All of these men, General MacArthur, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Major General Curtis LeMay, and Fleet Admiral William Halsey Jr. had pieces of information in common, plus pieces of information by their own findings, plus tactical and strategic ideas - some being in common and others not in common.
In addition, they all had a lot of post-war ideas about occupied territories and what to do about those, plus technical and strategic planning, plus development of the U.S. Air Force and how the Army and the Navy would relate thereto - including how much power each military branch should have, and use when necessary. The Navy in particular, being a bit envious, wanting to be able to deliver atomic bombs to targets.
All the above, going into the last half of World War II and what might follow.
These are examples of what would be on their minds, when they spoke - in public and in private. Their thoughts went back and forth, sometimes mildly, sometimes with a bit of vigor.
Going into the summer of 1945, all these men viewed the atomic bomb as a tactical weapon - a way to deliver tonnage of bombardment more efficiently: A handful of B-29’s versus a wing of many B-29’s carrying several bombs, each.
Effectiveness and efficiency of bombardment delivery was on the minds of the command structure, given the daunting problem of ground invasion of Japan combined with efforts to interrupt Japan’s.
Regarding the matter of the right thing to do: It was simply, finish the war as soon as possible with lower numbers of casualties. That, was what convinced President Truman to give the order.
The world was blessed, that the demonstration of what would happen by using the atomic bomb, occurred at the end of the war - a lesson for all to not start nor engage in “an atomic war.”
“given the daunting problem of ground invasion of Japan combined with efforts to interrupt Japan’s”
Corrected:
given the daunting problem of ground invasion of Japan combined with efforts to interrupt Japan’s ability to support itself.
Add to that the complete dulling of any moral sense caused by the decision to deliberately target the residential sector of Tokyo because houses would burn faster and more surely than factories. In fact they tested the incendiary bombs on mock-ups of Japanese homes.
https://djvu.online/file/KtnX8nIBruuA2
Oh and there were, in addition to the one million plus civilians, also a handful of small factories. And maybe some of the civilians worked from home.
Before we begin, Gentlemen, please arrange your armchairs in a circle...