The Case Against Medical Marijuana

There are two fairly well-defined positions that have emerged regarding the issue, under consideration by the Supreme Court of the United States of America, of whether the use of marijuana should be legalized for the treatment of certain medical conditions.

The first of these sees marijuana's limited legalization as, in almost all cases, the effort of so-called "stoners" (in contemporary parlance people who pretty much can't live without getting high on marijuana on a daily basis) to find a way to circumvent existing laws that criminalize the use of wacky weed so that they (the stoners), with the consent of their croakers (q.v., below), can stay high all the time with impunity. Those who oppose passing laws which legalize the use of marijuana in "medically" sanctioned cases are seen by those who favor such laws' passage as inflexible obstructionists (scare quotes intended to emphasize the rather cynical view taken by opponents of legalization to the validity of the term "medical").

The term "croaker" is Beat-Generation slang for "doctor." I first encountered it in the writings of William S. Burroughs. Its meaning has since the 1950s been narrowed somewhat to denote a physician who stretches prescription medication guidelines to insure that his or her patients do not have to endure existential pain beyond what contemporary drug mediation can guarantee is acceptable. Under the proposed new laws, I can't imagine marijuana becoming anything — at least in California — but a substance any croaker would readily prescribe for patients with the same sort of substance cravings Burroughs and his cronies flaunted 50 years ago, and for which their croakers provided relief by prescribing opiates when heroin (Burroughs' drug of choice) was in short supply.

On the other side of this issue are those who favor the blanket legalization of medical marijuana. The "medical" umbrella seems to be providing, for people who would ultimately remove any restrictions whatsoever on smoking grass, something of an entry-level platform from which they might leverage across-the-board approval of the use of boo to ameliorate pretty much any condition that might create stress in any human who tends to respond to "stressful" situations by freaking out. All of this is to say that, where the use of marijuana is concerned, the currently-enumerated "medical" conditions are designed to protect a sub-class of American citizens from coping with their lives in traditionally accepted (read "pharmacologically unmediated") ways.

In fact, if such legislation is allowed by the Supreme Court to stand, it will become not much more than an excuse for a bunch of pot-smokers of every ilk to do what abusers of the Americans With Disabilities Act and their attorneys have done: find ways to twist and subvert and otherwise undermine legislation designed to provide succor to a class of American citizens who are legitimately entitled to government-sanctioned relief from their afflictions so that the legislation in question becomes the instrument, in this case, for a bunch of stoners "getting over" at the expense of American taxpayers, who will minimally be presented with the bill for legal fees in the lawsuits that result from potheads' bringing actions against the state if they are denied, for any reason whatsoever, funded access to the drug which has been the foundation of their lifestyles for, in many cases, the past several decades.

But these arguments beg the real question, which has to focus on the consequences for human brain chemistry and, subsequently, human behavior, of the overuse of psychotropic substances. A psychotropic substance is one which, when ingested and absorbed into the bloodstream, interacts directly with brain chemistry to alter moods and behavior. Psychotropic substances can dramatically change the way we feel and the way we respond to our environments. Psychotropic substances are all potentially addictive, and marijuana is most assuredly a psychotropic substance.

Let me backtrack a bit. Hundreds of substances — from the caffeine in coffee to the nicotine in cigarettes to the alcohol in "adult" beverages — that many of us routinely ingest are psychotropic. Add to these innumerable prescription drugs, from antidepressants to allergy medications to painkillers to stimulants, and you'll begin to get an idea of the range of "acceptable" psychotropic substances tens of millions of Americans consume on a daily basis. And I haven't even mentioned so-called "street" drugs, from ecstasy to cocaine to heroin to marijuana, that millions more Americans use on a more-or-less regular basis.

What no legislation, and no public policy that I'm aware of, has ever taken into account is the biochemistry of drug use. While physicians routinely prescribe drugs that have jarring effects on human brain chemistry, they also routinely fail to acknowledge or to advise their patients that such drugs, although often suppressing symptoms of everything from allergies to depression, at the same time alter brain chemistry in such a way that the humans taking the drugs become more and more dependent on them and that their bodies and psyches are consequently less and less able to mount natural responses to their conditions. In other words, the greater the degree to which you rely on any sort of psychotropic drug to mediate between you and the events of your life, the less "human" you become.

