On the Freedom of the Will: Part II: Section I (Refuting Arminian Free-Willism)

Section I: Showing the manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in the Will's self-determining Power.

Having taken notice of those things which may be necessary to be observed, concerning the meaning of the principal terms and phrases made use of in controversies concerning human liberty, and particularly observed what Liberty is according to the common language and general apprehension of mankind, and what it is as understood and maintained by Arminians; I proceed to consider the Arminian notion of the Freedom. of the Will, and the supposed necessity of it in order to moral agency, or in order to any one's being capable of virtue or vice, and properly the subject of command or counsel, praise or blame, promises or threatenings, rewards or punishments; or whether that which has been described, as the thing meant by Liberty in common speech, be not sufficient, and the only Liberty, which make, or can make any one a moral agent, and so properly the subject of these things. In this Part, I shall consider whether any such thing be possible or conceivable, as that Freedom of Will which Arminians insist on; and shall inquire, whether any such sort of Liberty be necessary to moral agency, &c. in the next part. And first of all, I shall consider the notion of a self-determining Power in the Will: wherein, according to the Arminians, does most essentially consist the Will's freedom; and shall particularly inquire, whether it be not plainly absurd, and a manifest inconsistence, to suppose that the Will itself determines all the free acts of the will.

Here I shall not insist on the great impropriety of such ways of speaking as the Will determining itself; because actions are to be ascribed to agents, and not properly to the powers of agents; which improper way of speaking leads to many mistakes, and much confusion, as Mr. Locke observes. But I shall suppose that the Arminians, when they speak of the Will's determining itself, do by the Will mean the soul willing. I shall take it for granted, that when they speak of the will, as the determiner, they mean the soul in the exercise of a power of willing, or acting voluntarily. I shall suppose this to be their meaning, because nothing else can be meant, without the grossest and plainest absurdity. In all cases when we speak of the powers or principles of acting, or doing such things we mean that the agents which have these Powers of acting, do them, in the exercise of those Powers. So where we say, valor fights courageously, we mean, the man who is under the influence of valor fights courageously. Where we say, love seeks the object loved, we mean, the person loving seeks that object. When we say, the understanding discerns, we mean the soul in the exercise of that faculty So when it is said, the will decides or determines, this meaning must be, that the person, in the exercise of: Power of willing and choosing, or the soul, acting voluntarily, determines.

Therefore, if the Will determines all its own free acts the soul determines them in the exercise of a Power of willing and choosing; or, which is the same thing, it determines them of choice; it determines its own acts, by choosing its own acts. If the Will determines the Will then choice orders and determines the choice; and acts c choice are subject to the decision, and follow the conduct of other acts of choice. And therefore if the Will deter mines all its own free acts, then every free act of choice is determined by a preceding act of choice, choosing that act. And if that preceding act of the will be also a free act. then by these principles, in this act too, the will is self-determined: that is, this, in like manner, is an act that the soul voluntarily chooses; or, which is the same thing, it is an act determined still by a preceding act of the will, choosing that. Which brings us directly to a contradiction: for it supposes an act of the Will preceding the first act in the whole train, dieting and determining the rest; or a free act of the Will, before the first free act of the Will. Or else we must come at last to an act of the will, determining the consequent acts, wherein the Will is not self-determined, and so is not a free act, in this notion of freedom: but if the first act in the train, determining and fixing the rest, be not free, none of them all can be free; as is manifest at first view, but shall be demonstrated presently.

