https://twitter.com/Getty776/status/1760572602731638971
Posted on 01/28/2024 7:12:54 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
Reporting From Ukraine:
Note: other versions of this report are found elsewhere on FR, but this is guaranteed to be the complete transcript - unlike the others.
https://www.youtube.com/@RFU
[ Russian General Set Up All His Troops For a HIMARS Strike ]
==
Day 728: Feb 21
Today, the biggest news comes from the Kherson region.
First of all, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu suddenly announced that Russian forces completely eliminated the Ukrainian bridgehead and reestablished total control over the eastern bank of the river. The announcement was made during his briefing with Putin.
What is interesting is that even Putin, immediately but softly, challenged Shoigu’s claims by saying that he personally spoke with the commander of the Dnipro Grouping of Forces, who informed Putin that there were still a handful of Ukrainians inside the village.
Shoigu refuted it and portrayed Russian efforts to eliminate the bridgehead as a successfully completed effort.
According to the Institute for the Study of War, Shoigu likely prematurely claimed the Russian seizure of the settlement to reinforce its desired informational effects ahead of the Presidential election this March.
And this evaluation of the situation seems to be correct because, based on the available geolocated footage, Russian forces barely managed to get to the outskirts.
One video filmed by a Ukrainian drone operator shows how Russians sneaked in, put the Russian flag on the remnants of what once was a house, and very quickly started running away from the site.
Another video was filmed in the eastern part of the settlement that was always under Russian control or in the grey zone.
Russian sources reported that the flag mission was ordered by the commander of the Russian 810th Marine Brigade, who wanted to capitalize on the positive news of the capture of Avdiivka, and his plan was successful because by declaring the victory at the right time, he promptly got the rank of a general.
Once the Ukrainian marines, who are actually located in Krynky now, saw the claims of the Russian Defense Minister, they started releasing videos from the settlement. These videos came as a hard hit in the Russian information space and tarnished the reputation of the Russian Defense Minister, who was called out on lying in the eyes of the President.
The commander of the Russian 810th Marine Brigade, who basically let him down, immediately initiated attempts to fix the problem as soon as possible. Unfortunately for Russians, Ukrainian fighters anticipated such a response to their videos and prepared to face the attacks.
According to some fighters, the Ukrainian drone operators, in coordination with artillery crews, timely spotted and fired at the approaching Russian assault units, forcing them to retreat.
However, Ukrainians did not stop there and relocated multiple Special Force operators to the region who conducted intense reconnaissance with the most advanced tools.
As a result, Ukrainians identified a concentration of Russian forces approximately 15 kilometers from the bridgehead. What made the situation for Russians even worse, was that a Russian commander wanted to visit the base, so everyone was ordered to go and stay outside and wait.
The commander never showed up because Ukrainian Special Force operators conducted a HIMARS strike with cluster warheads.
According to Russian sources, two rockets struck the base at first, and one struck the base when another group of soldiers started collecting corpses and evacuating the wounded, causing even more destruction.
Russian sources also circulated footage of the aftermath, but there are so many corpses that I would need to censor the whole screen anyway. Ukrainian sources reported that the base had personnel from 3 different detachments, one of which was the Russian 810th Marine Brigade, which is responsible for the Ukrainian bridgehead area.
Two days ago, Ukrainian HIMARS crews increased their activity in the region and conducted a strike on Russian headquarters. The footage shows a complete destruction of the two-story house.
Ukrainian sources reported that the HIMARS crews used GLSDB rockets that were recently delivered to Ukraine from the United States and that these rockets showed a great result.
Two days before that, Ukrainians conducted yet another HIMARS strike. This time, the target of the strike was a Russian drone reconnaissance team.
Ukrainian reconnaissance identified the Russian drone in the sky and traced it all the way back to the drone crew.
Ukrainian HIMARS operators were ready to receive the final coordinates, and while the Russian soldiers were collecting their drones, the HIMARS rockets reached their predetermined destination and destroyed the whole group.
Overall, the Russian command artificially created a lot of problems for the Russian soldiers by trying to achieve informational objectives ahead of the Russian Presidential election.
Shoigu tried to frame the Russian effort in the east bank as similar to the seizure of Avdiivka.
Ukrainians leveraged the information space against the Russians by forcing them to eliminate the bridgehead as soon as possible and at any cost.
Such a trigger already resulted in multiple failed unplanned attacks and the destruction of dozens of Russian soldiers in the bases who were being collected to conduct the same mission.
Kremlin snuff box
https://t.me/s/kremlin_secrets
Some kind of nightmare... In the Kherson region, the enemy killed “from 50 to 60” of our military with one blow
Strike at a training ground in the Kherson region. Sources in the General Staff confirm, but so far refuse to say much. The only information verified so far is that “between 50 and 60 military personnel” were killed.
