makes this resolution much more favorable for Iran than the E3 proposal.[12] The Russian-Chinese resolution also reportedly bans the E3 from reimposing UNSC sanctions on Iran during the six-month extension period.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-29-2025
Even further the entire “great patriotic war”
Where Hitler broke the alliance with Stalin FOH, (friend of Hitler😎) lasted 1418 days, currently we are at 1356 days of pitins great egotistical war and what has he accomplished?
Millions dead and wounded
Cities razed
Russian economy collapsing
Soviet legacy equipment basically gone
Food exporter to food importer
Fuel exporter to fuel importer
Budget surplus to massive debt growth
2nd largest arms exporter to net arms importer
And he maybe almost soon will capture a destroyed small city all the while having less Ukrainian territory than back in March of 2022
Russian Oil Price Crash!
President Trumnp’s sanctions have crashed the price of Russian Urals grade oil to it’s lowest point of this war (currently about $43/bbl). Russia’s budget was based on an assumption of $70/bbl, but with their current deficit, they would need $90/bbl to breakeven - assuming constant volume, but volume is suddenly dropping as well.
Kyiv Independent (12 Nov):
“The discount of Russia’s flagship crude Urals to Brent has widened in recent days to the highest this year at $20 per barrel as the U.S. sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil upend crude flows, industry sources told Russian daily Kommersant on Wednesday.
Urals has traded at a discount to Brent since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with discounts susceptible to demand in China and India and the U.S. sanctions on Russia’s oil exports and industry.
The sanctions last month sent the discount surging again. As of Monday, Urals was priced $19.40 per barrel below Brent on a free-on-board (FOB) basis at the Russian Baltic Sea port of Primorsk and at the port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea...
...Before the U.S. sanctions from October 22, the discount was about $11-$12 per barrel...
...The widest discount was hit in 2022 and early 2023 – at over $30 per barrel below Brent, immediately after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the introduction of a Russian oil embargo in the EU from 2023.
However, in those years, Brent was trading at between $80 and $120 per barrel, much higher than the current price.”
The World now needs to remove Russian oil from the market - the replacement supply is already flowing:
Global Oil Prices Plunge 2.5% as OPEC, IEA Outlooks Point to Softer Market
OilPrice.com (12 Nov):
Oil prices tumbled on Tuesday, with Brent down 2.46% at $63.56 a barrel at 9:54 a.m. ET, and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) slid 2.64% to $59.43, as traders reacted to fresh signals of easing supply pressure and waning demand momentum through early 2026...
...The combination of steady OPEC+ supply, softer macroeconomic indicators, and shifting institutional forecasts has triggered broad liquidation across crude contracts. Traders cited by Reuters said technical pressure intensified once Brent slipped below $64, prompting algorithmic selling that amplified losses.
Brent and WTI are now at their lowest levels since early September, erasing the autumn rally that followed refinery outages in the U.S. Gulf. With inventories stable and demand revisions trending down, market participants are bracing for further volatility ahead of OPEC’s December policy review.”
Its all going ‘according to plan’
“Astronauts Marooned by Debris at China’s Space Station”
“Astronauts Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams became NASA’s most famous duo since Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin after staying on the International Space Station for more than nine months in 2024 and 2025 thanks to concerns about the safety of the Boeing spacecraft that was supposed to take them home.
Now there’s a Chinese trio facing the prospect of an extended stay in space: Chen Dong, Chen Zhongrui and Wang Jie. They were supposed to return from Tiangong, the Chinese space station, last week after half a year in orbit. However, the space agency called off the journey because space junk had collided with their Shenzhou-20 spacecraft.
No word yet on how much longer they’ll be in space.
The China Manned Space Engineering Office issued a vague statement on Tuesday saying its team is preparing for the astronauts’ return.
“All work is progressing steadily and orderly according to plan,” the office said, adding that the three Shenzhou-20 crew members are working normally aboard Tiangong with the three Shenzhou-21 astronauts meant to replace them.”
Restrictions and Internet shutdowns will help increase the birth rate in Russia
This opinion was expressed by a source in the Kremlin who is responsible for demographic issues. “Any shutdowns of the Internet, including mobile Internet, will help solve the issue of fertility. After all, if Russians have access to about 10-12 sites, social networks and instant messengers (as planned, we reported on this - ed.), it will be easier to protect them from the propaganda of childlessness, calls for abortion and other nasty things that the West broadcasts to us. And instead of them, we will spread the right appeals, explain why an increase in the birth rate and large families is very important,” our interlocutor believes. He also expects that Internet shutdowns will have an effect in terms of demographics as early as next year.