If the Will, which we find governs the members of the body, and determines their motions, does also govern itself, and determines its own actions, it doubtless determines them the same way, even by antecedent volitions. The Will determines which way the hands and feet shall move, by an act of choice: and there is no other way of the Will's determining, directing, or commanding any thing at all. Whatsoever the will commands, it commands by an act of the Will. And if it has itself under its command, and determines itself in its own actions, it doubtless does it the same way that it determines other things which are under its command. So that if the freedom of the will consists in this, that it has itself and its own actions under its command and direction, and its own volitions are determined by itself, it will follow, that every free volition arises from another antecedent volition, directing and commanding that: and if that directing volition be also free, in that also the will is determined; that is to say, that directing volition is determined by another going before that; and so on, till we come to the first volition in the whole series: and if that first volition be free, and the will self-determined in it, then that is determined by another volition preceding that. Which is a contradiction; because by the supposition, it can have none before it, to direct or determine it, being the first in the train. But if that first volition is not determined by any preceding act of the Will, then that act is not determined by the Will, and so is not free in the Arminian notion of freedom, which consists in the Will's self-determination. And if that first act of the will which determines and fixes the subsequent acts, be not free, none of the following acts which are determined by it can be free.-- If we suppose there are five acts in the train, the fifth and last determined by the fourth, and the fourth by the third, the third by the second, and the second by the first; if the first is not determined by the Will, and so not free, then none of them are truly determined by the Will: that is, that each of them are as they are, and not otherwise, is not first owing to the will, but to the determination of the erst in the series, which is not dependent on the will, and is that which the will has no hand in determining. And this being that which decides what the rest shall be, and determines their existence; therefore the first determination of their existence is not from the Will. The case is just the same, if instead of a chain of five acts of the Will, we should suppose a succession of ten, or an hundred, or ten thousand. If the first act he not free, being determined by something out of the will, and this determines the next to be agreeable to itself, and that the next, and so on; none of them are free, but all originally depend on, and are determined by, some cause out of the Will; and so all freedom in the case is excluded, and no act of the will can be free, according to this notion of freedom. If we should suppose a long chain of ten thousand links, so connected, that if the first link moves, it will move the next, and that the next; and so the whole chain must be determined to motion, and in the direction of its motion, by the motion of the first link; and that is moved by something else; in this case, though all the links, but one, are moved by other parts of the same chain, yet it appears that the motion of no one, nor the direction of its motion, is from any self-moving or self-determining power in the chain, any more than if every link were immediately moved by something that did not belong to the chain.-- If the Will be not free in the first act, which causes the next, then neither is it free in the next, which is caused by that first act; for though indeed the Will caused it, yet it did not cause it freely; because the preceding act, by which it was caused, was not free. And again, if the Will be not free in the second act, so neither can it be in the third, which is caused by that; because in like manner, that third was determined by an act of the Will that was not free. And so we may go on to the next act, and from that to the next; and how long soever the succession of acts is, it is all one: if the first on which the whole chain depends, and which determines all the rest, be not a free act, the Will is not free in causing or determining any one of those acts; because the act by which it determines them all is not a free act; and therefore the Will is no more free in determining them, than if it did not cause them at all.-- Thus, this Arminian notion of Liberty of the Will, consisting in the will's Self-determination, is repugnant to itself, and shuts itself wholly out of the world.

"Having taken notice of those things which may be necessary to be observed, concerning the meaning of the principal terms and phrases made use of in controversies concerning human liberty, and particularly observed what Liberty is according to the common language and general apprehension of mankind, and what it is as understood and maintained by Arminians; I proceed to consider the Arminian notion of the Freedom of the Will, and the supposed necessity of it in order to moral agency, or in order to any one's being capable of virtue or vice, and properly the subject of command or counsel, praise or blame, promises or threatenings, rewards or punishments; or whether that which has been described, as the thing meant by Liberty in common speech, be not sufficient, and the only Liberty, which make, or can make any one a moral agent, and so properly the subject of these things." ~ Jonathan Edwards

Here is the core portion of the sentence: "I proceed to consider the Arminian notion of the Freedom of the Will."

Woody.

OK Einstein. Why don't you explain, or translate, or paraphrase, or whatever, the first sentence of Mr. Edward's rant so that us stupid people can understand it.