They died during construction, as in Trudovskoye in the DPR. This is what happens when our soldiers are made easy targets for the enemy, and no one is punished for it.
We will find out more details and tell you. If only you knew how tired I am of writing about the deaths of our guys...
Kremlin snuff box
https://t.me/s/kremlin_secrets
62 soldiers were killed. We have to report three news about the attack on the training ground in the Kherson region
Sources in the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff reported important news about an enemy attack on our military at a training ground in the Kherson region. We decided that we had an obligation to disclose this information. Perhaps, at least now we will begin to punish those responsible for such tragedies.
Firstly, according to updated data, 62 military personnel were killed, including seven officers. About 30 people were injured.
Secondly, the blow was struck against the soldiers who were being prepared for assault operations in Krynki ( unfortunately, we have not captured them yet, no matter what Sergei Shoigu told the president ). They had a formation before the arrival of the “high authorities”, during which the enemy struck.
Thirdly, there are rumors that Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, commander of the Dnepr group of troops, was supposed to personally come to the formation.
“Teplinsky missed the blow by 10 minutes. He could have died,” said one of our interlocutors at the General Staff. He believes that the blow could have been an attempt on the general’s life, and the information about his arrival at the training ground was “leaked” to the enemy by Mikhail Yuryevich’s ill-wishers.
Our sources close to Teplinsky and other interlocutors among the military have so far refused to comment on this information. Therefore, it requires additional confirmation.
At the same time, the Ministry of Defense said that they would look into whether Teplinsky ordered the formation of fighters at the training ground. And they promise to seriously punish the general and report his offense to Vladimir Putin ( if, of course, Mikhail Yuryevich committed such an offense ).
We are not sure of such accusations, but we await with interest Teplinsky’s comments on this matter.
https://twitter.com/Getty776/status/1760572602731638971
https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1760654151401288005
https://twitter.com/front_ukrainian/status/1760603906248249374
No one gets punished because no one is willing to brief putin on the attack.
The article contains Russian confirmation of the HIMARs attacks on 2 training grounds. It also has confirmation on the HIMARs (possibly GLSDB) attack on a RU HQ building as well as a HIMARs or GLSDB attack on a drone group.
https://twitter.com/front_ukrainian/status/1760652388715692056
This is the second successful attack on RU drone operators over the past couple of days.
“downing of another Russian Su-34.”
Denys Davydov reports that 149 (+) of those aircraft have been produced, but that probably only half of them were airworthy.
Denys Davydov showed pictures of Gerasimov congratulating commanders of the Avdiivka assault. He seems to be alive.
Russia might attempt to annex Transnistria around Feb 28th.
a very important article - a must read:
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 21, 2024
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-21-2024
—
In the same vein:
Kremlin snuff box
https://t.me/s/kremlin_secrets
Rumors appeared that Andrei (Murza) Morozov was killed. We answer them
About a dozen interlocutors told us yesterday that Murza could have been killed. We checked this information, including talking with those who spoke with Andrei shortly before his death.
No, there was no murder! Andrei Morozov committed suicide. Again, instead of being rewarded for everything he did.
But there is one point. Sergei Shoigu knows for sure who drove Morozov to suicide. We also know, but we believe that the Minister of Defense should name the names. And there are very big names there.
Sergei Kuzhugetovich, will you name them and tell the truth? Otherwise we will have to do it. Andrei would approve of this, we know for sure...
The IMF forecasts 2.6% growth in Russia’s GDP in 2024, which is almost wholly accounted for by just their increase in Defense spending, over the 2023 budget.
Defense has surged to 38% of their Federal budget - a full on wartime economy.
Consumption is declining, while production is increasing, just like it did in the Soviet Union.
Putin has restored the Soviet Union, but just inside Russia.
Kremlin snuff box
Will Putin annex Transnistria? Three important insights
A number of media outlets and telegram channels began to actively disseminate information that on the eve of Vladimir Putin’s message to the Federal Assembly, another interesting event would occur.
A meeting of deputies of all levels will be held in Pridnestrovie. The last time such an event took place in the PMR was in 2006 and is usually marked by important decisions - for example, the adoption of the Constitution, the Emblem of the PMR, or the decision to hold a referendum (in 2006, over 90% of the residents of Transnistria voted to join Russia).
What’s this time? The fact that the meeting of deputies is taking place less than 3 weeks before the presidential elections in Russia and on the eve of Putin’s message has prompted commentators to think that the Kremlin may agree to include this territory into the Russian Federation. But this version has several inconsistencies.
Firstly, Moscow does not need this. We talked about attempts to incorporate Abkhazia into the Russian Federation, but this process has stalled. Mainly because of the Kremlin’s well-founded position - the inclusion of new territories may entail new sanctions, which our authorities still want to get rid of.
