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Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
On top of that no
Potatoes for potato water😂
Pitin goes full Stalin
Jay from Kyiv
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=XwwjaYt1eas&pp=ugUEEgJlbg%3D%3D
Lukoil just declared force majeure in Iraq. (Defaulting on their contract, because of sanctions).
They were pumping about 500,000 barrels per day there - about 10% of Iraq’s output. It is unlikely that Iraq will want to suffer that loss of revenue, and will instead follow Bulgaria, and now Romania, in nationalizing Lukoil’s assets. Looks like Moldova will as well (and Serbia, and Montenegro, and the Netherlands).
Russia established a great precedent during this war, of valuing the assets of Western companies that it nationalized, at just one Euro, for compensation.
Now the shoe is on the other foot, and every country has top cover to rip off Russian assets. The chance of a lifetime.
Lukoil’s finances are exploding in mid-flight. They seem to be on track to become a loss-making ward of the Russian State by next month, and will likely have to write off hundreds of billions of dollars of assets around the world. It sets very different conditions for Russia’s influence after the war.
That is the sound of bones getting crushed by sanctions.
The rate of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction remains relatively slow, likely in part because the Russian military command continues to pursue grinding offensive operations throughout the theater. ISW has continued to observe relatively little geolocated footage of Russian advances in and near Pokrovsk in early November 2025 compared to confirmed advances in mid- to late-October 2025. Geolocated footage published on November 10 and 11 indicates that Russian forces advanced in southeastern Pokrovsk and marginally advanced in southeastern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), respectively.[1] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Pokrovsk; in northern, northeastern, and eastern Pokrovsk; to western Myrnohrad from positions within Pokrovsk; east and northeast of Myrnohrad; and within eastern Myrnohrad.[2] Milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced near Krasnyi Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk), Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk), Kotlyne, and Udachne (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[3] Russian milbloggers refuted claims of substantial Russian advances northwest of Pokrovsk toward Hryshyne from Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), however.[4] Russian forces are struggling to close the Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk direction by advancing on the northern shoulder of the pocket near Rodynske, where they pose the greatest threat of closing the encirclement. Elements of the 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) have been fighting on the eastern flank of the Pokrovsk direction, including near Rodynske, in recent weeks and have been struggling to make advances comparable to the 2nd CAA (Central Military District [CMD]), which has been fighting and making gains on the western flank.[5]
Russian forces appear to be struggling to conduct successful ground assaults to take and hold additional ground despite having conducted a successful battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign and infiltration missions to degrade Ukrainian defenses and logistics in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[6] The urban terrain of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad is not conducive to mechanized, motorized, or mass infantry assaults intended to expand control of terrain, unlike Russian infiltration missions. The Russian military command has dedicated better-trained and better-equipped units to BAI and infiltration missions than they have to ground assaults. Elite dedicated drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are responsible for interdicting Ukrainian logistics and downing Ukrainian drones in the Pokrovsk direction, and Spetsnaz elements are responsible for initial infiltration missions aimed at disorganizing Ukrainian defenses and creating holes for standard Russian infantry to exploit on subsequent infiltration missions.[7] Russian forces are also struggling to extend logistics that would more easily enable Russian infantry who have already infiltrated into Pokrovsk to consolidate positions and accumulate personnel for further assaults.[8]
Russian forces will very likely seize Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but will likely take more time and suffer more casualties to do so than if the Russian military command focused more resources from elsewhere on the front in this direction. The Russian military command has chosen to maintain several offensive operations across the theater simultaneously, including northern Kharkiv Oblast in the Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk directions; eastern Kharkiv Oblast in the Kupyansk direction; northeast of the fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast in the Siversk direction; near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border junction in the Velykomykhailivka direction; and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast in the Hulyaipole direction. Russian forces have struggled to sustain simultaneous offensive operations on non-mutually supportive axes for much of the war.[9] Russia's persistent dedication of manpower and resources to various directions and grinding advances, rather than prioritizing resources to the Pokrovsk direction, will prolong the Russian campaign to seize Pokrovsk. The Russian military command has proven willing to tolerate the significant losses and time required for such campaigns.[10] The Russian military command may fear that reducing the Russian force presence or tempo of offensive operations anywhere else in the theater may provide Ukrainian forces with an opportunity to make gains or redeploy forces elsewhere. The Russian military command also likely seeks to maintain the facade that Russian forces are making substantial advances across the entire theater, contrary to the battlefield reality, and redeploying forces and means away from some areas of the front at the scale necessary to quickly collapse the Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk direction would undermine this Russian narrative.[11]
