Posted on 06/25/2022 1:07:51 PM PDT by Roman_War_Criminal
For generations, the mystery of what transpired at the Little Bighorn River on Sunday June 25th, 1876 has left both historians and amateur analysts miffed as to how a heavily decorated Civil War General who had the most astounding success (or luck) could have suffered to complete annihilating defeat at the hands of a stone-aged culture and 'uncivilized' force of 19th century barbarians.
Writers, authors, Military Veterans, even contemporary soldiers of the Boy General himself have not been able to completely grasp the outcome totally. This has been going on for generations. Lawrence Frost, E. Lisle Reedstrom, Cyrus Brady, President Theodore Roosevelt, Evan S. Connell, Robert Utley, and even Elizabeth Custer did their best to piece together the mystery of that infamous battle.
If you are looking for a good book on the battle - the best one I've ever read was written by Cyrus Brady written in 1904 and has multiple very controversial accounts of the battle from participants. It's a must have for any collector and LBH enthusiast.
https://www.amazon.com/Indian-Fights-Fighters-Bison-Book/dp/0803257430
Today, in memory of both sides of this highly contentious battle - I want to try to put together a concise timeline based on dozens of accounts - the source is here:
https://lbha.org/?p=45
And it's by far the most concise timeline I've ever seen in my years of reading/researching the battle.
What happened? Why didn't he retreat back towards Reno Hill after Yates' failed charge of the village? Was he cut-off before that point? Did he really think his ~ 600 troops could subdue a village as large as it was rumored to be? Why did he refuse the 4 companies of the 2nd Cavalry under Brisbin?
Brisbin called him an "Insufferable A$$" (Direct description by Major James Brisbin, 2nd Cavalry)
TIMELINE:
00:30am - 7th Cavalry breaks camp near Busby on a forced night march
02:50am - Lt. Varnum and his scouts arrive at the Crow's Nest Lookout
03:15am - Main column arrives at halt #1 on Davis Creek
03:40am - Two Crow scouts see Sioux Village for first time
04:00am - Varnum and scouts study the village in the valley of the Little Bighorn
05:00am - Varnum observes breakfast smoke at the halt #1 camp
05:20am - Varnum sends note to Custer who is still at halt #1
05:40am - Crow scouts observe two Sioux west of the Divide
06:20am - Varnum leads a sortie against the two Sioux
06:40am - Varnum loses sight of the two Sioux and returns to Crows Nest
07:10am - Crow scouts observe the two Sioux crossing the divide again
07:30am - Custer receives Varnum's note indicating the village has been spotted
08:00am - Custer and his personal scouts head toward the Crows Nest
08:45am - Command under Major Reno depart halt #1 camp and move toward the Crows Nest
09:00am - Custer's party arrives at the Crow's Nest and studies the valley
10:07am - Custer and scouts watched the command arrive at halt #2 camp on Davis creek for concealment
10:20am - Sgt. Curtis reports that he saw Cheyennes rummaging through the lost pack back near halt #1
10:30am - Custer and scouts are met by Capt. Tom Custer with this news
10:35am - Cheyennes spy on the 7th column at halt #2
10:50am - Officers call, Custer decides to attack.
11:45am - Command under Custer departs halt #2 camp down Davis Creek. The column is concealed by the nearby ravine about 1/4 mile east of the divide.
12:00pm - Command at halt #3; Custer assigns battalions.
12:12pm - Custer/Reno battalions left the divide half to descend to Reno creek. Benteen's battalion left the divide halt on an off-trail scout to the left.
12:32pm - Packtrain leaves divide on Custer's trail
13:20pm - Benteen's battalion arrives at upper No-Name Creek and turns down it. On the high ridge, Lt. Gibson observes the Little Bighorn valley empty. **He may not have been even looking at the LBH valley**
14:00pm - Custer-Reno battalions pass No-Name Creek. Scouts report Sioux in the LBH valley. Area is near the Lone Tepee.
14:15pm - Custer orders Reno to lead out at a trot past the Lone Tepee. Custer's battalion goes down the right side of Reno Creek.