(sigh!) Marlowe, stupid people by definition, CAN'T understand. i seriously doubt that you are one of them. Frankly, the sentences in the New Testament Greek are far more complicated than the Edwards excerpt that you posted earlier, yet it can be diagrammed. The Edwards Excerpt can be as well. While it might look as if it is the engineering drawings of the Starship Enterprise (NCC-1701E), it can be done. i had to diagram similar statements in Eighth Grade English (Spit!) classes.

Keep in mind that the language has changed Substantially since the Mid 18th Century, yet would have been perfectly comprehensible to somebody from that era. You are aware that there were no distractions from Radio, television, internet or even daily printed media for the great majourity of the people.

Yes, act of will and act of volition are the same thing. In fact, "act of will" makes the point even clearer.

Now, for libertarian free will to be true, the will's act in causing your legs to carry you to the kitchen cannot have been caused by something other than the will. That is, your will, by an act of will, caused itself to move your legs by an act of will. If act of will moving the feet was caused by something from outside the will, the desires of the heart (like we Calvinists claim) or genes or social conditioning or what have you, by definition we'd have determinism.

Understand so far?

I saw the important things to observe about the main terms and phrases used in the free will debate, especially what the ordinary usage of them is and what the Arminian usage is; then I considered the Arminian conception of free will and the supposed necessity of it for moral responsibility to exist, or whether the ordinary usage of "free will" is a better, or the only, justification for moral responsibility

Nice try AJ, but your translation needs another editing. The more I read of Mr. Edward's rant against Arminianism the more likely I am to conclude that it makes no sense because there's no sense there to make.

His sermons in which he sounds like an Arminian are much more clear and in need of no translation or paraphrasing. In the above essay I believe the he really had no idea what he was saying, and your paraphrase does nothing to clarify the matter.

But it was a nice try. Do you want to try in in English this next time?

(sigh!) Marlowe, stupid people by definition, CAN'T understand.

If stupid people can't understand it, then it is not worth understanding. Because at least half the population of the world has an IQ of less than 100. And if God made his gospel only for the intelligent to understand, then I suppose a sure sign of election would be an IQ over 120, eh? "Here, take this IQ test. If you score above 120, then you are clearly a chosen person."

Literary Genius is the ability to convey a profound message to an unsophisticated audience. Jesus is the prime example. Jesus did not speak in long run-on sentences. He spoke so that a child could understand, and yet his thoughts conveyed a message that cannot be contained in all the books in the world.

The Gospel message is simple. It is clear. One does not need run on sentences to explain it. Indeed, when Edwards is preaching a straight (Choose Christ) gospel message, he is easily understood. But when he attempts to disprove that which is not capable of being disproven as is shown above, then he comes off sounding like a man speaking in other tounges. And where there is no one around to interpret, that man ought to keep silent.

Here is the web site for Gerald's son-in-law Kurt Salerno's ministry, Church on the Street and his his wife, Lori Salerno's ministry Celebrate Life International

Both Lori and Kurt are being mightily used by God to reach the lost.

Gerald's older son Jerry is senior pastor of Columbia Community Church in Richland, WA and is being used by God there with his wife and three children.

They were all raised in a Church of God (Anderson, IN) pastor's home; certainly not Calvinistic by any stretch of the imagination.

Still trying for a flame bait post/thread removal tactic i see, forget it, not going to work, so get over it.

If stupid people can't understand it, then it is not worth understanding.

Non Sequitur. Nuclear Physics can't be understood by stupid people, yet i seriously doubt that you would dispute it's importance and inherent worth.

Because at least half the population of the world has an IQ of less than 100. And if God made his gospel only for the intelligent to understand, then I suppose a sure sign of election would be an IQ over 120, eh? "Here, take this IQ test. If you score above 120, then you are clearly a chosen person."

So, the entire population of the world has been IQ tested? If so, by what measure, Stanford-Benet, Guilfoil 120? Second: you have set an invalid condition. You don't know who God has made His Gospel for, aside for the corporate term "The Elect". If the conditional clause is invalid, the conclusion is nonsense.