Russian forces are taking advantage of foggy weather conditions that degrade Ukrainian drone operations to intensify offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and other areas of eastern Ukraine. Geolocated footage published on November 11 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Okhotnyche (northeast of Hulyaipole).[12] Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on November 11 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Uspenivka and Novomykolaivka and from positions near Okhotnyche, Novouspenivske, and Nove (all northeast of Hulyaipole).[13] Geolocated footage published on November 11 shows two Russian servicemembers raising flags in Novouspenivske in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[14] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence stated on November 10 that the contested “gray zone” in the Solodke-Novomykolaivka-Rivnopillya area (northeast of Hulyaipole) has grown significantly recently.[15] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian forces seized Novouspenivske.[16] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Solodke and advanced west of Zlahoda, to the eastern outskirts of Yablukove (all north of Hulyaipole), west of Novouspenivske, and east of Vesele (east of Hulyaipole).[17] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are attempting to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that supply Hulyaipole from Pokrovske (north of Hulyaipole).[18] Voloshyn noted that Russian forces recently intensified artillery strikes in the Hulyaipole direction, firing roughly 2,000 shells in 400 artillery strikes per day ahead of the Ukrainian withdrawals.[19]
Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are taking advantage of recent foggy weather to use infiltration tactics to advance toward Hulyaipole from the east.[20] Ukrainian military sources fighting in the Hulyaipole direction told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that Russian forces in the Hulyaipole direction are using weather conditions in which Ukrainian drones cannot fly to advance in small groups on foot or on motorcycles.[21] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces noted that Russian forces have been exploiting fog that hinders Ukrainian drone surveillance in recent attempts to penetrate the southern outskirts of Pokrovsk on light vehicles, consistent with ISW’s recent observations that Russian forces take advantage of poor weather to conduct ground operations in the area.[22] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are taking advantage of morning and evening fog to intensify offensive operations.[23]
A months-long [battlefield air interdiction ] BAI campaign likely facilitated recent Russian advances in the Velykomykhailivka and Hulyaipole directions. The campaign involved artillery, air, and drone strikes in Ukraine's near rear against targets such as roads, railways, and bridges that support Ukrainian GLOCs, aiming to degrade Ukraine's ability to sustain frontline forces and defend against subsequent Russian offensive operations.[24] A Ukrainian drone battalion commander operating in the Velykomykhailivka direction recently noted that the Russian airstrikes against bridges near Pokrovske (west of Velykomykhailivka) degraded Ukrainian logistics ahead of Russian advances.[25] The drone battalion commander added that Russian forces systematically employed fiber-optic sleeper drones to interdict Ukrainian GLOCs in that direction. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting guided glide bomb strikes near Rivnopillya and Yablukove (both northeast of Hulyaipole) to set conditions for further Russian advances in the area.[26] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces achieved low-altitude air superiority by targeting Ukrainian drone operators and therefore degrading Ukrainian drone operations before recently intensifying offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction.
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of November 10 to 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 11 that Ukrainian forces struck the Saratov Oil Refinery in Saratov Oblast overnight.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff reported the refinery processes over 20 petroleum products, including gasoline, fuel oil, and diesel fuel. Geolocated footage published on November 11 shows fires near the facility.[28] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed on November 11 that overnight Ukrainian drone strikes damaged unspecified civilian infrastructure facilities.[29] This attack marks the fourth Ukrainian drone strike against the Saratov Oil Refinery within a month.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 11 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Orsknefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Orsk, Orenburg Oblast overnight, damaging an AVT primary oil refining unit.[31] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the facility processes over 30 petroleum products, including gasoline, diesel fuel, aviation gasoline, and fuel oil. The Ukrainian General Staff added that the facility processes 6.6 million tons of oil annually. Geolocated footage shows smoke from a fire at the facility, and additional footage shows a drone flying in the area ahead of the strike.[32] Orenburg Oblast Governor Yevgeny Solntsev claimed on November 11 that falling drone fragments damaged an unspecified industrial facility overnight.[33]
Ukraine cleans up corruption:
Azerbaijan announced that it will move to full NATO Military standardization.
Hush, Keith. Your confusion isn’t just sad, it’s practically a TED Talk on the dangers of skipping school. Most men feel embarrassment and evolve. You? You treat it like a GPS: recalculating, confidently heading nowhere.
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(Mc)
“Who attained power through political manipulation, fear, and coercion?
Who maintains his power by enriching those around him, but if crossed has them jailed and/or killed.
Who is damning his people to economic catastrophe, and death for denying him victory?”
Vladolph Putler.
The Doom of Russia.
Lukoil’s Stavrolen petrochemical enterprise in Budyonnovsk, Krasnodar Krai was successfully struck tonight (12 Nov) by Ukrainian drones. At least three explosions, and on fire.
Kyiv Independent (12 Nov):
“Stavrolen Petrochemical Enterprise is one of Russia’s leading petrochemical companies and a subsidiary of Lukoil. It produces polyethylene, polypropylene, benzene, butylene-butadiene fraction, heavy petroleum resins, and other petrochemical products.
Ukraine’s General Staff said that the plant produces drone components, composite materials, body parts, seals, and insulation for various types of Russian military equipment.
Budyonnovsk is located about 500 kilometers (around 310 miles) from the eastern border of Ukraine.”
Ukraine hitting Roooski petro-chem plant is 5x better than whacking the Rooooski bog standard oil refinery. This puts crucial petro-chems in short. I bet this petro-chem installation was German-European built.
