Freedom must include right to ZOT

Judging from our nation’s body of law, the ruling class wrongly believes the government does.

However, you own your body and, with that ownership, you have a God-given natural right to do what you will with it, even if that means ending your life.

That is the lesson we should take from the life of Dr. Jacob “Jack” Kevorkian, who died June 3 at the age of 83. As he once said, “Dying is not a crime.”

"How could someone really determine what state of mind a dead person was in when they committed suicide?"

There is a distinction to be made between the judgment of souls, which nobody can do but God, and the judgment of words (as true or false), ideas (as good or evil), actions (as right or wrong.) That is why no one can say "That person is going to hell,". but one can say "That's person's actions were damnable."

In speaking about earthly consequences (e.g. beneficiaries cannot collect life insurance benefits in the case of a suicide), investigators would of course rely on the standard rules of evidence: witnesses, written or recorded statements, autopsy, etc.

Quite apart from a forensic context, how we morally evaluate the act of suicide is important. Many suiciders are under the influence of chronic depression or emotional derangement, and maybe also alcohol or drugs (which may also be responses to abnormal psychological conditions.

To grieving parents, I would not volunteer the remark that their suicide-son was guilty of an objectively damnable act. I would make the charitable assumption that his personal culpability might have been lessened, if not eliminated entirely, by factors what prevented him from fully comprehending or freely choosing what he had done. But to suicide-advocates who are aparently in control of their faculties (e.g. Exit/Hemlock type activists) I would apply the full weight of moral judgment.

"What about bombing soldiers from 20000ft behind the front lines? How would you know whether they were acting aggressively or not?"

As I mentioned before, killing in a (just) was is not based on a judgment about the guilt of the individual enemy soldier, nor upon a direct intent to kill him. It is based upon an evidence-based judgment that he is part of an aggressive warmaking force, and the moral obligsation to stop him. Killing him is not the object. If you hit a bomber aircraft with a missile and the pilot parachutes out, you can retireve him and hold him in custody, but you may not kill him. The object was to stop the bombing. You did that when you brought down the plane.

"Do snipers commit murder when they shoot someone from 800yds, that’s walking out of a building?"

"Someone"? You need to be more precise than that. "Shoot an enemy combatant in the context of a just war" = No, not murder. "Shoot en enemy noncombatant (who is not a military asset)" Yes, that is murder. "Shoot a person whose relationship to combat is unknown" -- that' a very tough one, especially in a war where all the enemy comnbatants are non-uniformed and where civilians are mobilized into operations on an ad-hoc bases (e.g. 12-year-old boys engaged in setting up IED's). The obligation is strict noncombatant immunity. In practice, heartbreakingly hard to do.

You maybe interested in some reading on the criteria for a Just War, both as the the cause (jus ad bellum) and the conduct (jus in bello). Thwre's a whole lot out there. Here's a good place to start:

http://tinyurl.com/Jus-ad-bellum

To say “That’s person’s actions were damnable.”...would require something to compare it to, a reference, wouldn’t it? To me, that statement would be relative to that persons’ beliefs. Beliefs which differ between individuals.

Killing him is the object, and the result of an action. What if that person were drafted and did not want to go to war? That particular judgement, the reason for the decision to bomb, you speak of, is relative to the decisions and judgements made earlier by those in charge.

Is the mere act of being in an enemy army considered combatant? Does an enemy have to actually be in combat when it is ok to kill him, or is just being a member of the enemy military enough justification?

"To say “That’s person’s actions were damnable.”...would require something to compare it to, a reference, wouldn’t it? To me, that statement would be relative to that persons’ beliefs. Beliefs which differ between individuals."

No, I'm speaking of the action, which is an objective thing. If it was a damnable action, it means that it is gravely morally wrong --- not matter anybody's opinoins--- AND if done under conditions of culpability, (knowledge and consent) it results, as it must, in moral condemnation.

"What if that person were drafted and did not want to go to war? That particular judgement, the reason for the decision to bomb, you speak of, is relative to the decisions and judgements made earlier by those in charge."

Again, no. The intent to stop somebody is not the same as the intent to kill somebody. Even a person who is clearly not personally culpable for his aggressive actions (e.g a seriously drunken/delusional man with a loaded shotgun, aiming at a group of toddlers) could be stopped by a sniper: this would not be murder if he died as a result. However, if the sniper just managed to shoot the shotgun out of his hand, the sniper would not be justified in subsequently pumping more lead into him and killing him: that would be murder.

I cannot go on with example after example. I've already burned my onion saute! :o/

Here's an article by Grisez which has had a decisive effect on my exercise of moral judgment. I think you will find it of interest:

Toward a Consistent Natural Law Ethic of Killing.

Good day to you.

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