THC, the psychotropic ingredient in marijuana, substitutes for the brain chemical anandamide, which plays a role in such important functions as memory, mood, appetite, and pain perception (just in case you were wondering why stoners can't seem to concentrate, can't recall what's happened from one moment to the next, and need to be constantly resupplied with munchies). But while no one is arguing that marijuana might not play some role in mitigating certain types of pain, becoming an habitual marijuana user has other significantly damaging side effects, including lethargy, loss of motivation, inability to focus, the aforementioned memory lapses, and, after prolonged use, difficulty in experiencing pleasure, among numerous others.

Legislation which broadens the scope of acceptability of our use of psychotropic substances — no matter whether the substance be marijuana or Paxil, cocaine or Ritalin (Ritalin, for the record, interacts to disrupt brain chemistry in exactly the same way cocaine does) — is legislation that expands institutional authority over what we accept as "human." This is to say that legislation which expands the acceptability and the legality of using psychotropic substances for the purpose of helping us cope with the physical or psychological pain of existence is legislation which contributes, ultimately, to the disaffirmation of our humanity, of our ability to experience fully what it means to be human.

This is not to say that I don't favor, for instance, the use of painkilling prescription drugs to ease the suffering of those who are in the final stages of a terminal illness. The use of painkillers for the purpose of making bearable another human's last days on earth is to me not only an acceptable but even an honorable application of modern pharmacology. Nor do I object to the short-term use of prescription psychotropic substances in times of crisis, such as enabling someone to bear otherwise debilitating pain while recovering from physical or emotional trauma.

Rather, at issue here is the legitimization of what has been regarded as a "street" drug for the purpose of ameliorating the suffering associated (at least anecdotally) with certain medical conditions. (Indeed, the evidence that marijuana is effective in reducing physical pain among its users is totally anecdotal to my knowledge.) Further, the issue involves adding yet one more psychotropic substance to the list of such substances that can be legally used to reduce our humanness, our ability to build the natural strength to respond to the events and conditions of our lives without biochemical mediation. It is, finally, for this reason that I would argue against the legalization of marijuana use for medical purposes.

Writer Greg Lewis is co-author, with Dr. Charles Gant, of the Warner Books hardcover "End Your Addiction Now." Dr. Lewis is a frequent contributor of political and cultural commentaries to several websites. His next book, "The Politics of Anger: How Marxism's Heirs Are Redefining Liberalism in America Today," is due out in late Spring. Read more of his work at http://www.GregLewis.org

"To exclude that use as a valid exercise of the power. The expression of that intent is accompished by separating them with the term "rather than"."

No. You would either say "not" or you would say nothing.

The sun rises in the East. Or, The sun rises in the East, not the West.

That's how you exclude.

You don't say, The sun rises in the East, rather than the West.

"If the intent was to include either possible use expressing that intent would be accomplished by using the term "and", or some other term of inclusion."

I see. So I would say, For my vacation, I couldn't decide between Florida or California. I decided to go to Florida and California.

How about, For my vacation, I couldn't decide between Florida or California. I decided to go to Florida rather than California.

C'mon. Learn English.

"Would preventing the shipment of infected cattle to another state prevent an injustice?"

In my personal opinion, the prevention would cause an injustice. I have a right to ship my cattle, even if they're dead and rotting.

"Would it be considered "unjust" for someone to ship infected cattle to a stockyard, and thereby infecting healthy cattle that don't belong to them?"

Unjust? Everybody is doing it. They've been doing it for years. Why are you picking on me? Buyer beware!

"Would it discourage the interstate commerce in cattle if people were afraid to ship them for fear they might become infected in transit?"

Fear what? Infection? Screw it. Once I ship 'em, I'm done. I don't care if they get infected or not. I got my money.

So, there's your answer. The shippers don't care. Can Congress step in? Your turn.

tacticalogic wrote: you can produce no evidence to support such a grammatically convoluted interpretatation of this letter

rp wrote: It's how the clause is actually being used in the courts. I'd say that's pretty damn good evidence.

So Roe v Wade is good evidence for the interpretation that the Constitution protects the right to have an abortion?

Where's yours.

You have Marshall (who you cited as a Founding Father) in Willson v The Blackbird Creek Marsh Co.. He did not use the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine as it later came to be used. I've quoted his opinion, which you have chosen to ignore.

He said that although there may have been an abridgement of navigation, the Court had no authority to make such a determination nor to apply a correction unless Congress had acted on the matter first.

