Posted on 08/15/2004 6:58:27 PM PDT by Pharmboy
Mr. Williams is a student at the University of Washington and an intern at HNN.
Though a definite link has yet to be established (or publicized), it becomes more apparent with each passing day that the acts of terror on September 11 were undertaken by individuals belonging to or associated with the Al-Qaida organization. While the group has ties to the Taliban, the current ruling faction in Afghanistan, neither can really be considered a government, making war with either an unconventional one. Yet the United States is hardly unused to combating unconventional foes. While the Vietnam War and the "War on Drugs" may bear some parallels, perhaps the most germane historical example is the often forgotten war with the Barbary pirates in the early 19th century. This conflict, pitting the United States against a stateless enemy, was memorable for the use of careful diplomacy, coalitions, special military tactics, and, unfortunately, confused goals.
Barbary Pirate by John Rush
The pirates of North Africa, operating variously with or without the approval of the nominal rulers of Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, had long been a thorn in the side of the European powers. Even Britain, the rarely disputed ruler of the seas, paid tribute to these pirates. Due to Britain's payments, colonial American merchants were rarely accosted, but after the peace of 1783 ships flying the Stars and Stripes were seen as easy prey. Fortunately for our young, cash-strapped nation, unable either to pay tribute or protect shipping, Portugal declared war on Algiers in 1785, sending a fleet to patrol the Strait of Gibraltar and prevent the Corsairs from passing into the Atlantic. In 1793, the war ended and in the last three months of that year eleven American ships were seized. Unable to raise funds to pay the ransom for the crews, the American negotiator was compelled to borrow from a Jewish moneylender living in Algiers to pay the nearly million-dollar ransom.
During President Washington's administration, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson disagreed sharply over policy toward the Corsairs. Adams strongly favored paying off the pirates, arguing that a long and protracted war would financially ruin the young nation. Jefferson vehemently disagreed, appealing not only to an American sense of honor, but also to the notion that a single, decisive war might be more cost-effective than annual bribes for perpetuity. Not surprisingly, their subsequent administration policies reflected these beliefs. Adams was anxious to prevent conflict, and ensured payment of all demanded tribute. In addition, Adams even agreed to build and deliver two warships for the Algerian Corsairs. Since the Corsairs were considered more a force of nature than a foreign nation, the fact that this was contrary to the popular, "millions for defense, not one cent for tribute," attitude toward French demands for bribes, was rarely noted. Yet, frustrated during tribute negotiations with Tunis, negotiator William Eaton wrote home that, "there is but one language which can be held to these people, and this is terror."
In May of 1801, the Corsairs of Tripoli became restless and declared war on the United States, figuring they could increase their annual tribute. Their disorganized fleet passed into the Atlantic but was chased back by a recently dispatched American squadron. The Americans cruised the Mediterranean, evacuating American merchantmen and winning several engagements with the Corsairs. Later that year Sweden declared war on the Tripolitans and lent considerable support to the American blockade of Tripoli. The combined fleet of Swedish and American, and infrequently Danish, ships was unwilling to bombard the city until early 1802 when President Jefferson ordered that the war be pursued with greater vigor. Despite occasional bombardment, as the blockade continued, it became impossible for the large American ships to prevent some of the smaller, faster Corsair gunboats from slipping through. The Americans wanted to draw the pirates into a large decisive battle, but their attempts proved fruitless. When Sweden made peace that year, the blockade collapsed.
Following the abandonment of the blockade, a series of unfortunate incidents made the American position increasingly difficult. An American captain killed the personal secretary of the British governor of Malta in a duel, straining relations with that important source of respite and supply. In early 1803, an accidental explosion aboard an American ship killed nineteen men. In May of that year, a large squadron of American warships was assembled and proceeded to Tripoli to destroy the Corsairs' fleet entirely. Large guns protected the anchored fleet, but marines landed close to the walls of the city to set fire to many of the docked ships as they were pelted with stones from the towns inhabitants. However, a heroic group of Tripolitans endured bombardment from the squadron and small-arms fire from the marines and extinguished the fires.