The situation in Pokrovsk remains difficult: the southern and southwestern parts of the city are under Russian control, the city center near the railway lies within the gray zone, while the northern part remains under Ukrainian control.
Based on data that Ukrainian servicemen provide to RADA from combat zones, the concern is updating the software and expanding the radar network to meet changing requirements. The main system is an improved multi-role hemispheric radar capable of detecting air threats, drones, and missiles. Due to its compact design, the radar can be used both as a transportable and as a self-propelled variant.
The radar can:
✅ detect nano-drones at a distance of 10 kilometers
✅ medium drones and helicopters at 45 kilometers
✅ low-altitude flying fighters at 35 kilometers
✅ heavy transport aircraft at 100 kilometers
Currently, 16 such radars are in service with the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Awesome Jay in Kyiv
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=xlSYdmwsL1I&pp=ugUHEgVlbi1VUw%3D%3D
Protests in St. Petersburg, economy collapsing, pay cuts for troops, no AD
I saw an update on that one Russian submarine that was lost (the Rostov on Don).
It is still sitting in the dry dock in Sevastopol where it was hit, with no efforts being made to repair it.
The Russian Navy long had a big presence in Sevastopol, before Putin screwed that up for them, along with so many other things.
Putin is The Doom of Russia.
“The order issued by Putin in October to capture Pokrovsk by November 15 expires in three days, and given that this objective has not been achieved, the Russian army has been assigned a new deadline — to seize Pokrovsk by December 15”
Did they say what year?
Putin’s one serious accomplishment during his reign, the construction of the 12 mile long Kerch Bridge is now allowing vast numbers of frightened Russians in Crimea to escape back to Russia. Repeated attacks in Crimea and on the bridge, plus water and other shortages now have put many panicking Russians and their vehicles on the road out of Crimea.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fQj0F2KKnTU [this video is dated 11/12/25 and is around 8 minutes long]
For those tracking the Crimea situation, a place where some are suggesting final action will soon be taken by Ukraine, here are some additional links from Nov. 11, 2025
Firestorm DEVOURS Crimea… Putin is POWERLESS Against Ukraine’s Asymmetric Assault
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hGpACIDZy9Y
Update From Ukraine | Huge! Strikes on Rus Tuapse Port and Crimea | Sanctions Work!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FEXlk3_Ytgs
Some suggest that Ukraine will soon take out that bridge, but I suspect they might only damage it enough to prevent anything heavier than a commuter train on the frail bridge, and anything heavy like tanks or other major military equipment on the 4 lane road bridge. In the past it was once damaged so only one lane of auto traffic could safely cross it. An attempt was made some time ago to see if they could begin using the rail bridge for heavy trains, but apparently that trial convinced them it would be too dangerous. If only Putin would stop his stupid war and let his people have some of the joys of normal living.
As a negotiating incentive to Putin, Ukraine could agree to let this bridge be called the V. Putin Memorial Kerch Bridge. It was a successful and useful accomplishment to complete this major construction. Too bad he decided to use it for ill.
U.S. Sanctions Force Russian Move to Relinquish Control of Key Serbian Oil Asset (Not even owned by Lukoil or Rosneft, but Gazpromneft)
OilPrice.com (Nov 11, 2025):
“Gazprom Neft and Gazprom affiliates hold a majority stake in (Serbia’s only refinery Naftna Industrija Srbije) NIS, with the Serbian state owning the remaining 29.9%...
Now, the Russian owners of NIS have applied to the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)...
...“The petition states that the Russian side is ready to cede control and influence over the NIS company to a third party,” the Serbian energy minister added.
“The state of Serbia supported this request. OFAC has already responded with certain comments and we hope it will announce its position within the week,” Dedovic Handanovic said.
“Time is running out and a solution must be found, but citizens must not suffer and run out of fuel. That will not and must not happen.”
Since the last waiver expired on October 8, banks have stopped processing NIS-related payments and Croatia’s JANAF pipeline has halted deliveries of crude oil to the refinery. The JANAF pipeline from Croatia had been Serbia’s primary supply line for Russian and Kazakh crude since 2022. Without new supply of crude, the NIS refinery can operate only until November 25, according to Serbian officials.
