To say “That’s person’s actions were damnable.”...would require something to compare it to, a reference, wouldn’t it? To me, that statement would be relative to that persons’ beliefs. Beliefs which differ between individuals.
Killing him is the object, and the result of an action. What if that person were drafted and did not want to go to war? That particular judgement, the reason for the decision to bomb, you speak of, is relative to the decisions and judgements made earlier by those in charge.
Is the mere act of being in an enemy army considered combatant? Does an enemy have to actually be in combat when it is ok to kill him, or is just being a member of the enemy military enough justification?
No, I'm speaking of the action, which is an objective thing. If it was a damnable action, it means that it is gravely morally wrong --- not matter anybody's opinoins--- AND if done under conditions of culpability, (knowledge and consent) it results, as it must, in moral condemnation.
"What if that person were drafted and did not want to go to war? That particular judgement, the reason for the decision to bomb, you speak of, is relative to the decisions and judgements made earlier by those in charge."
Again, no. The intent to stop somebody is not the same as the intent to kill somebody. Even a person who is clearly not personally culpable for his aggressive actions (e.g a seriously drunken/delusional man with a loaded shotgun, aiming at a group of toddlers) could be stopped by a sniper: this would not be murder if he died as a result. However, if the sniper just managed to shoot the shotgun out of his hand, the sniper would not be justified in subsequently pumping more lead into him and killing him: that would be murder.
I cannot go on with example after example. I've already burned my onion saute! :o/
Here's an article by Grisez which has had a decisive effect on my exercise of moral judgment. I think you will find it of interest:
Toward a Consistent Natural Law Ethic of Killing.
Good day to you.