In October of that year, a large U.S. man-of-war, Philadelphia, gave chase to a Corsair ship trying to break the blockade, but was lured into an uncharted reef. The ship was paralyzed and overtaken and put into the service of the pirates. The following February, eight marines sailed a small merchant vessel alongside the anchored Philadelphia, killed twenty Corsairs, and destroyed the warship without any loss of life of their own side. Upon hearing of the attack Admiral Horatio Nelson called it, "the most bold and daring act of the age." Yet the blockade remained largely ineffective.
Early in 1804, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies declared war on Tripoli, lending a number of small, maneuverable gunboats that were thought to be helpful in subduing the pirates. On August 3, the American-led force began an all-out attack, sailing into the harbor and bombarding the city at direct range. The Americans aboard the smaller gunboats decided to counter the pirates' standard technique and approached the enemy ships fast, boarding them and engaging in hand to hand combat. After destroying much of the town's fortifications, several gunboats, and a large mosque, the squadron withdrew.
Bombardment of the town achieving little besides massive civilian casualties, a change in strategy was in order. A small force of marines was sent to Alexandria, Egypt, to locate the original hereditary ruler of Tripoli, with the intent of restoring him to the throne. Upon finding him, they raised a mercenary army of Arabs and Greeks and began a several hundred-mile march towards Tripoli from the land. After a difficult march across the Libyan Desert and a bloody victory in the outlying town of Derne, the marines were informed by messenger that the war was over. The treaty that was signed guaranteed the return of American prisoners but changed little. The difficulties with the Barbary States, including a series of confrontations with Algiers in 1814-17, would continue until France brought the era to an end by invading and colonizing most of North-West Africa. Notably, Algiers in 1954 proved to be the forerunner to the type of war being waged against the United States today.
Hence, my heartfelt recommendation to simply "Kill 'em all and let God sort 'em out".
From the Halls of Montezuma
To the Shores of Tripoli;
We will fight our country's battles
In the air, on land and sea;
First to fight for right and freedom
And to keep our honor clean;
We are proud to claim the title
of United States Marine.
Our flag's unfurled to every breeze
From dawn to setting sun;
We have fought in ev'ry clime and place
Where we could take a gun;
In the snow of far-off Northern lands
And in sunny tropic scenes;
You will find us always on the job--
The United States Marines.
Here's health to you and to our Corps
Which we are proud to serve
In many a strife we've fought for life
And never lost our nerve;
If the Army and the Navy
Ever look on Heaven's scenes;
They will find the streets are guarded
By United States Marines.
The muslims used their sea power to raid Italy, Spain and France taking up to a million slaves.
My point in posting this was to show the similarities in their motivations based on their religious doctrine. I agree with your solution also...
Also, regarding "an identified power to deal with," if this develops into a low-grade but recognized world war, we would seek to compel the then leaders of Iran and Saudi Arabia to guarantee the peace -- just as the Bey of Tripoli was the signer of the two Treaties of Peace and Amity that were signed to end the war against the Barbary Pirates.
Congressman Billybob
Latest column, "Says the Wuss: Ma, He's Touching Me"
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We can have that in our new PC and sensitive wars...
worldnetdaily, 4/27/04
U.S. WAR AGAINST TERRORISTS GOES BACK TO FOUNDING FATHERS - (WorldNetDaily.com, 4/27/04) Most Americans probably think the Islamic terrorists declared war on the United States Sept. 11, 2001. Actually, it started a long time before - right from the birth of the nation. In 1784, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams and Benjamin Franklin were commissioned by the first Congress to assemble in Paris to see about marketing US products in Europe. Jefferson quickly surmised that the biggest challenge facing US
merchant ships were those referred to euphemistically as "Barbary pirates." They weren't "pirates" at all, in the traditional sense, Jefferson noticed. They didn't drink and they really weren't out to strike it rich. Instead, their motivation was strictly religious. They bought and sold slaves, to be sure. They looted ships.
But they used their booty to buy guns, ships, cannon and ammunition. Like those we call "terrorists" today, they saw
themselves engaged in jihad and called themselves "mujahiddin."