The TAF-NK plant is smaller and more focused on local civilian needs, as opposed to military production for the war in Ukraine.
It may also be better protected than most, and so Ukraine's risk-to-reward ratio for sending drone strikes on TAF-NK may put TAF-NK lower down on priority lists of most important targets.
The desperation by the usuals is comical
Pitin tries desperately to take a small town, something the Soviets would have done in days, meanwhile his county is systematically being dismantled and the DEAR LEADER is powerless to stop it.
His minions are left to fling insults and propaganda and fire memes since his AD is nearly worthless 😂😂
I thought that this was an interesting observation (not sure if it’s true).
@moritamikamikara3879
Quick reminder: The battle of Pokrovsk is the single longest non-siege battle of human history. It’s been longer than Stalingrad, it’s been longer than Verdun.
Exactly right.
In 1970 a French scholar named author Roger Mucchielli (in a book titled "Psychologie de la publicité et de la propagande") coined a term for this propaganda technique: "Accusation in a Mirror".
When you accuse your opponent of doing what you yourself do and intend to do.
The practice has a long history, going back to at least Soviet propaganda of the 1920s, and identified publicly by Joseph Goebbels in 1934 as a "clever trick".
"Accusation in a Mirror" -- Definition and effects:
Soviet / Russian & Other "Accusations in a Mirror" since 1920, as of November 2025
| Year | Place / Context | Russian Propagandist Accusation | Mirror Image (What Soviets/Russians Were Doing) | Western / External Reactions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1920 | Soviet invasion of Poland War | Soviets accused Poland of imperialist aggression | Red Army advancing westward into Poland | Western journalists noted inversion; Poland seen as defending itself |
| 1920s–1930s | Comintern propaganda | Soviets accused the West of “imperialism” and “colonial exploitation” | USSR consolidating control over non‑Russian nationalities (Caucasus, Central Asia, Ukraine) | Western observers saw hypocrisy; Soviets framed it as “anti‑imperialist solidarity” |
| 1934 | Nazi Nuremberg Rally (Goebbels) | Goebbels claimed: Enemies accused Germany of crimes they themselves committed | Nazi regime preparing aggressive expansion | Goebbels praised this as the “cleverest trick” of WWI propaganda |
| 1932–33 | Holodomor famine | Soviets accused Kulaks/foreign saboteurs of hoarding grain and starving people | Russians seized Ukrainian grain, causing famine | Western reports exposed famine; Soviets denied and blamed “enemies” |
| 1939–40 | Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact & Baltic annexations | Soviets accused Britain/France of warmongering | USSR partitioning Poland with Germany, annexing Baltics | Western diplomats recognized hypocrisy |
| 1941–45 | WWII Soviet propaganda | Soviets accused Allies of plotting imperialist domination | USSR annexing Eastern Poland, Baltics, Bessarabia; installing puppet regimes | Western publics skeptical but muted due to alliance |
| 1945–49 | Postwar Eastern Europe | Soviets accused West of dominating liberated nations | USSR coercively installing communist governments | Western press highlighted contradiction |
| 1947–53 | Early Cold War, Cominform | Soviets accused U.S. of imperialism, coups, destabilization | USSR consolidating Eastern Bloc, orchestrating coups (Czechoslovakia 1948) | Western analysts documented systematic disinformation |
| 1956–68 | Hungary & Prague Spring | Soviets accused West of fomenting uprisings | USSR suppressing revolts with military force | Western media condemned hypocrisy |
| 1979 | Afghanistan invasion | Soviets accused U.S. of imperialist meddling | USSR invading and occupying Afghanistan | Global condemnation; Soviets framed it as “defense of socialism” |
| 1980s | Soviet Active Measures campaigns | Soviets accused the CIA of creating AIDS, destabilizing governments | USSR running covert bioweapons programs, assassinations, disinformation ops | Pres. Reagan's Active Measures Working Group identified Soviet tactics |
| 1990s | Chechnya wars | Russians accused West of supporting “terrorists” | Russia fascists waging brutal counterinsurgency, widespread civilian casualties | Western NGOs documented atrocities; Russia framed it as anti‑terror defense |
| 2008 | Georgia (South Ossetia & Abkhazia) | Russians accused Georgia of aggression | Russia fascists invading, carving out protectorates | Western governments condemned; Russia claimed “peace enforcement” |
| 2014 | Ukraine (Crimea) | Russians accused Kyiv of fascism and aggression | Russia fascists annexing Crimea, backing separatists | Western reaction: sanctions; Russia framed annexation as “self‑determination” |
| 2022–present | Ukraine full‑scale invasion | Russians accused Ukraine of neo-Nazis, genocide, NATO aggression | Russia fascists invading, bombing civilians, attempting regime change | Global recognition of the “accusation in a mirror” tactic; broad condemnation |
"Accusation in a Mirror" is also sometimes called "projection", "mirror imaging" or "hypocrisy accusation".
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