September 22, 2008
Democrats Try to Hijack the So-Called "Bailout"
Hatched by Dafydd
Republicans see the collapse of the mortgage market as a potential catastrophe that requires emergency measures... but an aberration caused by government intrusion into the market, not an indictment of capitalism and free markets.
Democrats see it as proof positive that capitalism has been proven to be a fad that will soon pass away, like pet rocks... and a golden opportunity to reintroduce failed liberal fascist economic policies straight out of the platforms of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Jimmy Carter.
Which George W. Bush will show up... the veto-wielding Bush with a spine that we've seen in Democratic spending legislation after the 2006 elections -- or the wimpy, appeasing Bush that we've seen in legislation on racial preferences, Israeli-Palestinian "negotiations," and Republican spending prior to the 2006 elections? The choice will spell the difference between a small-footprint intervention or a massive repudiation of decades of progress on free-market economics.
But first, let's again talk about how we got into this mess.
Subprime mortgages, securitization, and toxic assets
This is the crux of the crisis: Back in the cretaceous period, when a bank or S&L issued a mortgage, it held that mortgage until the borrower paid it off. But in the contemporary era, what starts out as a mortgage is typically bundled with other mortgages into a "mortgage-backed securitie" (MBS) -- essentially bonds that can be traded on the open market. Bizarrely, in the process, bad debt automagically becomes good investment.
How are MBSs created? Let me quote from an excellent sumary in a newsletter by John Maudlin (free registration required):
Let's jump back 18 months. I spent several letters going over how subprime mortgages were sold and then securitized. Let's quickly review. Huge Investment Bank (HIB) would encourage mortgage banks all over the country to make home loans, often providing the capital, and then HIB would purchase these loans and package them into large securities called Residential Mortgage Backed Securities or RMBS. They would take loans from different mortgage banks and different regions. They generally grouped the loans together as to their initial quality as in prime mortgages, ALT-A and the now infamous subprime mortgages. They also grouped together second lien loans, which were the loans generally made to get 100% financing or cash-out financing as home owners borrowed against the equity in their homes.
Typically, a RMBS would be sliced into anywhere from 5 to 15 different pieces called tranches. They would go to the ratings agencies, who would give them a series of ratings on the various tranches, and who actually had a hand in saying what the size of each tranche could be. The top or senior level tranche had the rights to get paid back first in the event there was a problem with some of the underlying loans. That tranche was typically rated AAA. Then the next tranche would be rated AA and so on down to junk level. The lowest level was called the equity level, and this lowest level would take the first losses. For that risk, they also got any residual funds if everyone paid. The lower levels paid very high yields for the risk they took.
Then, since it was hard to sell some of the lower levels of these securities, HIB would take a lot of the lower level tranches and put them into another security called a Collateralized Debt Obligation or CDO. And yes, they sliced them up into tranches and went to the rating agencies and got them rated. The highest tranche was typically again AAA. Through the alchemy of finance, HIB took subprime mortgages and turned 96% (give or take a few points depending on the CDO) of them into AAA bonds. At the time, I compared it with taking nuclear waste and turning it into gold. Clever trick when you can do it, and everyone, from mortgage broker to investment bankers was paid handsomely to dance at the party.
So what started as mortgages -- ranging from very secure prime mortgages, which are doing fine, to lousy subprime mortgages for too much money to borrowers who really didn't have either the credit history or income to justify such loans, many of which are currently in default 60 days or more -- were, by the magic of "securitization," turned into bond-like securities; and in the process, many of the bad and even defaulted loans were transmaugrified into AAA-rated investments.
The banks and other financial institutions that securitized mortgages (and resecuritized already securitized MBSs) would make their nut by skimming some percent, typically fifty basis points (0.5%), off the loan rate; thus, if they began with a package of mortgages at 6.5% (they tried to bundle like with like), they would securitize them into an MBS that paid 6%, keeping the difference -- and hoping there would be few enough defaults that the mortgages would produce more than 6% net.
What happens when loans are defaulted is very complicated and not really germane to this post; they created different tiers, or "tranches," with different ratings -- AAA down to junk -- for different prices, that distributed the losses from worst tranch up to best. Not important here.