NIS operates Serbia’s only refinery in Pancevo, which supplies about 80% of Serbia’s gasoline and diesel and more than 90% of jet fuel and heavy fuel oil.”
U.S. Sanctions Force Russian Move to Relinquish Control of Key Serbian Oil Asset (Not even owned by Lukoil or Rosneft, but Gazpromneft)
OilPrice.com (Nov 11, 2025):
“Gazprom Neft and Gazprom affiliates hold a majority stake in (Serbia’s only refinery Naftna Industrija Srbije) NIS, with the Serbian state owning the remaining 29.9%...
Now, the Russian owners of NIS have applied to the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)...
...“The petition states that the Russian side is ready to cede control and influence over the NIS company to a third party,” the Serbian energy minister added.
“The state of Serbia supported this request. OFAC has already responded with certain comments and we hope it will announce its position within the week,” Dedovic Handanovic said.
“Time is running out and a solution must be found, but citizens must not suffer and run out of fuel. That will not and must not happen.”
Since the last waiver expired on October 8, banks have stopped processing NIS-related payments and Croatia’s JANAF pipeline has halted deliveries of crude oil to the refinery. The JANAF pipeline from Croatia had been Serbia’s primary supply line for Russian and Kazakh crude since 2022. Without new supply of crude, the NIS refinery can operate only until November 25, according to Serbian officials.
NIS operates Serbia’s only refinery in Pancevo, which supplies about 80% of Serbia’s gasoline and diesel and more than 90% of jet fuel and heavy fuel oil.”
.
The situation in the Hulyaipole direction is deteriorating, although Russian forces will probably spend considerable time setting conditions for efforts to seize the settlement. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on November 12 that the situation in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka (Velykomykhailivka) directions has “significantly worsened” as Russian forces are taking advantage of poor weather conditions to infiltrate between Ukrainian positions and have seized three unspecified settlements.[1] Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on November 12 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from positions near Novouspenivske and Nove (both northeast of Hulyaipole) and that fighting is ongoing for Rivnopillya, Yablukove, and Solodke (all northeast of Hulyaipole and west to northwest of Nove and Novouspenivka).[2] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on November 12 that mixed-weapon Russian strikes destroyed Ukrainian defensive positions and forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the Rivnopillya area on the evening of November 11.[3] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Yablukove (north of Hulyaipole), west of Rybne, south of Solodke, and west of Nove (all northeast of Hulyaipole).[4] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the eastern boundary of Yablukove and that the terrain in the Hulyaipole area favors rapid advances but that Ukrainian mining operations are hindering them.[5]
Russian forces will likely attempt to isolate and encircle Hulyaipole from the northeast in accordance with a new campaign design that aims to degrade Ukrainian defenses to enable advances through infiltration tactics. This new campaign design consists of a prolonged battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign that degrades Ukraine's ability to sustain frontline forces such that Ukraine cannot defend against subsequent Russian offensive operations in the area; tactical interdiction efforts targeting local supply lines and Ukrainian drone operators; infiltration missions intended to identify, worsen, and exploit the resulting weak points in Ukrainian defenses such that Ukraine defenses become disorganized; and mass small group assaults to make rapid advances and force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from an area.[6] Russian forces have been conducting a monthslong BAI campaign targeting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Hulyaipole and Velykomykhailivka directions, including highways, roads, and railway lines.[7] This campaign is similar to the BAI campaign that Russian forces waged against Pokrovsk starting in Spring-Summer 2025, ahead of intensified operations to seize the town beginning in October 2025.[8] Russian forces intensified infiltration missions and have been making relatively quick advances in the Hulyaipole direction in recent weeks, and Russian milbloggers have identified interdicting and cutting the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway as a goal of these Russian advances.[9]
Elements of three Russian combined arms armies (CAAs) are currently arrayed to either conduct or support offensive operations against Hulyaipole. Elements of the Russian 5th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]) are currently responsible for and advancing in the area northeast and east of Hulyaipole.[10] Elements of the 5th CAA will likely push west to cut the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway before pursuing a relatively small encirclement. The Russian military command could choose to pursue a wider encirclement of Hulyaipole, which would threaten a larger portion of Ukrainian forces and land in the pocket at the expense of more time and resources. Elements of the 5th CAA are currently better arrayed to conduct a smaller encirclement of Hulyaipole that would more likely result in more limited advances and inflict fewer losses on Ukrainian forces, but would likely allow Russian forces to make an operationally significant advance in a shorter amount of time at a lower resource cost. Elements of the Russian 29th CAA (EMD) are operating on the northern flank of the 5th CAA in the area southeast to southwest of Velykomykhailivka.[11] Elements of the 29th CAA will likely pursue operations supporting Russian efforts to advance southwest and west of Velykomykhailivka toward Pokrovske, which could reinforce efforts to seize Hulyaipole given the area's proximity to Ukrainian GLOCs supporting Hulyaipole, such as the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway. Elements of the 35th CAA (EMD) are operating southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne, but elements of the 35th CAA have not begun actively pursuing offensive operations in the area south and southwest of Hulyaipole in recent weeks. The Ukrainian defenses in the Hulyaipole direction are best suited to defend against pushes from the south, so it is unlikely that elements of the 35th CAA would activate in this area as long as these defenses pose a significant challenge to Russian forces.[12]