Your Dormant Commerce Clause contradicts Marshall's opinion. It was a later invention of the Court, just like Roe v Wade.

In your opinion, does the power to regulate commerce among the several states allow Congress to act for the positive purposes of the General Government, provided they act within the U.S. Constitution?

That question answers itself. Of course they have the constitutional power to do something "provided they act within the U.S. Constitution". That doesn't really clear anything up, though.

On the other hand, an Article I, Section 10 restriction just sits there and accomplishes what it it supposed to. For example, "No state shall coin money." Pretty clear. It accomplishes what it is supposed to without having to going to court.

No prohibition in the Constitution accomplishes anything by itself. It needs to be enforced, in one manner or another. Absent an enforcement mechanism, it's just words.

From The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition:

rather than

CONJUNCTION:And not: "Gibson guitars—with their carved tops and necks that are fitted and glued to the body, rather than bolted on—are expensive to make" (Joshua Rosenbaum, New York Times February 11, 1998).

PREPOSITION:Instead of: "diseases in which the immune system plays the villain rather than the protector" (Sandra Blakeslee, New York Times December 31, 1996).

_________________________________________

KJV Proverbs 8.10: Receive my instruction, and not silver; and knowledge rather than choice gold.

In my personal opinion, the prevention would cause an injustice. I have a right to ship my cattle, even if they're dead and rotting.

Apparently Congress thinks you don't have a right to if it's going to infect healthy cattle in the process.

Unjust? Everybody is doing it. They've been doing it for years. Why are you picking on me? Buyer beware!

Everybody does it, you say? There isn't a single cattle producer out there who is sending healthy cattle to market, who's product you're infecting and who's work you're corrpting with your dead rotting carcass? I seriously doubt it. Spare me the histrionics.

Fear what? Infection? Screw it. Once I ship 'em, I'm done. I don't care if they get infected or not. I got my money.

Well, that does sound like something you'd do, but the rest of the world doesn't operate like you do. Other people aren't done once they ship them. They have more cattle to raise and take to market. They can get top dollar for them if they're healthy, and rely on their reputations for producing healthy animals to keep buyers interested in bidding on them. If a cattle producer ships good quality, healthy animals to market expecting to get a good price for them, and they arrive sick and no one wants to buy them, he's going to have quite a different opinion than yours.

So, there's your answer. The shippers don't care. Can Congress step in? Your turn.

Sure Congress can step in. There's an obvious injustice to the producers who are producing and selling healthy animals, and to the degree that injustice is being caused through interstate commerce they can remedy it.

It's how the clause is actually being used in the courts. I'd say that's pretty damn good evidence. Where's yours?

Then if we started using it differently, that would be evidence of a different original intent. Your idea of "pretty damn good evidence" is actually logically flawed use of evidence that won't pass even a rudimentary validity check. No wonder you're having such a hard time with this.

My evidence is the remaining writings of the Founders on the subject. In every instance where they talk about the power to RCATSS, they talk about it as a means of preventing injustice among the states. They do not talk about any other use or purpose for that power. There is no evidence in any of the other writings to support the contention that it was intended for anything other than that.

"In every instance where they talk about the power to RCATSS, they talk about it as a means of preventing injustice among the states."

Some are specific, some talk in generalities. I agree that it can be used as a means of preventing injustice among the states. I have no problem with that. I never did.

I disagree that it can only be used for that purpose, however. And you cannot find one Founding Father who says that -- who limits the power to that one purpose.

"There is no evidence in any of the other writings to support the contention that it was intended for anything other than that."

Oh, puh-leeze!

I quoted Founding Father and United States Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall who said in an 1824 court opinion in "We are now arrived at the inquiry-What is this power? It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution."

This description of the power to regulate commerce among the several states speaks for itself. I see no limitation of "preventing injustices"!

This was in a USSC landmark case opinion by the Chief Justice of the USSC, also a Founding Father, written 5 years before Madison's private correspondence.

"There's an obvious injustice to the producers who are producing and selling healthy animals"

That's quite a stretch, isn't it?

After all, didn't Madison say the power was to be used "as a negative and preventive provision against injustice among the States themselves"? Where's the injustice by the state? Seems to me the injustice is being caused by the producer of unhealthy animals.

Didn't Madison also say that the injustice was the abuse of the power by the importing States in taxing the non-importing? He said nothing about unhealthy animals. There are many many references by Madison and other Founding Fathers that the abuses in question were due to state imposed taxes, tariffs, imposts, duties, etc.

