Damage assessment was at its infancy during World War II. Before the Normandy invasion in June 1944, detailed and reliable ground information describing the extent of damage done to Germany’s industrial base by the combined allied bomber offensive was not generally available.
Strategic operations, such as the Schweinfurt raid of 1943, used aerial photographs to determine the effectiveness of its various bombing campaigns. "Bomb" damage was assessed in two distinct phases: preattack and postattack analysis. In preattack analysis, the function of an industrial system was established.
This analysis featured collaboration between photo-interpreters and industrial engineers, allowing for an appraisal of both the area and locations of the industrial system and the functional components of the system. This process was a precursor for any subsequent damage assessed against a particular target. The postattack analysis summarized the damage from the bombing strikes in a damage interpretation report.
From this report, options to reattack, feasibility of reattack, and the degree of production loss were assessed. The meager beginnings of a damage assessment cell called the Allied Central Interpretation Unit created the art and science of battle damage assessment.
The information available to the allies on the effect of bombing German industrial systems was derived primarily from aerial photography and supplemented with interrogations of prisoners of war (POWs), and friendly agents working behind enemy lines.
To justify the tremendous effort spent by the allies in both blood and treasure, and to validate the US Army Air Forces strategic bombing doctrine, on-the-spot investigation of the targets was required to assess the final results. The strategic bombing missions, by their very nature, were flown great distances behind enemy lines.
As a result, actual damage could not be verified by allied ground forces until after the territory had been captured, delaying the ground truth verification of the bombing by weeks, months, or even years.
Following Robert McNamara's 1940 - 1942 involvement at Harvard Business School - in a program to teach analytical approaches used in business to officers of the United States Army Air Forces - he entered the USAAF as a captain in early 1943, serving most of World War II with its Office of Statistical Control.
One of his major responsibilities was the analysis of U.S. bombers' efficiency and effectiveness, especially the B-29 forces commanded by Major General Curtis LeMay in India, China, and the Mariana Islands. McNamara established a statistical control unit for the XX Bomber Command.
The Unknown World War II in the Northern Pacific
Only vessels under Soviet flag, manned by Soviet crews, carried out the entire USSR-bound Pacific shipping. Just as it was stated in the Report of the People’s Commissariat of External Trade: “Soviet steamers, exclusively”.
There were no convoys. The vessels sailed across the ocean one by one without any escort, although many historians and officials still write about “Pacific convoys” in their publications.
In accordance with the Lend-Lease Agreement, American and Canadian shipyards performed repair work on the Soviet vessels. Some 30 Soviet fishing and factory ships of People’s Commissariat of Fishing Industry were repaired under this program, and always returned home with Lend-Lease cargo aboard.
During 1941–44, the Japanese Navy and Coast Guard stopped and detained Soviet transport ships 178 times for periods from several hours to several months. Submarines of the combatant states patrolled the area. The great sea battle of Komandorsky Islands took place near the routes of Soviet vessels.
A total of 23 Soviet ships were lost in the Pacific Ocean. Of those, nine were stranded on the rocks by storms, crushed by ice floes or blown in Soviet minefields. The remaining 14 were destroyed either by enemy action or friendly fire.
Heavy B-29 “Superfortress” bombers operated from the airfields of western China against military and industrial facilities in Manchuria and Japan. On July 29, 1944, one of them landed at the Soviet air base near Vozdvizhenka village in Primorye region.
Colonel (then-Major) Solomon Reidel of VVS, ferried the interned B-29 to Moscow. Under the personal order of Josef Stalin, the aircraft was fully disassembled and reverse-engineered into the Tu-4, the first Soviet long-range bomber with nuclear-carrying capacities. The work was performed under supervision of famous plane designer Andrey Tupolev.
Two other “Superfortresses” followed suit in November. Another battle-damaged B-29 crashed on the slopes of Sikhote-Alin mountain ridge. The crew bailed out over taiga, and wandered in the woods in separate groups for nearly a month. Eventually everyone was rescued by the combined efforts of crewmembers, local indigenous people and the VVS (Soviet Air Force).
All interned Americans were sent across Siberia to Uzbekistan, to a remote camp near Tashkent, which was established specifically for them. From there the NKVD staged four “escapes” of the internees across the border to Iran, then to the British occupation zone south of Tehran, and eventually to the USA. 291 American airmen returned home this way.
Vladivostok was Off Limits to all western allies during World War II. U.S. Naval Intelligence officers attempted to get to, and explore around, Vladivostok, but all failed at gathering (1 succeeded in getting to Vladivostok).
IMHO: Japanese transportation of raw materials from Korea to Japan, was effectively sheltered by Russian "neutrality" throughout all of World War II, until August 1945 - despite some successful U.S. Navy submarine operations in the Sea of Japan.
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