You have set up another straw man conditional. Who told you that Edwards didn't convey his message to the masses? In light of the vast amount of reading over the ages, i would strongly suggest that his message was assimilated and comprehended...even by those with public school education.

The Gospel message is simple. It is clear. One does not need run on sentences to explain it.

You've obviously never read New testament Greek, LOL. The Gospels are FULL of what you call "run-on sentences". That is simply the nature of the language. As was the nature of Mid 18th Century English (Spit!)

Indeed, when Edwards is preaching a straight (Choose Christ) gospel message, he is easily understood. But when he attempts to disprove that which is not capable of being disproven as is shown above, then he comes off sounding like a man speaking in other tounges. And where there is no one around to interpret, that man ought to keep silent.

So, on the basis of mere exerpts of sermons that Edwards preached, you are making a general conclusion about The validity of Edwards' Theology, and absolving yourself from the necessity of considering his arguments. Not a bad gig if you can get it, but not intellectually or Spiritually honest either.

Your analogy falls apart if I have to go to the kitchen to answer the phone. I didn't want to get up. - Corin Stormhands

Opponents to Edwards' determinism respond as follows. First, defining free choice as "doing what one desires" is contrary to experience. For people do not always do what they desire, nor do they always desire to do what they do - Norman Geisler (From post #25)

I suggest you read Part I of Edward's treatise. When the phone rang, you had two desires: to remain seated, and to answer the phone. Your preference was to answer the phone. Therefore, your will acted in following your strongest inclination. If remaining seated had been your preference, you wouldn't have gotten up.

In every decision of the Will, the strongest desire is always followed. That was Edwards point in Part I. Here is a short excerpt:

...in every act of will there is an act of choice; that in every volition there is a preference, or a prevailing inclination of the soul, whereby, at that instant, is out of a state of perfect indifference, with respect to the direct object of the volition. So that in every act, or going forth of the will, there is some preponderation of the mind, one way rather than another. And the soul had rather have or do one thing, than another, or than not to have or do that thing; and that where there is absolutely no preferring or choosing, but a perfect continuing equilibrium, there is no volition. - Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, Part I, Section I, "Concerning the nature of the will"

I did not say that the will is not free. But as with all freedoms, it has its limitations. Being able to accept or reject the Gospel of Christ is not one of those limitations. God grants sufficient grace to men to make a knowing decision and allows them the free will to do it. It does not diminish God's sovereignty if he sovereignly grants to men that ability. He gives men the ability to do lots of things. How does that subtract from his sovereignty?

You can claim that God gives men the grace to make a "knowing decision" (although your claim is in conflict with Scripture, which declares: "1 Corinthians 2: 14 -- But a natural man does not accept the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him; and he cannot understand them, because they are spiritually appraised."). You can claim that Man has a free will for the making of decisions (no objection from this corner).

All of which does the Arminian System not a bit of good, as the Bible remains ADAMANT that so long as a Man remains Spiritually Dead, that Man will always Reject God (Romans 8:5-8) -- for he still hates God, and so rejecting God is what he wants to do.

As long as a Man remains Spiritually Dead, he will always reject God.

Now, I have a question: it seems to me that the Arminians think it fundamentally "unfair" that Scripture commands all men everywhere to Repent, when at the same time Scripture teaches us that no man ever will Repent unless he is first Regenerated by the Holy Spirit. So here is my question:

God commands all men everywhere to obey the Law of God perfectly. Yet even the Arminian will admit that NO man who comes into the world in an Unregenerate state (which is all men except Jesus) will ever obey the Law of God perfectly -- Unregenerate Men are 100% certain to commit Sin, and indeed they enter the world with one Sin (Original Sin) already upon their account! Yet the Arminian does not think it "unfair" that God commands all men everywhere to obey the Law of God perfectly -- even though He knows that, being Unregenerate, they will not!!
So if God is not "unfair" to command all men everywhere to obey the Law of God perfectly -- even though He knows that, being Spiritually Dead, they will not obey; why, then, do Arminians consider it "unfair" of God to command all men everywhere to Believe on Jesus and Repent unto Him -- even though He knows that, while they remain Spiritually Dead, they certainly will not Believe and Repent??