14:17pm - Boston Custer trots ahead of the packtrain several miles back to catch up with Custer (He is the last poor soul to join the ill-fated battalion).
14:32pm - Benteen's battalion arrives at Reno Creek. They can see the packtrain 3/4 mile above. Boston Custer joins them.
14:37pm - Benteen's battalion reaches a location known as the morass to water his horses. Boston Custer trots on towards Custer.
14:43pm - Custer's battalion trots to the right of Reno. Scouts report Sioux alarming the village. Reno is ordered to charge by Lt. Cooke.
14:45pm - Boston Custer passes lone tepee
14:47pm - Reno's battalion crosses the left bank of Reno creek
14:51pm - Custer's battalion halts to water at North Fork
14:53pm - Reno's battalion crossed the to the left bank of the LBH river at ford A and waters horses then reforms. Sioux are observed far off ahead moving to attack.
14:55pm - Cooke leaves Reno to report to Custer
14:57pm - Benteen's battalion departs the morass as the packtrain arrives. Packtrain halts to water and close up.
15:01pm - Cook reports the Sioux are attacking Reno. Custer's battalion starts down right bank of the LBH river leaving Reno Creek
15:03pm - Reno's battalion starts charge down the left bank of the LBH River.
15:05pm - Reno's battalion observes Custer & scouts on the right bank bluff of the river
15:10pm - Pony captors leave Reno charge and go ahead of the column to capture Sioux herd.
15:12pm - Benteen's column walk past lone tepee
15:15pm - Sgt. Daniel Kanipe leaves for Capt. Benteen and the packtrain
15:17pm - Packtrain leaves the morass
15:18pm - Reno's battalion halts and forms skirmish line. Custer's battalion observed on the bluffs to the right and they disappear. Custer's column enters Cedar Coulee.
15:23pm - Custer's battalion arrives near bend of Cedar Coulee and halts
15:24pm - Custer and officers including Boyer leave to Weir Point
15:28pm - Custer's party arrives at Weir Point and see the village and Reno skirmishing
15:30pm - DeRudio supposedly sees Custer from the valley on Weir Point at this time
15:32pm - Packtrain passes Lone Tepee
15:33pm - Boston Custer passes Reno Hill. The Reno fight would have been visible for the next 5 minutes to him.
15:34pm - Trumpeter John Martin leaves Custer's battalion with the final message. Custer moves down towards Cedar Coulee
15:38pm - Martin meets Boston Custer at the head of Cedar Coulee
15:40pm - Martin observes Reno's battalion fighting in the timber.
15:41pm - Sgt. Kanipe meets Benteen's battalion with a verbal message from Custer
15:48pm - Packtrain meets Kanipe who had Custer's message
15:49pm - Boston Custer overtakes Custer's battalion at the mouth of Cedar Coulee with news that Reno has is retreating upstream and up the hills
15:56pm - Custer battalion starts down Medicine Tail Coulee
15:58pm - Benteen's battalion meets Trumpeter John Martin where they can hear firing.
16:00pm - Reno's battalion still in retreat across the LBH. Several scouts killed by this time.
16:04pm - Custer's battalion halted in Medicine Tail Coulee where Bouyer joins them
16:05pm - Herendeen's party is cut-off from Reno and hides in the timber along the LBH
16:06pm - Benteen observes Reno's men retreating for the first time
16:08pm - Yates' battalion (Companies F & E) separate down the Medicine Tail Coulee. Custer's battalion (Companies C, I, and L) move north out of the Coulee.
16:10pm - Reno's obliterated battalion assume Reno Hill and prepare defenses
16:15pm - Custer's battalion (C, I, L) arrive on Luce Ridge and halt in a defensive position
16:18pm - Yates' battalion (F & E) arrive at Ford B, light firing heard. Custer's battalion can see and hear the firing
16:20pm - Benteen reaches Reno Hill.
16:23pm - Yates' battalion arrives on the cutbank unopposed at Deep Coulee
16:27pm - Packtrain observes smoke several miles away. Custer's battalion leaves Luce Ridge and meets Yates downstream
16:30pm - Firing is first heard by Benteen & Reno's troops from Custer's troops
16:33pm - Yates' battalion is attacked on its flanks
16:38pm - Custer's battalion fired at Sioux on their left flank as they attempt to cross at Upper Deep Coulee
16:46pm - Yates' battalion on foot to reunion point. Custer joins Yates.