But defaults, of course, are where the whole pyramid scheme broke down. While housing prices continued to rise, everybody was happy and there were few defaults. But starting a couple of years ago, when the housing bubble burst and the mortgage default rate shot up, a bunch of banks found themselves holding very insecure securities, losing money hand over teakettle. The crash began among the lenders and spread to secondary markets (the MBSs and CDOs) and even tertiary markets (insurance underwriters like AIG). In short order, institutions all over the world found themselves holding pieces of paper whose value was impossible to determine -- which are referred to as toxic assets.
Toxic assets are illiquid, meaning they cannot be bought or sold because nobody knows how much to offer for them; they are frozen. If you hang onto them, they might regain some value later... or they could disappear completely. Worse, illiquid securities see their ratings drop; and current law forbids some types of funds from holding anything but AAAs... which means they may be forced by law to sell -- but unable to sell because of illiquidity!
Not only that, but current law also requires that such securities be "marked to market," meaning they must be valued at the last price offered by some institution that was desperate to sell -- because of the law in the previous paragraph. Thus, even institutions that didn't have to sell their toxic assets had to reprice them; this meant that a number of financial institutions suddenly did not have sufficient reserves for the amount of loans or leveraging they had out. That meant they needed to get hard cash and fast... which meant they would have to panic-sell a bunch of securities, precipitating a new round of re-rating and re-valuating.
Eventually, nobody had a clue what anything was worth anymore; and nearly every financial institution in the world, it seems, was involved up to the fourth cervical vertebra in this mess.
It was that uncertainty that caused the mortgage market to collapse. It's like trying to buy a car when all you can see is a grainy photo in a newspaper: You can't test-drive it, inspect it, or even kick the tires. You don't even know whether it contains an engine... how can you possibly make any kind of offer whatsoever?
Worse yet, the seller has never seen the car either, and he knows no more about it than you!
So what is to be done? Obviously, since the problem is the inability to set a value for these instruments, which makes them impossible to buy or sell (illiquid), the solution is to find a way to value them. Enter the Paulson-Bernanke emergency rescue plan.
Treasury presses the reset button
As proposed by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson and Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke, the putative "$700 billion" "bailout" is actually neither: It will neither cost that much, nor will it bail out those financial institutions that wrote bad loans for people they knew were not likely to be able to pay them off.
As I understand it, here is the basic plan. Note that I'm drawing this from many sources, it's not yet written in stone -- or even in ink -- and I can't give you sources. If you want more information, you're on your own! But here is what I've been able to glean:
- The Treasury is given authority to spend up to $700 billion (outstanding at any particular moment) to buy MBSs, CDOs, and related instruments that have become "illiquid." These "toxic assets" will be purchased from their current owners at a huge discount... meaning the banks and other investors who purchased these pigs in pokes will, in fact, take a significant financial hit... they're not being "bailed out."
So the Treasury can buy up these toxic assets; what do they do with them?
- I believe the plan (which has not yet been formalized in legislation) is to create a Treasury owned and managed resolution corporation that will take ownership of these toxic assets. Analysts will then pore through each MBS, determining the status of all the underlying mortgages and making a report publicly available. This will make the opaque assets completely transparent. All the financial fundamentals will be visible, so analysts at private companies can examine all of the securities and decide how much they would pay for each.
- The resolution corporation will then auction off each of the the now-transparent MBSs, selling it to the highest bidder; that very action allows the market to reset the value of the security.
That is why I characterize this rescue operation as "pressing the reset button."
Once some corporation has examined the fundamentals of the security and offered the winning bid for it, the MBS becomes (by definition) liquid; it is no longer a toxic asset. Its value has been reset... and it can go up or down after that point based upon subsequent, well-understood events (defaults, repayments, prepayments) in the underlying mortgages and reevaluations based upon other, market-based criteria. In other words, it becomes just like a mutual fund.
The crisis was the inability to value MBSs; the solution is to reset their values. The beauty of the Paulson-Bernanke plan is that this resetting is done by the free market, not by government decree.
Finally, note this point:
- When the Treasury-owned resolution corporation auctions off the now-transparent MBSs, it can use that money as income. Since the asset is now much more valuable than before (having been scrubbed into transparency), if it becomes saleable, then it will certainly sell for more than the discounted rate at which the corporation bought it. In other words, the resolution corporation will make a profit on every security it resells -- so the program will not actually cost $700 billion... it may even end up completely in the black.