Ukrainian forces will need to defend against Russian operational-level BAI and tactical-level interdiction to counter this new Russian campaign design. Russian operational-level BAI campaigns supporting offensive pushes in the Pokrovsk, Hulyaipole, and Kupyansk directions have lasted for months and preceded intensified Russian infiltrations toward or in the towns.[13] Russian forces begin these BAI campaigns by interdicting major Ukrainian GLOCs at operational depth using artillery, air, and drone strikes conducted by elite drone units. This interdiction campaign aims to degrade Ukrainian defenses sufficiently to allow Russian drone and artillery crews to advance to within tactical range of these GLOCs and local logistics lines to Ukrainian forward positions and thereby to intensify interdiction efforts at the tactical level as well. Russian BAI and tactical interdiction campaigns also intensively target Ukrainian drone operators and artillery crews, which are integral parts of Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian infiltration missions and infiltration assaults. Degrading Ukraine's drone and artillery capabilities creates holes in Ukrainian defenses that Russian forces can exploit for more rapid gains. Russian technological and operational-tactical innovations are the primary factors facilitating Russian advances in the Hulyaipole and Pokrovsk areas. Ukrainian forces will have to develop technological, operational, and tactical responses to this new Russian approach in order to disrupt it.
Russian forces will likely collapse the pocket around Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but the significance of seizing these towns will depend on the circumstances and conduct of the Ukrainian withdrawal. Geolocated footage published on November 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Pokrovsk.[14] Russian milbloggers and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk) and advanced southwest of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), in eastern Novopidhorodne, and south of Molodetske (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[15] Geolocated footage published on November 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces either maintain positions or recently advanced in northern Pokrovsk and Zakhidnyi Microraion (central Myrnohrad), areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[16] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on November 12 that Russian forces launched a large-scale multi-day motorized assault against Pokrovsk employing light equipment on the M-30 Selydove-Pokrovsk highway that runs through eastern Pokrovsk.[17] The corps reported that Russian forces have established firing positions in multiple areas of Pokrovsk and that Ukrainian forces still maintain logistics to Pokrovsk. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in Myrnohrad reported on November 12 that Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad continue to receive supplies.[18] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rodynske, but did not retake the settlement.[19] The milblogger added that Russian forces continue to employ glide bomb strikes to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Myrnohrad.
ISW previously assessed that the Russian seizure of Pokrovsk would achieve an operationally-significant effect of depriving Ukraine of its use of Pokrovsk as a logistics hub — an objective that Russia already achieved by July 2025.[20] The further operational significance of the seizure of Pokrovsk remains unclear but depends on several factors, including whether Ukrainian forces conduct an orderly withdrawal or disorderly retreat; whether Ukrainian forces are able to conduct a successful defense after the collapse of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket; and Russian forces’ ability to exploit the collapse of the pocket and conduct a successful pursuit.
Russian milbloggers are mounting a concerted informational campaign prematurely calling the fall of Pokrovsk, likely to influence the information space. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that the majority of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) is a contested ”gray zone” and that Russian forces have “firm control” of Pokrovsk, having exploited recent thick fogs – likely referring to recent footage of Russian servicemembers entering Pokrovsk on motorcycles.[21] Multiple Russian milbloggers claimed on November 11 and 12 that Russian forces had nearly seized Pokrovsk.[22] Milbloggers and the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) also amplified artificial intelligence (AI)-generated footage of alleged Ukrainian mass surrenders in Myrnohrad, whose authenticity the Ukrainian General Staff and many of the milbloggers themselves refuted.[23] One milblogger claimed that Ukraine is distributing the footage in order to discredit and drown out “legitimate” footage showing the conditions of Ukrainian forces in the pocket — still portraying Russian forces as exerting more control in the area than available evidence currently supports.[24] ISW has only observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized roughly 46 percent of Pokrovsk and 10 percent of Myrnohrad.
