[Corin Stormhands]

If act of will moving the feet was caused by something from outside the will, the desires of the heart (like we Calvinists claim) or genes or social conditioning or what have you, by definition we'd have determinism.

Your analogy falls apart if I have to go to the kitchen to answer the phone. I didn't want to get up.

[SoliDeoGloria]

Your analogy falls apart if I have to go to the kitchen to answer the phone. I didn't want to get up. - Corin Stormhands

Opponents to Edwards' determinism respond as follows. First, defining free choice as "doing what one desires" is contrary to experience. For people do not always do what they desire, nor do they always desire to do what they do - Norman Geisler (From post #25)

I suggest you read Part I of Edward's treatise. When the phone rang, you had two desires: to remain seated, and to answer the phone. Your preference was to answer the phone. Therefore, your will acted in following your strongest inclination. If remaining seated had been your preference, you wouldn't have gotten up.

In every decision of the Will, the strongest desire is always followed. That was Edwards point in Part I. Here is a short excerpt:

...in every act of will there is an act of choice; that in every volition there is a preference, or a prevailing inclination of the soul, whereby, at that instant, is out of a state of perfect indifference, with respect to the direct object of the volition. So that in every act, or going forth of the will, there is some preponderation of the mind, one way rather than another. And the soul had rather have or do one thing, than another, or than not to have or do that thing; and that where there is absolutely no preferring or choosing, but a perfect continuing equilibrium, there is no volition. - Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, Part I, Section I, "Concerning the nature of the will"