Posted on 03/27/2025 3:13:37 PM PDT by marcusmaximus
Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested exploring the establishment of an interim administration in Ukraine supervised by the UN and several nations to hold elections.
"In order to hold democratic elections there, in order to bring to power a viable government that enjoys the people's trust. And then begin negotiations with them on a peace treaty, sign legitimate documents that will be recognized throughout the world and will be reliable and stable," Putin said while speaking with the sailors of the Arkhangelsk submarine.
The Russian leader stated that this process would open the way to legitimate negotiations to resolve the Ukraine conflict.
(Excerpt) Read more at breakingthenews.net ...
Ok, but back to my question. Since there is no way in hell Putin is giving back that 20% what is the expectation here? Z is going to have to cut a deal or the people of Ukraine are going to have to remove him.
Baha was first with the news. And Putin’s crazed video with the crazy eyes rolling in all directions while he was making his temporary administration debut plea is all over Twitter now.
Taking the lever of power from one criminal enterprise and handing it to another criminal enterprise. Who’s the winner in that?
That's only because a blithering biased idiot that has never grasped Russia's territorial war objectives:
1) To liberate Donetsk and Lugansk.
2) To build a land bridge from Crimea to mainland Russia.
3) To dominate the Black Sea coastline and assure control over the Black Sea.
All of that, minus a small liberating a small remaining part of Donetsk has been achieved.
A dishonest propagandist like you wants to move the goalposts and claim Russia wants or wanted all of Ukraine.
It’s up to President Trump really. And Putin’s game playing and delays are starting to annoy President Trump who has a lot on his plate right now.
How about UN interim governance of Russia?
From GROK:
Did Russia initially think it could conquer the entirety of Ukraine?
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, there’s evidence to suggest that the Kremlin believed it could achieve a swift and decisive victory, potentially conquering the entirety of Ukraine or at least forcing a rapid capitulation of its government. This assessment is based on several factors from that period.
First, Russian military strategy appeared to prioritize a blitzkrieg-style operation, with forces advancing toward Kyiv from multiple directions, including Belarus, in an apparent attempt to decapitate the Ukrainian government within days. The deployment of lightly armed paratroopers to seize key locations like the Hostomel airport near Kyiv, combined with reports of assassination lists targeting Ukrainian leadership (as claimed by Ukrainian and Western officials), points to an expectation of quickly toppling President Volodymyr Zelensky’s administration.
Second, the scale and speed of the initial operation—spanning a front from Kharkiv in the east to Kherson in the south—suggests Russia aimed to overwhelm Ukraine’s defenses before significant resistance could organize. Analysts have noted that Russia’s early troop deployment, estimated at around 150,000 to 190,000 personnel, was substantial but insufficient for a prolonged occupation of a country Ukraine’s size (over 600,000 square kilometers) without anticipating a quick collapse of resistance.
Third, statements from Russian leadership and state media at the time framed the “special military operation” as a limited effort to “denazify” and “demilitarize” Ukraine, implying confidence that these goals could be met without a drawn-out conflict. Kremlin rhetoric also suggested a belief that parts of Ukraine’s population, particularly in Russian-speaking regions, might welcome or at least not resist occupation—a miscalculation that became evident as resistance stiffened nationwide.
However, it’s less clear whether Russia’s ultimate goal was to annex all of Ukraine or simply install a puppet regime while seizing key territories (e.g., the east and south). Some military experts argue the initial force size and logistics setup were inadequate for a full conquest and occupation, hinting that Russia may have banked on psychological shock and political collapse rather than a sustained military campaign across the entire country.
By late March 2022, as Ukrainian forces stalled Russia’s advance and Western aid began flowing, Russia shifted focus to consolidating gains in Donbas and the south, suggesting the initial grand ambition—whether total conquest or regime change—had overestimated Russia’s capabilities and underestimated Ukraine’s resolve. So, while Russia likely thought it could dominate Ukraine rapidly at the outset, the evidence doesn’t definitively prove it planned to govern every inch of it long-term; the plan seemed more about breaking Ukraine’s sovereignty fast and hard.