Now, I agree that Congress may prohibit the interstate shipment of tainted or unhealthy beef. They did so in 1884, which was later upheld in Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913). But that had nothing to do with any perceived injustice between producers. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court:

"Our dual form of government has its perplexities, state and nation having different spheres of jurisdiction, as we have said; but it must be kept in mind that we are one people; and the powers reserved to the states and those conferred on the nation are adapted to be exercised, whether independently or concurrently, to promote the general welfare, material and moral. This is the effect of the decisions; and surely, if the facility of interstate transportation can be taken away from the demoralization of lotteries, the debasement of obscene literature, the contagion of diseased cattle or persons, the impurity of food and drugs, the like facility can be taken away from the systematic enticement to and the enslavement in prostitution and debauchery of women, and, more insistently, of girls."

Sounds to me as though Justice McKenna is talking about the positive purposes of the General Government.

In addition, in your favorite case, Hammer v Dagenhart, No. 704. Argued April 15, 16, 1918 June 3, 1918, Justice Day said in the opinion of the court:

"Articles heretofore barred and dealt with by this court have been such as could fairly be said to be "outlaws of commerce"; consequently all persons have been forbidden to ship them; the article itself is barred from commerce."

This was in a USSC landmark case opinion by the Chief Justice of the USSC, also a Founding Father, written 5 years before Madison's private correspondence.

This was in a USSC landmark case that was about an exercise of the power to RCATSS for preventing an injustice. That is the context of the comment. You yourself described it as a "vague reference" to some "broader power". There is the sum of your evidence from the founders. A single sentence, containing what you think is a vague reference to some broader power.

Are you trying to discern their original intent, or are you looking for "emanations and penumbras"? "Vague references" to "some broader power" falls squarely into the domain of emanations and penumbras.

Didn't Madison also say that the injustice was the abuse of the power by the importing States in taxing the non-importing? He said nothing about unhealthy animals. There are many many references by Madison and other Founding Fathers that the abuses in question were due to state imposed taxes, tariffs, imposts, duties, etc.

He did say that was an injustice, and that these injustices were the reason they considered giving the federal government the power to RCATSS. They also imagined that other "contrivances" might be implemented that would also constitute an injustice and should be dealt with by the same means. If Madison didn't say anything about unhealthy animals, which of the Founders did, that you enter this example into evidence?

"A single sentence, containing what you think is a vague reference to some broader power."

Actually, a single sentence, containing what is a clear reference to some broader power (ie., "This power ... may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations"). Yeah, "no limitations" sounds a lot to me like "some broader power".

But not to you.

Actually, yours is the single sentence, containing what you think is not only a narrow use of power, but restricted to that narrow use.

"This was in a USSC landmark case that was about an exercise of the power to RCATSS for preventing an injustice."

Yes it was. And as I've said time and time and time again, perventing injustice is certainly part of the power to RCATSS. Where does Founding Father and Chief Justice John Marshall limit the power to just that purpose?

He doesn't. He does just the opposite.

They did so in 1884, which was later upheld in Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913). But that had nothing to do with any perceived injustice between producers.

And what direct bearing does this opinion have on the intent of the Founders when they wrote and ratified the Constitution? On what basis do you assert that this opinion rendered in 1913 by others, be considered their opinion in 1787? You have Justice McKenna describing the use of the power to RCATSS for the "positive purposes of the General Government". Now, when you can find one of the Founders describing this same kind of use you will have evidence to support your reading of Madison's letter. Until you do, you don't have it.

"that other "contrivances" might be implemented"

Unhealthy animals are those other contrivances?

And here I read that as state imposed revenue generating measures other than taxes, tariffs, imposts, duties, etc.

So he was referring to diseased cattle, huh?

"If Madison didn't say anything about unhealthy animals, which of the Founders did"

Would you expect the Founding Fathers to be this specific when writing the U.S. Constitution? That if this document didn't contain the phrase "unhealthy animals", it didn't apply to them? You're being silly.

In Hammer v Dagenhart, Justice Day said, "Articles heretofore barred and dealt with by this court have been such as could fairly be said to be "outlaws of commerce"; consequently all persons have been forbidden to ship them; the article itself is barred from commerce."

Let's just put "unhealthy animals" in the "outlaws of commerce" category, shall we?

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