Anybody have an answer for me?

***You have set up another straw man conditional. Who told you that Edwards didn't convey his message to the masses? In light of the vast amount of reading over the ages, i would strongly suggest that his message was assimilated and comprehended...even by those with public school education.***

I read Edwards in High School. I hated it, and him, but had no problem understanding what I read. That's one reason I hated it, and him. Of course, I was an Arminian back then. I had good reason to hate Edwards and make up any stupid excuse to discount it, and him.

Eventually I grew up. Now, like thoughtful men everywhere, I consider him America's greatest preacher and read his stuff frequently. It is vastly more satisfying than the sour milk preached from most modern day pulpits.

Woody.

Opponents to Edwards' determinism respond as follows. First, defining free choice as "doing what one desires" is contrary to experience. For people do not always do what they desire, nor do they always desire to do what they do - Norman Geisler (From post #25)

People do not always do what their primary desire is, but it is usually for reasons of consequences.

In that case the secondary desire is to avoid the consequences of choosing the first desire, so they act in accordance with the desire that will cause the least pain and therefore relatively more pleasure.

Human desire can be summed up as pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain. Where the primary desire might bring great pleasure, it also may bring gret pain, due to consequences.

To say that one does not always do what one desires is to ignore the reason for not choosing that desire, even though it is wanted. That reason is in itself a desire.

Therefore the will is always predicated on desire.

I don't think I understand the relevance of Corin's objection. Since they don't put implants in your brain making you get up whenever the phone rings, you yourself clearly have an act of will to do it. You seem to be objecting to the soft determinist (Calvinist in this context, although there are soft determinists who aren't Christian) case that the desires rather than the will cause choices, but this is off topic from Edwards' argument, which is an examination of libertarian free will. So I'll just note that a soft determinist would answer that you desire to listen to the phone keep ringing and/or miss a potentially important call even less than you desire to get up and answer it.

So, back to the argument. We have, first of all, what you can call the first level act of will, to make your legs carry you to the kitchen, and we've seen that for libertarian free will to be true, this first level act of will must not be caused by anything outside the will. So it's caused by the will itself, and when the will causes something, by definition we have an act of will. So you could call it a second level act of will. Now the question is, where does the second level act of will come from? If it's caused from outside the will, we get some form of determinism. I suppose you could posit that it has no cause, but then you'd both give it a traditional title of God (the Uncaused Cause), and abandon libertarian free will, since it would mean people act on random urges that have no connection to anything you could call a "self" or a "character" (it's not clear either term would make sense anymore) and which we are powerless to resist. In other words, you'd have hard determinism.

So, if you want to have libertarian free will, the second level act of will must itself be chosen by the will; we now have a third level act of will. Obviously, the same analysis applies to the third level act of will, and any more you might add. The acts of will go back in an infinite regression.

Since you yourself had a beginning, and your choice to go to the kitchen an even more recent one (when the phone rang, for instance), you haven't had time for an infinite number of acts of will. One of the acts of will was the initial link in the chain. Where did this first one come from? A choice made by the will? Ah, but this contradicts the idea of the initial act of will being initial, since a choice made by the will is the definition of what an act of will is. But you need a source within the will to have libertarian free will. Ruinously for the libertarian free will position, any attempt to find one either contradicts the idea of an initial act of will, or abandons it altogether for the infinite regression. In order for the chain to get started, then, something must have given the will direction from outside.

And now I've given you the argument as best I can (I've expanded it a little from Edwards' version too), so have at it.

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