So what went wrong for Russia?
Russia’s initial plan in Ukraine unraveled due to a combination of strategic miscalculations, operational failures, and unexpected Ukrainian resilience. Here’s a breakdown of what went wrong:
1. **Underestimating Ukrainian Resistance**: Russia assumed Ukraine would fold quickly, either due to internal division or lack of will to fight. This was a massive misread. Ukrainians, regardless of region or language, rallied around their government and military. Zelensky’s decision to stay in Kyiv and his public defiance galvanized national morale, while grassroots efforts—like civilians making Molotov cocktails—disrupted Russian expectations of a passive population.
2. **Overestimating Russian Military Capability**: The Russian armed forces looked formidable on paper, but reality exposed deep flaws. Corruption had hollowed out logistics and readiness—troops ran out of fuel, food, and ammo within days. Equipment was poorly maintained; breakdowns of tanks and vehicles clogged advance routes. The initial force of roughly 150,000-190,000 was spread too thin across a vast front, lacking the numbers for a decisive blow or sustained occupation.
3. **Intelligence Failures**: The Kremlin seemed to rely on faulty assumptions fed by its own echo chamber. Reports suggest the FSB (Russia’s security service) assured Putin that Ukraine’s leadership would collapse and that pro-Russian sentiment would ease the invasion. Instead, intelligence overestimated Russian sympathizers and underestimated Ukraine’s military reforms since 2014, which had produced a more capable, NATO-trained force.
4. **Logistical Nightmares**: Russia’s supply lines were a mess from the start. Long, vulnerable convoys—like the infamous 40-mile column north of Kyiv—got bogged down by fuel shortages, ambushes, and muddy terrain (exacerbated by the spring thaw, or “rasputitsa”). This left frontline units stranded, unable to sustain momentum or retreat effectively.
5. **Tactical Blunders**: The early push relied on speed over preparation. Airborne assaults, like at Hostomel, aimed to seize key points but were repelled by dug-in defenders. Russian commanders failed to coordinate air, ground, and artillery effectively, leaving units exposed. The focus on Kyiv diverted resources from consolidating gains elsewhere, stretching forces thin and allowing Ukraine to counterattack.
6. **Western Response**: Russia didn’t anticipate the speed and scale of Western support. Sanctions crippled its economy, while weapons like Javelin anti-tank missiles and later HIMARS systems turned the tide on the battlefield. NATO’s unity and intelligence-sharing (e.g., satellite data) gave Ukraine an edge Russia couldn’t match.
7. **Morale Collapse**: Russian troops, many conscripts or poorly briefed, weren’t prepared for a real war. Reports of desertions, surrenders, and intercepted calls home showed plummeting morale as they faced fierce resistance and high casualties—estimated at 15,000+ dead by mid-2022, per Western figures, rivaling Soviet Afghanistan losses in a fraction of the time.
By late March 2022, Russia abandoned its Kyiv thrust, retreating in disarray from northern Ukraine. The shift to Donbas revealed a Plan B born of necessity, not foresight. In short, Russia bet on a quick knockout, but Ukraine’s grit, Russia’s own incompetence, and global backlash turned it into a grueling slugfest.
Yes, Pres Trump is not happy with Putin right now. But there is an issue with Z that has not been overtly discussed. Given that significant “issue”, Trump will never fully side with Z. I suspect you know what I am referring to... and I won’t go into it further.
Post a X-Twitter link, and then we can all see, so as not to just take your word. Thx.
It’s all a mess.
What could go wrong?
Zelensky changed that overnight. It can easily be remedied.
Gender, however, is often discussed as a social construct—how people identify, express themselves, or are perceived culturally. Some argue this means there are more than two genders, pointing to identities like non-binary, genderfluid, or others recognized in various societies and historical contexts.