That's why the Paulson-Bernanke plan is neither a bailout -- the so-called beneficiaries in fact must pay dearly for their folly -- nor massively expensive, since it resells most of the securities it bought, and at a profit. It could still end up costing money, depending on how many of the MBSs end up still toxic even after the complete report (if too many of the underlying mortgages are in default, for example); but the losses won't be anywhere near $700 billion, and they may be less than the profits.
Democrats: fingers in the pie, finger in your eye
But the loyal opposition is not content to use the Paulson-Bernanke emergency mortgage-market rescue plan to rescue the mortgage market from the current emergency; how dull that would be, especially in an election year. Rather, they see America's crisis as their opportunity to enact or re-enact by extortion every awful, failed, thoroughly discredited, socialist-populist scheme they have tried, or always wanted to try, over the past century. Senate Democrats demand:
- Contingent stock in every, single company that sells its toxic assets to the resolution corporation; this would give the federal government a degree of ownership of virtually every bank, savings and loan, or other financial institution in the entire country. It is liberal fascism at its purest, and it would lead directly to much greater government control of private capital.
- They demand that bankruptcy judges be allowed to rewrite the terms of the underlying mortgages, in order to "provide direct assistance to homeowners caught in the foreclosure crisis"... in other words, to allow people who took out loans much too big for houses they could not afford to nevertheless keep those houses, even though they cannot make the payments. All at the expense of financial institutions that are teetering at the brink as it is.
- Democrats demand "limits on the pay of top executives whose firms seek help." That is, Congress would set the salaries and bonuses of executives working at companies that are in serious trouble because of the mortgage meltdown... and that's always worked out so well in the past!
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They also have structural demands:
The 44-page Senate proposal, pulled together by Senator Christopher J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut and the chairman of the banking committee, would require the Treasury to run the rescue plan through a new "Office of Financial Stability" to be headed by an assistant treasury secretary. It would also establish an "Emergency Oversight Board" to monitor the bailout effort, made up of the Fed Chairman, the chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission; and two non-government employees with "financial expertise" in the public and private sectors, one each appointed by the majority and minority leadership in Congress.
In addition, the Senate proposal would require monthly reports to Congress, rather than the biannual reports that would be required under the Bush administration’s proposal.
This sounds like an invitation to micromanagement -- and unless I miss my guess, the "Emergency Oversight Board" will somehow end up stuffed with former members of the Clinton administration and/or Barack H. Obama's campaign, like Franklin Delano Raines, James Johnson, and Jamie Gorelick... the same people who ran Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into the ground and ran many of the very multinationals that offered subprime loans, hedge-funds and other derivatives, or that insured these toxic assets, thus creating the crisis in the first place.
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While former Clintonista (and now Charlie "Tax Ducker" Rangel's lawyer) wants the Democrats to go even further:
Barack Obama has tried to run as a unifying centrist. Now it may be time for him to clear the fog and talk, walk and sound like a true FDR liberal -- reminding the American people that at times like this, the government is a friend, not an enemy, contrary to conservative theology. Indeed, now may be the time for him and the Democratic Congress -- urged on as recently as Thursday by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson -- to take the next 30 days to enact something reminiscent of FDR's first 100 days. It should be more than just a $700 billion bailout. It should also include billions to help homeowners avoid foreclosure, to assist the auto industry, to upgrade the nation's infrastructure, and to spur development of alternative energy sources.
One can always trust Democrats to find a way, in any crisis, to throw gasoline at the bull.
President Bush (and the upcoming President John S. McCain) must remain stalwart and demand an up or down vote on a clean version of the Paulson-Bernanke rescue plan... no add-in spending, no wage and price controls or upgrading the nation's infrastructure, and specifically, no damned earmarks.
Anything less than this standard of rectitude and disinterested statesmanship would be an economic betrayal of America... and must lead to electoral ruin for any party which puts immediate self-gratification ahead of national economic survival.
Hatched by Dafydd on this day, September 22, 2008, at the time of 4:23 PM