Moreover, opinion polls show that the topic of Transnistria does not arouse due interest in our society. Therefore, it is unlikely that it will be possible to sell it to voters as a big victory.
Secondly, the Pridnestrovians do not need this. We told you that after the start of the Northern Military District, a certain balance formed between Kiev, Tiraspol and Chisinau - Tiraspol does not interfere in the war in Ukraine, and the Armed Forces of Ukraine are not involved in the so-called “internal affairs of Moldova.”
And although Zelensky has repeatedly raised the issue of liquidating the PMR in negotiations with Sandu, the authorities in Chisinau refuse this idea. Mainly understanding that this territory is inhabited rather by Eurosceptics.
Their appearance in the electoral field of Moldova can greatly change the balance towards focusing on Russia. Sandu does not want to take risks on the eve of the elections.
Thirdly, sources in Tiraspol close to the PMR President Krasnoselsky admitted that local deputies had already received threats. And, importantly, from completely different sides.
“Chisinau has canceled customs benefits for our companies. This will kill the already constrained economy. It will be more difficult to compete in European markets with higher prices,” our interlocutor explained.
According to him, unambiguous hints came from Moscow that the PMR should block Moldova’s movement into the EU. Including through political decisions. At the same time, there were various hints from Kyiv.
In particular, “Kyiv is interested in opening a transport corridor through the PMR. A few days ago there were negotiations on the return of consuls to the territory of the Republic,” says our interlocutor.
He emphasized that Ukraine is negotiating quite toughly and is even signaling that it can seize the left bank of the Dniester “if necessary.” However, Chisinau insists on peaceful integration.
So what will they talk about at the meeting on February 28? So far, even the deputies themselves have not given specific answers. The main oligarch of the PMR, Victor Gushan (owner of the Sheriff holding), is expected at the event.
The interlocutors are reluctant to talk about the prospects of joining Russia. “Physically, we are not even capable of rotating peacekeepers. If sanctions follow, the situation for the PMR could seriously worsen,” says an interlocutor in Moscow familiar with the situation.
It can be assumed that the discussion will be about the economic future of the region. After all, Transnistria was sandwiched between Moldova and Ukraine. On the scale of the Northern Military District, it is clear that a land corridor to Transnistria is impossible in the near future.
As of today, there are no revolutionary decisions regarding the future of the PMR either in Tiraspol or in Moscow. However, it is obvious that in the context of further integration of Moldova into the EU, the screws for the “gray zone” will be tightened.
“Russia might attempt to annex Transnistria around Feb 28th”
They could take advantage of the absence of American support, causing everyone else to fail to challenge it.
Ukraine and Moldova have some sort of a defense agreement to send troops to prevent Transistria annexation. U.S. has sent a bunch of Airborne forces to Romania but recent ISR flights don’t indicate heightened concern for the area.
As I've mentioned before, the Dniester is the historical border of southwest Ukraine. I would not be surprised if Chisinau was willing to cede Transnistria to Kyiv after the war. First, to allow Moldova to join the EU without resistance from Transnistria. Second, because Transnistria has historical ethnic, cultural and economic ties with Ukraine. Russia annexing the territory would mean Ukraine could only take it in war. This might be Russia's primary reason for annexing.
They could take advantage of the absence of American support, causing everyone else to fail to challenge it.
In the short term, it would be a simple vote, a referendum in Transnistria, then formal annexation by Russia. If they thought they could pull it off, they would already have made amphibious landings west of Odesa to establish a beach head into Transnistria. That ship has sailed sunk.
In the longer term, Transnistria becomes another massively armed garrison exclave akin to Kaliningrad, to be used in future wars against Ukraine, Moldova and beyond.
Looks like they have gotten their act together, to make a concerted push in the North, to retake up to the Oskil River, as an Operational objective.
ISW reports:
"Russian forces are conducting a cohesive multi-axis offensive operation in pursuit of an operationally significant objective (to seize the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast) for nearly the first time in over a year and a half of campaigning in Ukraine.
The prospects of this offensive in the Kharkiv-Luhansk sector are far from clear, but its design and initial execution mark notable inflections in the Russian operational level approach. Russian efforts to seize relatively small cities and villages in eastern Ukraine since Spring 2022 have generally not secured operationally significant objectives, although these Russian operations led to large-scale fighting and significant Ukrainian and Russian losses.
Russian forces likely pursued more operationally significant objectives during their Winter-Spring 2023 offensive, but that effort was poorly designed and executed...
Russian offensives to this point have generally either concentrated large masses of troops against singular objectives (such as Bakhmut and Avdiivka) or else have consisted of multiple attacks along axes of advance that were too far away to be mutually supporting and/or divergent. The current Russian offensive in the Kharkiv-Luhansk sector, by contrast, involves attacks along four parallel axes that are mutually supporting in pursuit of multiple objectives that, taken together, would likely generate operationally significant gains...