16:47pm - Reno returns from searching for Hodgson back on Reno Hill
16:52pm - Reno dispatches Lt. Hare to speed up ammunition mules
16:55pm - Cracking sounds of Custer's volleys prompts Capt. Weir to ask to move downstream.
17:05pm - Weir and D company depart Reno Hill in search of Custer. Heavy firing from Custer's battalion is notably diminished
17:10pm - Custer's last heavy firing heard from Reno Hill
17:22pm - Benteen departs Reno Hill with Companies H, K, and M to join Weir
17:25pm - Weir arrives at Weir Point and notes that Custer fight is over with just scattered firing three miles away
View from Weir Point:
17:47pm - Reno orders retreat with Sioux massing for an attack on Weir Point - they go back to Reno Hill. 1 loss in the retreat.
“...The Army had field trials in 1872 or 1873 and went to the US Springfield single shot rifle .45-70. IMHO, that was a bad move...” [Roman_War_Criminal, post 30]
The design of the M1873 rifle (aka “Trapdoor”) descended directly from the M1868 and M1870 rifles, which were reworked from the muzzleloader rifle-muskets left over in huge numbers, from the American Civil War. Designed by Erskine S Allin, chief engineer at the National Armory at Springfield, Massachusetts, the M1873 was selected as a less costly alternative to competing designs, of which the highly-praised Remington Rolling Block was the most prominent.
Historian Joe Bilby, widely recognized as an authority on small arms of the 1860s and 1870s, compared the Trapdoor and the Rolling Block and judged them equally good.
“Spencer Carbines were used in the Civil War.
The 7th should’ve had them at LBH...” [Roman_War_Criminal, post 31]
The Union Army did purchase large numbers of Spencer rifles & carbines during the American Civil War, but sold them off a rapidly as possible after 1865.
Orthodox military thinking of the day favored long range rifle fire, and the Spencer’s rimfire rounds were incapable of firing a suitably heavy bullet to the required range. The Henry rifle’s cartridges were even weaker.
No gunmaker succeeded in developing a repeater that could handle the 45-70 cartridge and pass all the grueling tests the military establishment required. Additionally, repeaters were much heavier than the single-shot rifles. Try hefting a Hotchkiss, a Keene, or a Winchester 1886 and see for yourself.
No European power of the time except Imperial Germany fielded a repeater, and the Germas (Prussians) chambered theirs (Mauser 71/84) for the much lighter 11.15x63Rmm cartridge.
A lot of Indians/Desperados had Henry’s at LBH.
I would argue that rate of fire and available ammo were a step up from a heavy bullet with longer range.
Spencer’s won the day at Beechers Island. Same with the Wagon Box Fight.
The Spencer’s range was about 500 yards and not bad at all.
Take into account the mounted infantry tactics of the day and it’s pretty clear the Springfields were probably not the best weapon to wield for Plains Indian Warfare.
YMMV however.
“Have read that Custer declined to take Gatling guns..too cumbersome...” [Bonemaker, post 41]
Take a trip to southeast Montana and walk the battlefield.
Gaze southeast, in the direction Custer and his troops had to ride from.
Much of the landscape is dissected by highly eroded clay hillocks, with many small gulches and draws. They are called “badlands:” very bad country to travel through. Men on foot have difficulty walking upright on the slippery clay, which in June is usually quite soggy (the rainy season in those parts is May/June). Very rough for men on horseback; impossible for horsedrawn artillery, which is how the US Army of that day regarded Gatling guns.
Trying to negotiate that route, the 7th Cav would never have got to the battlefield. Better, perhaps, for the troops who fell in battle, but likely fatal to Custer’s reputation. He was considered the foremost Indian fighter at the time.