GROK on NPR:
Its editorial standards aim for neutrality, and it’s broken stories critical of both sides, like Obama’s drone strikes or Biden’s border policies. Conservatives argue the bias isn’t in lies but in what’s omitted—say, underreporting on illegal immigration’s economic costs. Liberals counter that NPR reflects reality’s complexity, not a right-wing echo chamber’s talking points.
You speak with the fluidity of a libtard.
Musk, for example, has argued on several occasions that Democrats have “imported” voters, claiming last month that the Biden White House was “pushing to get in as many illegals as possible” to unlawfully vote in last year’s presidential election. He also claimed that noncitizens have been voting, repeatedly making the assertion on social media.
Asked if Democrats imported immigrants to vote in the U.S., Grok has stated in part that “there’s no solid evidence that Democrats have systematically imported immigrants to vote in U.S. elections. Claims like this often stem from political rhetoric, but voting by noncitizens in federal elections is illegal, rare, and heavily penalized — think fines, jail, or deportation.”
From GROK:
What are the top 10 most fun things to do for residents of Kazan, Russia?
Here’s a list of the top 10 fun activities for residents of Kazan, Russia, tailored to local interests and the city’s unique offerings. These activities blend cultural exploration, outdoor recreation, and entertainment options that residents can enjoy regularly:
1. **Stroll Along Bauman Street**
Kazan’s lively pedestrian street is a hub of activity with shops, cafés, street performers, and historic charm. Residents can enjoy a casual walk, grab a coffee, or listen to buskers any day of the week.
2. **Visit the Kazan Kremlin**
A UNESCO World Heritage Site, the Kremlin offers free entry to its grounds, where locals can explore the Kul Sharif Mosque, Annunciation Cathedral, and stunning views of the Kazanka River—perfect for a relaxing outing.
3. **Relax at Millennium Park**
This green space, built for Kazan’s 1,000th anniversary, is ideal for picnics, leisurely walks, or just unwinding amidst fountains and sculptures, making it a favorite for residents year-round.
4. **Splash at Riviera Aquapark**
One of Russia’s largest water parks, Riviera is a go-to spot for fun with its slides, pools, and saunas. It’s a great escape for families or friends, especially during Kazan’s hot summers or cold winters.
5. **Explore Tatar Culture at the Chak-Chak Museum**
This interactive museum offers a tasty dive into Tatar traditions with tea and chak-chak tastings. Residents can book a tour to enjoy a cultural experience that’s both educational and delicious.
6. **Bike or Skate Along the Kazanka Embankment**
The scenic embankment is perfect for cycling, rollerblading, or a sunset stroll. With bike rentals available, it’s a popular spot for active residents to enjoy the riverfront.
7. **Catch a Game at Kazan Arena**
Home to local football team Rubin Kazan, this stadium hosts exciting matches and events. Residents can cheer on their team or enjoy the vibrant atmosphere during sports season.
8. **Step Back in Time at the Soviet Lifestyle Museum**
A quirky, interactive museum where locals can try on Soviet-era clothes and play with retro items. It’s a nostalgic and entertaining way to spend an afternoon.
9. **Day Trip to Sviyazhsk Island**
Just 58 km from Kazan, this historic island town offers a peaceful getaway with its monasteries, wooden architecture, and natural beauty—ideal for residents seeking a quick escape.
10. **Enjoy Local Festivals**
Kazan hosts events like the Karavan Festival (May), Muslim Cinema Festival (September), and opera or jazz festivals. These celebrations give residents a chance to enjoy music, food, and community spirit.
These activities reflect Kazan’s blend of Tatar and Russian cultures, its modern amenities, and its historic charm, offering residents a mix of fun, relaxation, and local pride. Whether it’s a daily ritual or a weekend adventure, there’s plenty to keep life exciting in this vibrant city.
Not wishing the UN on anyone, but what is good for the goose is good for the gander.
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