...Russian forces appear to be attacking along mutually supporting axes, something Russian forces have often failed to do in the past, which suggests possible improvements in Russian operational planning at least in this sector of the front. The areas in which Russian forces are trying to advance are mutually supporting because they are roughly parallel with one another and close enough together to generate pressure on the same groupings of Ukrainian defenders...
...Mutually supporting operations also set conditions for the tactical envelopment or encirclement of Ukrainian forces in some areas if Russian forces can advance rapidly enough or if Ukrainian defenders make mistakes...
...The likely Russian offensive operation towards the Oskil River appears to be a much more sustainable effort than previous Russian offensive operations in Ukraine. The following observations are based on the current tempo of Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and it is unclear if many of them would hold in the event of a significant intensification of the Russian offensive effort. Ukrainian artillery shortages and delays in Western security assistance are creating uncertainty in Ukrainian operational planning and are likely prompting Ukrainian forces to husband materiel.
These constraints on Ukrainian operations are likely limiting Ukraine’s ability to degrade and pressure Russian forces and logistics along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and it is unclear if the Russian military would be able to conduct a relatively sustainable offensive operation in the absence of these Ukrainian constraints.
Russian forces attacking along the Luhansk-Kharkiv axis appear to be attempting to use some of the principles of Soviet deep battle theory, particularly the principle of conducting multiple simultaneous attacks to pin the defender’s frontline forces and reserves...
...The current tempo of Russian offensives along the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis, Russian force generation efforts, and the Russian ability to conduct operational-level rotations will likely allow Russian forces to conduct offensive operations along each axis of advance without pulling manpower away from another. The tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine is generating personnel losses at a rate roughly equal to the rate at which Russia is currently generating new forces through crypto-mobilization efforts... making Russian offensive efforts at current levels of intensity sustainable.
The losses Russian forces have taken in their effort to seize Avdiivka prompted the Russian command to transfer elements from other sectors of the front to support that effort, but the Russian elements attacking along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line are doing so in a way that has not thus far required the commitment of reserves from other sectors of the front...
...The apparent sustainability of the Russian offensive effort and the mutually reinforcing directions of Russian advance suggests that the Russian command may be learning from previous operational design failures. Russian forces have previously conducted offensive operations at tempos far beyond their ability to replace losses in manpower and materiel...
...The Western Grouping of Forces‘ current offensive operation may be the first instance of a large formation capturing and implementing at least campaign design lessons.
Russian offensives along the Oskil River have not shown tactical improvements or innovations, however. Russian tactical engagements continue to display many of the same mistakes Russian offensive operations have repeatedly shown, causing high losses of men and materiel for limited gains. Russian learning and innovation thus appear to be partial and possibly confined thus far to operational level planning and force generation...
...A successful Russian advance to the Oskil River would very likely result from months of accumulated marginal tactical Russian gains at very high cost...
...Russian interdiction efforts will likely have greater chances of isolating the battlespace on the east bank of the Oskil River than elsewhere in Ukraine where Russian forces are conducting offensive operations, however. Six bridges (both railway and roadway bridges) cross the Oskil River between Kupyansk and the Oskil Hydroelectric Power Plant. Satellite imagery from mid-January suggests that many of these bridges have sustained some damage and a few appear unlikely to be usable by heavy equipment...
...The Kremlin may believe that delayed Western security assistance to Ukraine will give Russian forces opportunities to accelerate advances in the coming months, although it is unclear if this belief is accurate...
...The Russian command may hope that the east bank of the Oskil River is a sector that Ukrainian forces are willing to cede in order to continue responding to Russian offensive operations elsewhere in eastern Ukraine.
The longer the Russian military maintains the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine the more opportunity the Western Grouping of Forces has to achieve its operational objective of pushing Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River."
Denmark signs bilateral Military support agreement with Ukraine.
Kyiv Post reports:
“Denmark, one of Ukraine’s staunchest allies, said Thursday it had reached a 10-year security agreement with Kyiv, following similar deals signed recently by Berlin, London and Paris.
Ukraine has been keen to shore up its security with bilateral agreements while it waits in hope of someday joining the NATO defence alliance.
“The agreement means that future military and civilian support will be established in a framework for the next 10 years in a bilateral political agreement,” Denmark’s foreign ministry said in a statement.
The support will be financed by Denmark’s Ukraine Foundation, currently valued at 69.1 billion kroner ($10 billion), it said.
Denmark is the fourth-biggest donor of military aid to Ukraine, according to recent data from the Germany-based Kiel Institute for the World Economy...
...”The commitments build bridges to Ukraine’s future EU and NATO membership,” the government said in its statement.”
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