“1866 and 1873 Winchesters were available but genius army brass were leery of ammunition consumption.” [Bonemaker, post 43]
Winchester lever actions could indeed pour out a heavy volume of fire for a few seconds, but they fired cartridges little better than those for revolvers - not “real battle rifle rounds” - closer to the 5.56mm rounds for the M16, that gun enthusiasts were pleased to sneer at well into the 1980s. And reloading their tube magazines is a thumb-busting chore, during which anybody armed with one is helpless.
The 45-70 far outranged the lever action cartridges.
Aside from ammunition wastage fears, the military doctrine of the day favored long-range rifle fire laid down by masses of troops. Reloading a single-shot was less of a chore, and your vulnerability doesn’t matter so much if you are part of a formation lined up for battle. Trained troops were expected to annihilate any hostile force armed with repeaters, long before they closed the range.
It’s easy to critique leadership of the day, based on more recent knowledge. Doesn’t mean it’s intellectually honest.
“...Spencer’s won the day at Beechers Island. Same with the Wagon Box Fight.
The Spencer’s range was about 500 yards and not bad at all...” [Roman_War_Criminal, post 63]
I looked up the reference for the range of the Spencer. Most of the webpage was a series of advertisements for Orlando area hotels. Not sure what the entire setup was driving at.
Quite apart from that, I’d never argue against the Spencer, as the best repeating long arm of the 1861-1865 period. An effective range of 500 yards does sound a bit optimistic for the rimfire rounds it chambered. I have seen several estimates of 300 yards as the effective range of individual fire from 58 cal rifle-muskets; just what was expected from the early 45-70 cartridges, I’m not certain.
Volley fire was supposed to afford greater ranges than individual fire. But - as you noted with the Wagon Box and Beecher Island engagements - it couldn’t do much if one side closed the range or ambushed the other.
I am attempting to point out that the senior leadership of the time rejected the hints that combat in ACW were pushing at them. In the late 1860s and early 1870s, the goal was more about saving money - rightly or wrongly. War Dept appropriations dropped from about $31,000,000.00 in 1865 to a bit over $700,000.00 the following year.
And it was a common-sense commonplace among the officer corps that if you put repeaters in the hands of troops, they’d fire off all their ammunition before getting close enough to do the job, thus stressing the supply lines beyond reason. The same argument was used against autoloading rifles, 50 years later. Doesn’t make any of it right, but that’s what people in charge thought.
Recall that in June 1876 the engagement at Plevna was still more than a year in the future.
Interesting. Thanks, off to do some reading on the subject.
The stuck case problem exists today with full auto weapons, although it is rare it does happen.
Like you, I was driving by...on a work trip. I had passed it on the way out to Washington, and decided to stop on the way back. I love visiting historical sites.
Earlier in the day, I had a meeting with a potential client, so I was wearing a skirt suit and high heels. I hiked up the trail in those high heels...to the great amusement of the park rangers. About 3/4 of of the way up to the best viewing site, I saw the signs warning about rattlesnakes. Figured I probably wouldn’t outrun a snake, but might be able to spike it with my shoes....lol.
I’ve heard that. The copper cases didn’t extract properly when the gun got hot. That, and they were formed more like a piece of Damascus steel, not drawn like modern cartridges. I think I remember reading that in Chris Kyle’s book “American Rifle”, or maybe somewhere else.
Don’t forget that G. A. Custer’s younger brother, Thomas Custer, was awarded the Medal of Honor twice for his actions during the Civil War.
Okay mate, at the Battle of Little Big Horn you take a trapdoor Springfield and I have dibs on a 44-40 1873.😀
“No gunmaker succeeded in developing a repeater that could handle the 45-70..”
No shoulders either...they weren’t making Limbsavers in those days.
The British fought the Zulu nation at the battles of Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift 3 years later on January 22 & 23, 1879. Dandyman mentioned that earlier.
In those cases there were claims about the copper cartridges used by the Martini-Henry rifles failing to extract after the barrel got hot after sustained fire.
I can see a comparison Isandlwana and Custer’s battalion fighting on an extended front and both getting over run and wiped out; while Rorke’s Drift and the Reno-Benteen positions being compact and more defendable. However, if the Zulus and the Sioux/Cheyenne had been willing to expend lives, I think both positions would have fallen. In both cases most likely due to the 2 units running out of ammunition. But I’ll leave that for speculation on another day.