The Russian military command continues efforts to consolidate and integrate drone units into conventional military structures, but the position of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies relative to the new Unmanned Systems Forces remains unclear. Deputy Commander of the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces Colonel Sergei Ishtuganov announced on November 11 that the Russian MoD created an independent Unmanned Systems Forces service that includes drone regiments, battalions, and other units.[25] ISW observed Russian efforts to establish a separate Unmanned Systems Forces service beginning in Summer 2024.[26] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov announced in December 2024 that the Russian MoD would establish the Unmanned Systems Forces as an independent service by the third quarter of 2025.[27] Ishtuganov stated that Russian forces will assign drone operators, engineers, technicians, and other support personnel to such elements, which coordinate with Russian manufacturers on drone and electronic warfare (EW) development.[28] These efforts are in line with the Russian MoD’s efforts to centralize Russian drone procurement and establish control over informal drone units that organically emerged within Russian military units since 2022.[29] Ishtuganov reiterated Russian intentions to create a dedicated higher military school for drone operators.[30] Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree in July 2025 to create a higher military school for drone operators by 2027.[31] Ishtuganov and other Russian sources notably did not clarify the relationship of the elite Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies drone crews to the newly-formed Russian Unmanned Systems Forces.
The Kremlin is conducting multiple information operations against the Baltic states as it did to justify the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, likely as part of Phase Zero conditions-setting for a possible attack on the Baltic states at some point in the future. ISW is not currently forecasting an imminent Russian attack on the Baltics. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov gave an interview to Russian media on November 11 in which he brought together several Russian long-running information operations about the Baltic states.[32] Lavrov accused the Baltic states of “Russophobia,” “anti-Russian” sentiments, and the mistreatment of Russian speakers and of failing to adhere to agreements with Russia. Lavrov presented the Baltic states as puppets of the United Kingdom, implying that they have lost their sovereignty. Lavrov suggested that they are not really European, implying that they belong properly to Russia and not Europe.[33] Lavrov also described the Baltic states as threatening Russia and claimed that “some figures” in the European Union have been “egging on” the Baltic states by suggesting that Kaliningrad Oblast could be “razed.” The Kremlin has used similar informational lines against the Baltic states previously, but Lavrov’s presentation of all of them together in a single statement is noteworthy.[34] Lavrov’s accusations, both direct and veiled, against the Baltic states closely parallel the accusations the Kremlin has made against Ukraine to justify its illegal occupation of Crimea and parts of Ukraine's Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts in 2014 and the 2022 full-scale invasion.[35] Lavrov’s November 11 statements are the continuation of ongoing Kremlin efforts to set informational conditions for a possible future attack on one or all Baltic states, and are thus part of ongoing Russian Phase Zero operations to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future. ISW has observed no direct indicators of Russian preparations to attack NATO states imminently, and Phase Zero conditions-setting efforts can last for years. The Kremlin can also choose not to attack even after setting conditions to do so. ISW’s assessments that these and other activities constitute Phase Zero conditions-setting efforts are meant to call attention to the parallels with pre-2022 Russian conditions-setting efforts vis-a-vis Ukraine but are not an imminent attack warning at this time.
Officials reported aerial incursions in French and Lithuanian airspace. French radio station Europe 1 reported on November 12 that French law enforcement observed an unidentified drone made several flights over the Mulhouse rail yard while French Leclerc battle tanks were in transit on the night of November 11 to 12.[36] Europe 1 reported that an unidentified drone flew twice over the ammunition production building of the Bergerac gunpowder factory in France on the night of November 10 to 11, and a source close to the investigation stated that the site's jamming and identification system malfunctioned and failed to intercept the drone.[37] Lithuanian broadcaster LRT reported on November 11 that Lithuanian border guards intercepted eight balloons smuggling goods from Belarus to Lithuania, one of which border guards seized at the Rūdninkai training ground in the Šalčininkai district.[38] The various incursions into European airspace in recent weeks come against the backdrop of Russia's intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO's cohesion, and set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[39]
more + maps https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2025/
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