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That Donald Trump as follow through on his threat to impose additional 25% sanction on India to discourage it importing Russian oil, implies that the president has concluded that Vladimir Putin requires additional incentives to conclude a piece deal.

It is the view of many that the condition on the ground is such that time is running out for Ukraine. It's asserted that Russian advances that heretofore had been minimal and expensive, have now become enveloping maneuvers that threatened to catastrophically break the Ukrainian line. It is assumed that Ukraine is running out of manpower and Russia, although short of equipment, has ample manpower reserves.

The counterargument is to the effect that inflation in Russia is at 9% forcing interest rates to 18% with shortages of consumer goods already apparent on shop shelves. There are reported shortages of petrol in given areas. Russian banks are under extreme pressure because of failed loans, partially due to high interest rates, and the ruble has now come under pressure. The Russian national budget is largely dependent on the sale of oil and the quantity of oil and the profits have been reduced either by way of sanctions or by way of decaying infrastructure. Unemployment is on the rise. Russian cash reserves are dissipating.

So assuming – these facts indicate that Trump's tariffs against India (notably not against China) are necessary for Ukraine's survival, will they avail? Will Russia again find alternative buyers, presumably China? Will other possible sanctions be effective, presumably regulations against ships transporting Russian oil?

The answers to these questions require us to a state of knowledge that we do not have, principally the actual state of the vulnerability of the Russian economy, and the power of Ukraine to hold on.