If I had been in charge of that targeting, I would have targeted the Japanese 16th Army Headquarters in Kyushu. Wiping them out would have conclusively demonstrated the power of the bomb, decapitated the leadership of the forces defending Kyushu, and if we had to invade there, dramatically reduced the Japanese resistance.
But the Air Force aimed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, at civilians and at our POWS in those cities (not to mention wiping out most of the Japanese Christian population in Nagasaki).
From wiki
“The Target Committee nominated five targets: Kokura (now Kitakyushu), the site of one of Japan’s largest munitions plants; Hiroshima, an embarkation port and industrial center that was the site of a major military headquarters; Yokohama, an urban center for aircraft manufacture, machine tools, docks, electrical equipment, and oil refineries; Niigata, a port with industrial facilities including steel and aluminum plants and an oil refinery; and Kyoto, a major industrial center. The target selection was subject to the following criteria:
The target was larger than 4.8 km (3 mi) in diameter and was an important target in a large city.
The blast wave would create effective damage.
The target was unlikely to be attacked by August 1945.[73]
These cities were largely untouched during the nightly bombing raids, and the Army Air Forces agreed to leave them off the target list so accurate assessment of the damage caused by the atomic bombs could be made. Hiroshima was described as “an important army depot and port of embarkation in the middle of an urban industrial area. It is a good radar target and it is such a size that a large part of the city could be extensively damaged. There are adjacent hills which are likely to produce a focusing effect which would considerably increase the blast damage. Due to rivers it is not a good incendiary target.”[73]
The Target Committee stated that “It was agreed that psychological factors in the target selection were of great importance. Two aspects of this are (1) obtaining the greatest psychological effect against Japan and (2) making the initial use sufficiently spectacular for the importance of the weapon to be internationally recognized when publicity on it is released. ... Kyoto has the advantage of the people being more highly intelligent and hence better able to appreciate the significance of the weapon. Hiroshima has the advantage of being such a size and with possible focussing from nearby mountains that a large fraction of the city may be destroyed. The Emperor’s palace in Tokyo has a greater fame than any other target but is of least strategic value.”[73]
Edwin O. Reischauer, a Japan expert for the U.S. Army Intelligence Service, was incorrectly said to have prevented the bombing of Kyoto.[73] In his autobiography, Reischauer specifically refuted this claim:
... the only person deserving credit for saving Kyoto from destruction is Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War at the time, who had known and admired Kyoto ever since his honeymoon there several decades earlier.[74][75]
Extant sources show that while Stimson was personally familiar with Kyoto, this was the result of a visit decades after his marriage when he was governor-general of the Philippines,[76] not because he honeymooned there.[77][78] On 30 May, Stimson asked Groves to remove Kyoto from the target list due to its historical, religious and cultural significance, but Groves pointed to its military and industrial significance.[79] Stimson then approached President Harry S. Truman about the matter. Truman agreed with Stimson, and Kyoto was temporarily removed from the target list.[80] Groves attempted to restore Kyoto to the target list in July, but Stimson remained adamant.[81][82] On 25 July, Nagasaki was put on the target list in place of Kyoto. It was a major military port, one of Japan’s largest shipbuilding and repair centers, and an important producer of naval ordnance.”
This sounds similar to the issues raised about the firebombing of Dresden.
Germans had actually been urging family members to Dresden in the belief that it would never be destroyed. (The Americans, it was explained to them, are simply too much into the arts to ever allow that city to be bombed.)
That comment so stupid.
The reason for the targeting was made clear. The targeting of current targets was to maximize the physiological impact on the Japanese leadership
War ends when one side loses the will to fight. It not some magical disagreement between adults that can be solved by hugs and kisses
Grow up child
Just stop lying for once
Negative!
It "smelled" of not wanting to waste our precious atomic bombs on low-value targets - namely: cities that had already been ravaged by conventional bombing!
Regards,
RE: Why not target the Japanese 16th Army headquarters in Kyushu?
This issue was raised during a lecture by World War II historian Victor Davis Hanson. I’ll try to summarize what I understood from his response to the question…
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were chosen because they were ideal demonstration targets—intact, militarily significant cities whose destruction could be clearly measured—while Kyushu’s 16th Army headquarters did not meet the criteria the Target Committee and Truman relied on.
The choice was driven by military logic, psychological impact, and technical constraints, not by a desire to maximize civilian casualties.
The Target Committee emphasized that the atomic bomb’s effects had to be scientifically observable and psychologically shocking. That meant:
The city had to be large, densely built, and mostly undamaged so the blast and fire effects could be unmistakable.
The target needed military or industrial value, not a purely civilian area.
The bomb had to be dropped visually, requiring predictable weather and geography.
Hiroshima was described as the “largest untouched target” still functioning as a military center. As for Nagasaki… it was not the first choice—it was used only because cloud cover prevented bombing Kokura.
Your idea—destroying the Kyushu command structure before an invasion—sounds strategically compelling. But it I think it fails the criteria the U.S. planners actually used.
Kyushu was already heavily bombed and militarily dispersed
By mid‑1945, U.S. firebombing had devastated much of Japan’s urban and military infrastructure. Tokyo was “practically rubble,” and Kyushu’s major cities had also been hit. A dispersed headquarters or partially destroyed city would not provide the clear, dramatic demonstration the bomb was intended to produce.
A military HQ—even a large one—would not fill that area. The Target Committee insisted on a dense urban zone so the bomb’s power would be undeniable.
The Interim Committee explicitly stated the goal was to make a “profound psychological impression on as many of the inhabitants as possible.”
Destroying a headquarters—even a major one—would not have produced nationwide shock. Japan had already lost many headquarters to conventional bombing and STILL refused to surrender,
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were mixed military-industrial cities, not purely civilian:
Hiroshima housed the Second Army Headquarters, responsible for defending southern Japan.
It contained major military supply depots and industrial plants.
Nagasaki was a major shipbuilding and arms-production center.
The U.S. did not select “civilian cities” in the abstract—they selected military cities that were still intact enough to demonstrate the devastating power of the atomic bomb.
Truman and team believed Japan would fight to the last man, as seen at Iwo Jima and Okinawa.
The bomb was intended to:
Force immediate surrender
Avoid an invasion expected to kill hundreds of thousands of Americans and millions of Japanese
Demonstrate overwhelming power to Japan and the Soviet Union
A tactical strike on Kyushu’s 16th Army would not have achieved these strategic goals. Unfortunately, many innocent people had to die to save the lives of EVEN MORE innocent people. In life, we are not given easy choices…
You will find it below for your edification and education.
Read this carefully as it may save your life or the life of a relative or friend. In the next few days, some or all of the cities named on the reverse side will be destroyed by American bombs. These cities contain military installations and workshops or factories which produce military goods. We are determined to destroy all of the tools of the military clique which they are using to prolong this useless war. But, unfortunately, bombs have no eyes. So, in accordance with America’s humanitarian policies, the American Air Force, which does not wish to injure innocent people, now gives you warning to evacuate the cities named and save your lives. America is not fighting the Japanese people but is fighting the military clique which has enslaved the Japanese people. The peace which America will bring will free the people from the oppression of the military clique and mean the emergence of a new and better Japan. You can restore peace by demanding new and good leaders who will end the war. We cannot promise that only these cities will be among those attacked but some or all of them will be, so heed this warning and evacuate these cities immediately.