And I still have visiting and walking the battlefield on my ‘bucket’ list.
BATTLE OF LITTLE BIGHORN: WERE THE WEAPONS THE DECIDING FACTOR?
Interesting read! Thanks
“...copper cases didn’t extract properly...formed more like a piece of Damascus steel, not drawn like modern cartridges...” [Hardastarboard, post 70]
Many different cartridge-case designs were tried in the period 1857-1900. Also many metallurgy methods and alloy combinations.
Problems with case extraction were evident from the start: the the first US-made cartridge revolver (Smith & Wesson’s No. 1, introduced 1857) fired the 22 Short, with a small powder charge and very low pressure. Fired cases bulged so badly that the cylinder refused to rotate. The design had to be modified, to incorporate a special disc behind the cylinder, which rotated along with it, to prevent bulged case heads from dragging on the standing breech.
The type of case you refer to was called a built-up or composite design: coiled brass inner layer, covered with copper foil or heavy cardboard, folded metal head like a shotshell, charge sealed inside waterproof paper. The British used these in 577 Snider (cartridge conversion of the muzzle-loading Enfield), early 577/450, and some other chamberings based on the latter.
Not sure if the US military ever used any built-up rounds.
Centerfire military cartridges issued in 1873 look pretty much like rimfire rounds, with a featureless flat face on the head. Priming compound was placed in a cup inserted from the case mouth and crimped from the outside, to hold it in place. The case metal - then copper - had to be thin enough and soft enough to deform when struck by the firing pin, limiting attainable pressure, which wasn’t terribly high by modern standards anyway. The system was developed by Stephen Vincent Benet in the late 1860s, when he was assigned to Frankford Arsenal (he was later Chief of Ordnance from 1874 to 1891).
This was also called “inside priming”. Cartridges made this way were produced in France until World War 2 at least.
The International Ammunition Association glossary. “Benet priming” is listed; also some other terms I could not recall clearly. Ought to clear up some of the confusion.
“...you take a trapdoor Springfield and I have dibs on a 44-40 1873.” [Bonemaker, post 72]
I’ll concede before we start. I’m too old and feeble to pick up a Trapdoor these days. Probably have trouble with a Winchester M1873; even in its carbine version, it weighed as much as the issue Trapdoor carbine.
Please recall that this very argument was used for years, against the 5.56x45mm cartridge chambered in the M16 family.
What it really points to is that there cannot be an infantry small arm that is ideal for each and every situation. Short-range high-rate-of-fire arms can be superior in urban environments and terrain with heavy undergrowth.
In open terrain, with attendant long sight distances and little cover, someone armed with a single-shot chambering a heavy, powerful cartridge can - if properly trained - take out an opponent armed with an arm chambering low power cartridge (either a 44-40, or one of today’s pistol-caliber carbines).
“Fascinating and thought provoking article. Addresses all our discussion points. Can’t attest to the research and scholarship behind it though it seems pretty solid.”
https://www.historynet.com/battle-of-little-bighorn-were-the-weapons-the-deciding-factor/?r [Bonemaker, post 75]
Pretty decent summary of many key points.
I kept hoping for an objective definition of “effective range.” The author seemed to use at least three different ones.
The most common definition from a military standpoint: “the maximum range at which hits can be expected.” It’s kind of fuzzy. How many hits, given repeated firing? One? Fifty? A hundred? Or is it the range beyond which the probability of obtaining a hit declines below a certain value?
It isn’t the range beyond which the bullet loses so much velocity that it can no longer cause serious wounds.
And it’s not solely an attribute of a specific cartridge. Rather, it’s very much a combination of cartridge, weapon, and operator. The 30-06 cartridge (30M2 153gr flat base military load) fired from the Garand rifle has an effective range of 600 yards. But when fired by a sniper from a suitable bolt-action rifle (say, a Winchester M70 Target model, 1963 vintage), it can deal serious injury beyond 1000 yards. And when fired in a burst from the M1919 Machine Gun, each single bullet can do serious damage well beyond that.
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