Why did these 18th-century terrorists represent such a grave threat to US merchant ships? With Independence from Great Britain, the former
colonists lost the protection of the greatest navy in the world. The US had no navy - not a single warship. Jefferson inquired of his European hosts how they dealt with the problem. He was stunned to find out that France and England both paid tribute to the fiends - who would, in turn, use the money to expand their own armada, buy more weaponry, hijack more commercial ships,
enslave more innocent civilians and demand greater ransom. This didn't make sense to Jefferson. He recognized the purchase of peace from the Muslims only worked temporarily. They would always find an excuse to break an
agreement, blame the Europeans and demand higher tribute.
After three months researching the history of militant Islam, he came up with a very different policy to deal with the terrorists. But he didn't get to implement until years later. As the first secretary of state, Jefferson urged the building of a navy to rescue American hostages held in North Africa and to deter future attacks on US ships. In 1792, he commissioned John Paul Jones to go to Algiers under the guise of diplomatic negotiations, but with the real intent of sizing up a future target of a
naval attack.
Jefferson was ready to retire a year later when what could only be described as "America's first Sept. 11" happened. America was struck with its first mega-terror attack by jihadists. In the fall of 1793, the Algerians seized 11 US merchant ships and enslaved more than 100 Americans. When word of the attack reached New York, the stock market crashed. Voyages were canceled in every major port. Seamen were thrown out of work. Ship suppliers went out of business. What Sept. 11 did to the U.S. economy in 2001, the mass shipjacking of 1793 did to the fledgling US economy in that year.
Accordingly, it took the US Congress only four months to decide to build a fleet of warships. But even then, Congress didn't choose war, as Jefferson prescribed. Instead, while building what would become the US Navy, Congress sent diplomats to reason with the Algerians. The US ended up paying close to $1 million and giving the pasha of Algiers a new warship, "The Crescent," to win release of 85 surviving American hostages.
It wasn't until 1801, under the presidency of Jefferson, that the US engaged in what became a four-year war against Tripoli. And it wasn't until 1830, when France occupied Algiers, and later Tunisia and Morocco, that the terrorism on the high seas finally ended. France didn't leave North Africa until 1962 - and it quickly became a major base of terrorism once again.
What's the moral of the story? Appeasement never works. Jefferson saw it. Sept. 11 was hardly the beginning. The war in which we fight today
is the longest conflict in human history. It's time to learn from history, not repeat its mistakes.
Thansk, snope. I searched the term "Barbary" and came up with a goose egg.
I don't think they understand that.
Regardless, given the opportunity, we should continue to hand out taxpayer funded Ass-whoopins every time.
At the same time you have to remember that one of the very first nations to recognize the brand new USA at the time of the American Revolution was the Ottoman Empire.
The Middle East is not a monolith.
Some of them may end up with a dirty nightshirt and half ownership in a camel. Others may end up with an oil well and a multimillion dollar reward for bringing in Moqtada Al Sadr's head.
I agree that this is a perfectly legal and Constitutional approach to the problem, and I'm mystified why we haven't pursued it. However, one issue I do have with the concept of issuing letters of marque and reprisal is that many vessels operated by privateers in the 18th and 19th Centuries rivaled the best of the men-o-war operated by the governments in that era. Indeed, many privateer vessels were constructed in the same yards that produced the USS Constitution, USS Ranger, USS Kearsarge, and other US-flagged vessels of the era. Today, I doubt that a private entity could successfully construct and operate any vessel equivalent to an attack submarine, aircraft carrier, or any capital ship. The capital outlay would be just too much, and any President foolish enough to authorize the deployment of nuclear ordnance by any private entity would be quickly impeached and forced out of office.
I would envision 21st Century privateers to be small, land-based units. I think the era of the sea-based privateer is over.
Also, regarding "an identified power to deal with," if this develops into a low-grade but recognized world war, we would seek to compel the then leaders of Iran and Saudi Arabia to guarantee the peace -- just as the Bey of Tripoli was the signer of the two Treaties of Peace and Amity that were signed to end the war against the Barbary Pirates.
I would add one more caveat - sanction those leaders if insurgencies targeting Americans cropped up, and immediately unseat them from power if the insurgencies continued and/or if it could be proven that they were aiding and abetting them.
I cheated. I used google ;-)
Ya beat me to it.
Sorry, one correction to my last - the USS Kearsarge wasn't constructed until 1862. I thought it was a Revolutionary War-era vessel; I was wrong.
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